Stanley Smith v. Mike Beebe , 123 F. App'x 261 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-1864
    ___________
    Stanley Smith, as Executor for the   *
    Estate of Jenny Smith, Deceased,     *
    *
    Appellant,        * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    v.                              * District of Arkansas.
    *
    Mike Beebe, Arkansas State Attorney *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    General; State of Arkansas,          *
    *
    Appellees.        *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 14, 2005
    Filed: February 22, 2005
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Jenny Smith lived in an Arkansas nursing home. In September 1993, she was
    not properly secured in her bed and fell, causing head trauma and other injuries that
    led to her incapacity for several months. Jenny died in December 1994. A year later,
    Stanley Smith, executor of Jenny’s estate, brought a medical malpractice lawsuit
    against the nursing home. An Arkansas state court held the lawsuit was barred by the
    two-year medical injury statute of limitations. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(a)
    (Michie 1993). The court also held the one-year tolling provision for persons “who
    had been adjudicated incompetent at the time of the act, omission, or failure
    complained of” did not apply. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(e) (Michie 1993)
    (repealed). Smith then brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
    the State of Arkansas and the Arkansas attorney general asserting the now-repealed
    tolling provision was unconstitutional. The district court* dismissed the action as
    barred by sovereign immunity.
    Sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over lawsuits
    brought by private citizens against states unless the state has waived its immunity or
    Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity under a valid exercise of Congressional
    power. Here, the States of Arkansas has not consented to be sued in the federal
    courts, Burk v. Beene, 
    948 F.2d 489
    , 492-93 (8th Cir. 1991), and Congress did not
    abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id.; Will
    v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 66-67 (1989). Thus, sovereign
    immunity bars Smith’s § 1983 claim against the State. Smith’s claim against the state
    attorney general is also barred, see 
    id., and his
    claim for money damages was barred
    and properly dismissed, see 
    Burk, 948 F.2d at 492-93
    .
    Smith appeals asserting the exceptions to sovereign immunity should be
    broadened to encompass his situation. We lack authority to do so. Although
    Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, we are bound by the Supreme
    Court’s holding in Will that Congress did not do so when it enacted § 1983. Further,
    the limited exemption to sovereign immunity in Ex parte Young, 
    209 U.S. 123
    (1908), does not apply here because the state attorney general has no special relation
    to the tolling provision challenged by Smith. See Children’s Healthcare is a Legal
    Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 
    92 F.3d 1412
    , 1415-16 (6th Cir. 1996); Sherman v. Community
    Consolidated Sch. Dist., 
    980 F.2d 437
    , 440-41 (7th Cir. 1992); Long v. Van de Kamp,
    *
    The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    
    961 F.2d 151
    , 152 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
    845 F.2d 1195
    ,
    1208 (3d Cir. 1988).
    Because Smith’s claims against the State and its attorney general are barred by
    sovereign immunity, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Smith’s lawsuit.
    ______________________________
    -3-