United States v. Petronilo Salvador ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-3791
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,       *
    *
    v.                                *
    *
    Petronilo Payan Salvador,               *
    *
    Defendant - Appellant.      *
    ___________
    Appeals from the United States
    No. 05-1257                           District Court for the District
    ___________                           of Minnesota.
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,      *
    *
    v.                               *
    *
    Alonso Urquidez-Tellez,               *
    *
    Defendant - Appellant.     *
    ___________
    Submitted: September 13, 2005
    Filed: October 20, 2005
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, LAY and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
    Alonso Urquidez-Tellez was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to
    distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute thirteen ounces of
    methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
    offense. As a result of the same investigation that lead to Urquidez-Tellez’s
    conviction, Petronilo Payan Salvador pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
    methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
    Urquidez-Tellez’s only argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to
    support his conviction. Salvador argues the district court1 improperly denied him a
    sentence reduction. We affirm.
    I. Background
    In the summer of 2003, the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office was investigating
    a group of methamphetamine traffickers based in south Minneapolis. This
    investigation resulted in five indictments, including those of the two appellants.
    During the course of the investigation, an undercover officer made three
    methamphetamine purchases from the group. The first two purchases were for two
    ounces each. For the third purchase, the undercover officer arranged to buy thirteen
    ounces of methamphetamine.
    To facilitate each sale, members of the conspiracy drove to a parking lot where
    they met the undercover officer. Because of the size of the third purchase, the
    members of the conspiracy sent three vehicles to the location of the transaction. The
    1
    The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of Minnesota.
    -2-
    occupants of the first vehicle, including Salvador, negotiated the drug deal with the
    officer. The first vehicle had a semi-automatic pistol in the glove compartment.
    Urquidez-Tellez was a passenger in the second vehicle, which contained a loaded .357
    magnum between the center console and the passenger seat. The trunk of the second
    vehicle contained the drugs which were hidden in a cereal box. Another co-
    conspirator and a person who was not charged were in the third vehicle. The record
    does not indicate whether the third vehicle contained any weapons.
    After the undercover officer indicated that she needed to leave the parking lot
    to obtain the cash for the purchase, she gave a signal, and officers moved in and
    arrested the occupants of all the vehicles. A search warrant was then executed at the
    house where many of those arrested, including both appellants, were staying. Officers
    recovered an additional eleven ounces of methamphetamine, forty pounds of
    marijuana, a sawed-off shotgun, $24,200 in cash, and Western Union receipts for
    $57,000 in wire transfers. Urquidez-Tellez went to trial where he was convicted by
    a jury. All of the remaining members of the conspiracy pled guilty.
    A. Urquidez-Tellez’s Role in the Conspiracy
    Urquidez-Tellez, who was the cousin of another member of the conspiracy,
    lived in Arizona until shortly before the second methamphetamine purchase. When
    the second purchase took place, he was in a Minnesota hospital undergoing surgery
    for a hernia. Urquidez-Tellez gave a false name and false date of birth when he
    checked into the hospital. He was released on the morning of August 28, 2003. His
    doctor told him to go home and get bed rest. Instead, he rode with a co-defendant to
    the location of the third methamphetamine purchase which occurred that afternoon.
    This co-defendant testified at trial that Urquidez-Tellez was present when the third
    methamphetamine purchase was planned and that Urquidez-Tellez touched the .357
    magnum in the vehicle en route to the transaction.
    -3-
    B. Salvador’s Role in the Conspiracy
    Salvador’s primary role in the conspiracy was to serve as a translator because
    he was the only member of the group that spoke English. He served in this role at all
    three of the methamphetamine transactions. During the second transaction, he also
    personally handed the drugs to the undercover officer. Salvador also made bank
    deposits for a co-conspirator.
    II. Urquidez-Tellez’s Appeal
    The standard of review for a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support
    a conviction is strict. United States v. Hamilton, 
    332 F.3d 1144
    , 1149 (8th Cir. 2003)
    (quoting United States v. Washington, 
    318 F.3d 845
    , 852 (8th Cir. 2003)). This Court
    must view the evidence in “the light most favorable to the government, resolving
    conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all favorable inferences that support
    the verdict.” Id. at 1148. The verdict must be upheld if “there is any interpretation
    of the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1149.
