United States v. Maurice Powell ( 2004 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-3427
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    Maurice Deshaun Powell,                  *
    *
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 11, 2004
    Filed: August 16, 2004
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    Maurice Deshaun Powell was indicted by a federal grand jury charging him
    with possession with intent to distribute in excess of fifty grams of a mixture or
    substance containing a detectible amount of cocaine base, a controlled substance, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Powell entered a conditional
    plea of guilty preserving the issue of whether police officers properly entered his
    residence seeking to arrest a third-party suspect. The district court1 sentenced Powell
    to seventy months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. Powell was also
    1
    The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of
    Minnesota.
    ordered to pay a $100 special assessment. Powell now appeals and asserts that the
    district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the search conducted at his
    residence. We affirm.
    I.
    On December 17, 2002, Officer Mark Beaupre and other officers from the
    Minneapolis Police Department teamed with Hennepin County drug court2 probation
    officers to locate and arrest various defendants who had failed to appear in drug court.
    As a result, the defendants' name and address appeared on a warrant list of offenders.
    The officers went to 2226 Glenwood Avenue, Apartment 1, in Minneapolis,
    Minnesota, to execute an arrest warrant for Yargamar Bausel.3 Beaupre did not have
    2
    Hennepin County, Minnesota, operates a specialized court ("drug court")
    designed to handle all felony-drug crime violations in the county. When an individual
    is arrested and charged in drug court, the defendant meets with a pre-trial evaluator
    for a bail assessment. Defendants who appear in drug court and are conditionally
    released must first provide personal information, including a current address and
    verification information. This information is used to start a case file concerning the
    defendant's conditional release. The information is used by drug court probation
    officers, the court, and attorneys. A defendant on pre-trial release is required to
    provide the drug court probation officer assigned to his or her case updated
    information regarding any change of address. If the defendant, on pre-trial release,
    fails to appear for court, an arrest warrant is issued.
    3
    Yargamar Bausal had been arrested on July 31, 2001, and made his first
    appearance in drug court on August 1, 2001. Bausal met with a drug court probation
    evaluator and gave his home address as 2226 Glenwood Avenue, Apartment 1,
    Minneapolis, Minnesota. Bausal told the evaluator that he had been living there for
    two years with a woman named Royette Clark. Bausel was released on bond with
    required conditions.
    Bausel's 2226 Glenwood Avenue address was recorded in the Adult Field
    Services ("AFS") database system, an electronic filing system, used by pre-trial
    release officers to keep track of defendants. On August 27, 2002, Bausel failed to
    appear for a jury trial, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant
    -2-
    a copy of the bench warrant–with Bausal's current address–in his possession when he
    began his search for defendants on the list. Instead, Beaupre relied on the warrant list
    given to him by the probation officer that accompanied Beaupre during the operation.
    Beaupre, the probation officer, and another Minneapolis officer began their
    operation around 5:00 a.m. Beaupre's team was assigned to find and arrest a number
    of people, including Bausel. Before going to the 2226 Glenwood address listed for
    Bausel, the team went to three other defendants' addresses provided on the warrant
    list. At two of the addresses, the officers located and arrested the defendant listed;
    however, at the third address, the officers found no one home.
    At approximately 8:00 a.m., the officers arrived at the Glenwood address. As
    Beaupre's team approached the apartment they did not notice any signs or markings
    on the outside of the apartment listing the names of the apartment's occupants. Once
    on the porch, the officers noticed that the door to the apartment was ajar. They
    knocked on the door and announced their presence, but no one responded. The
    officers then entered the apartment in an effort to locate Bausel.
    Once inside, the officers saw a man lying on the couch asleep. While speaking
    to the man on the couch, Beaupre was approached by Cherokee Moore, Maurice
    Powell's girlfriend. Moore asked the officers why they were there, and they responded
    that they were there to execute a "warrant pick-up." When Beaupre asked if anyone
    listed 8216 West 31st Street, Apartment 6, St. Louis Park, Minnesota, as Bausal's
    recent address.
    Julie Pribil, a drug management assistant, placed Bausal's name and the 2226
    Glenwood address–provided by the AFS system–on a list along with 300 other
    wanted drug court pre-trial releasees who had violated their conditional releases. The
    warrant list of offenders was provided to a drug court probation supervisor with the
    Fugitive Apprehension Unit.
    -3-
    else was in the apartment, Moore stated that only her two children were present, and
    pointed to a bedroom. Immediately after his encounter with Moore, Beaupre saw a
    man (later identified as Maurice Powell) run from a room near the rear of the
    apartment to the bathroom. Beaupre immediately followed the man. Beaupre chased
    Powell into the bathroom where he found Powell standing near a wastebasket that
    contained a large amount of crack cocaine in plain view. Officer Beaupre recovered
    the narcotics and arrested Powell.
    At the scene, Powell told the officers that he, not Moore, owned the crack
    cocaine. After transporting him to the station, Beaupre read Powell his Miranda
    rights. Powell appeared to understand the warning, waived his rights, and gave a
    statement to Beaupre restating his previous admission that the drugs found were his
    and not Moore's.
    Powell moved to suppress the drugs, contending that the entry into his home
    to execute an arrest warrant for Bausel violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
    motion to suppress was heard before a magistrate judge who filed her report and
    recommendation that the motion be denied.
    The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation in its
    entirety. The court concluded that Beaupre's team had sufficient grounds to
    reasonably believe that Bausal resided at 2226 Glenwood. The court noted that the
    officers, relying on a warrant list supplied by the Hennepin County drug court, were
    not under an obligation to conduct an independent full-scale investigation. The
    district court found that Beaupre's team was entitled to enter the 2226 Glenwood
    apartment, and thus the seized evidence was not fruit of the poisonous tree. As a
    result of its findings, the court denied Powell's motion to suppress.
    Powell entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to
    distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A). In
    -4-
    the plea, Powell preserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion
    to suppress.
    II.
    On appeal, Powell asserts that Beaupre's team's entry into his 2226 Glenwood
    apartment was illegal. Specifically, Powell contends that the officers' entry into his
    apartment to execute an arrest warrant for Bausal, who did not reside at 2226
    Glenwood, violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
    The Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    (1980), "that
    police officers do not need a search warrant to enter the home of the subject of an
    arrest warrant in order to effectuate the arrest." United States v. Boyd, 
    180 F.3d 967
    ,
    977 (8th Cir. 1999). An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries
    with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there
    is reason to believe the suspect is within. Steagald v. United States, 
    451 U.S. 204
    , 221
    (1981). In Steagald, police entered the defendant's home without a search warrant to
    arrest a third-party suspect. While there, police seized drugs that were in the
    defendant's possession. Applying Steagald, we held that in the absence of exigent
    circumstances or consent, a law enforcement officer could not legally search for the
    subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party, without first obtaining a
    search warrant. 
    Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215
    –16; see also, United States v. Davis, 
    288 F.3d 359
    , 362 (8th Cir. 2002).
    However, Steagald does not prevent police entry if the arresting officers
    executing the arrest warrant at the third person's home have a reasonable belief that
    the suspect resides at the place to be entered and have reason to believe that the
    suspect is present at the time the warrant is executed. 
    Boyd, 180 F.3d at 977
    (citing
    United States v. Risse, 
    83 F.3d 212
    , 216 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). "Whether the police officers possessed
    a reasonable belief that [Bausal] resided [at 2226 Glenwood] is a mixed question of
    -5-
    fact and law." 
    Risse, 83 F.3d at 215
    . We review the factual findings for clear error,
    while the legal conclusion is reviewed de novo. United States v. Dixon, 
    51 F.3d 1376
    ,
    1381 (8th Cir. 1995). The "officers' assessment need not in fact be correct; rather,
    they need only reasonably believe that the suspect resides at the dwelling to be
    searched and is currently present at the dwelling." 
    Risse, 83 F.3d at 216
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    In the present case, Powell argues that the police did not have a reasonable
    belief either (1) that Bausel resided at 2226 Greenwood, or (2) that Bausel was
    present at the time of the officers' entry. Specifically, Powell urges this Court to find
    that Officer Beaupre's team's reliance on the warrant list was unreasonable. We find
    this argument unpersuasive.
    First, Bausel told his pre-trial release evaluator that he was living at 2226
    Glenwood and that he had resided there for two years. Second, the officers relied on
    an address listed in the AFS database system, which is maintained by the drug court
    probation unit and regularly relied on by officers executing arrest warrants. Julie
    Pribil testified that the address provided in the AFS database system was the best
    information the executing officers could have relied on in executing their arrests.
    Officer Beaupre was accompanied to the 2226 Glenwood address by a drug court
    probation officer. Beaupre's team had arrested two other suspects using the addresses
    provided on the warrant list before arriving at the 2226 Glenwood address. Even
    though the bench warrant provided a different address than the one listed on the
    warrant list, the officers were not required to compare the warrant list and the bench
    warrant to discover this fact.4 Based on these facts, it was reasonable for the officers
    4
    In United States v. Clifford, we held that although the arresting officers did
    not actually possess the federal warrant during the entry and arrest, one of the officers
    knew of an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest for his failure to appear to
    serve a sentence, and this awareness excused the officers' need to possess the actual
    warrant during its execution. 
    664 F.2d 1090
    , 1093 n.6.
    -6-
    to rely on the warrant list and not obtain the actual physical arrest warrant before
    arriving at 2226 Glenwood. We hold that the officers reasonably believed that Bausel
    resided at 2226 Glenwood when they arrived to execute Bausel's arrest warrant.
    Beaupre's team also had a reasonable belief that Bausel was present at the 2226
    Glenwood address when they executed the warrant. The warrant list had been
    accurate for other defendants sought that morning. It was not unreasonable for the
    officers to believe that Bausel would be at home during the early morning hours.
    Shortly after 8:00 a.m., the officers arrived at the 2226 Glenwood address. When the
    officers reached the residence, they were not put on notice that Powell–and not
    Bausel–resided at 2226 Glenwood. There were no mailbox indicators or markings on
    the door to indicate that Powell (rather than Bausel) resided at 2226 Glenwood. When
    the officers reached the door they noticed that the door was ajar, raising the officers'
    suspicion that someone was at home. Based on this evidence, it was not unreasonable
    for the officers to believe that Bausel resided and was present at 2226 Glenwood.
    Because we find that the officers reasonably believed Bausel was a resident of
    2226 Glenwood and reasonably believed that Bausel was present at the time the
    warrant was executed, we hold that the officers lawfully entered Powell's residence.
    Thus, the seizure of the drug evidence in plain view was valid.5 We conclude that the
    district court did not err in denying Powell's motion to suppress.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
    ______________________________
    5
    Powell conceded at oral argument that if the police reached his address
    lawfully, the entry–and subsequent seizure of evidence–was valid.
    -7-