    A. The Drug Convictions
    Urquidez-Tellez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
    and possession with intent to distribute thirteen ounces of methamphetamine. A
    conspiracy conviction requires proof that the defendant entered into an agreement with
    at least one other person to sell methamphetamine. United States v. Rodgers, 
    18 F.3d 1425
    , 1428-29 (8th Cir. 1994). A conviction for possession with intent to distribute
    requires “knowing” possession of the methamphetamine. United States v. Barrow,
    
    287 F.3d 733
    , 736 (8th Cir. 2002). “Proof of constructive possession is sufficient to
    satisfy the element of knowing possession.” United States v. McCracken, 
    110 F.3d 535
    , 541 (8th Cir. 1997).
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    Urquidez-Tellez contends there was not sufficient evidence to support his
    conviction. The crux of his argument is that he was not known to law enforcement
    prior to his arrest on August 28, 2003. The fact that he was not previously known to
    law enforcement does not mean, however, that he was not involved in the conspiracy.
    Urquidez-Tellez was present at the third transaction where the members of the
    conspiracy planned to sell thirteen ounces of methamphetamine.2 He was in the car
    that contained the drugs, and a co-conspirator testified that Urquidez-Tellez knew the
    location of the drugs. Knowledge of the presence of contraband, plus the ability to
    control that contraband either directly or through another person establishes
    constructive possession. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 
    18 F.3d 641
    , 647 (8th
    Cir. 1994). Although Urquidez-Tellez was not the only person in the vehicle,
    constructive possession can be joint. 
    Id.
     Urquidez-Tellez was also related to a
    member of the conspiracy and was staying with members of the conspiracy in a house
    where additional methamphetamine was found. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could
    infer that Urquidez-Tellez gave false information to the hospital because he was
    participating in a criminal enterprise and/or that he would not have disobeyed doctor’s
    orders to sit in a vehicle in a parking lot if he was not actively participating in the drug
    transaction that was taking place. In summary, we find that there was sufficient
    evidence for a reasonable jury to find Urquidez-Tellez guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt on the two drug charges.
    B. The Gun Conviction
    Urquidez-Tellez was also convicted of possession of a firearm in conjunction
    with a drug trafficking offense. For this conviction to stand, a reasonable jury must
    have been able to find that Urquidez-Tellez possessed a firearm and that there was a
    nexus between his possession of the firearm and his drug trafficking activity.
    Hamilton, 
    332 F.3d at 1150
    .
    2
    Although the terms of the sale were agreed to, the drug dealers were arrested
    before the money and the drugs changed hands.
    -5-
    In this case, Urquidez-Tellez occupied a vehicle that contained drugs. Within
    his reach was a loaded gun. A reasonable jury could infer that the purpose of the
    weapon was to protect the drugs or the drug dealers if anything went wrong during the
    sale. United States v. Williams, 
    104 F.3d 213
    , 215 (8th Cir. 1997). Another occupant
    of the vehicle testified that Urquidez-Tellez knew of the weapon’s presence and
    touched it on the way to the drug transaction. Thus, we find that there was sufficient
    evidence for a reasonable jury to find Urquidez-Tellez guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt on the gun charge.
    III. Salvador’s Appeal
    Salvador asserts that the district court erred when it failed to grant him a
    reduction in sentence under United States Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.2 on the basis
    that he was a minor participant in the conspiracy. “The propriety of a downward
    adjustment is determined by comparing the acts of each participant in relation to the
    relevant conduct for which the participant is held accountable and by measuring each
    participant’s individual acts and relative culpability against the elements of the
    offense.” United States v. Belitz, 
    141 F.3d 815
    , 818 (8th Cir. 1998). The burden was
    on Salvador to establish his entitlement to the reduction. United States v. Johnson,
    
    358 F.3d 1016
    , 1018 (8th Cir. 2004). A district court’s factual determination of
    whether a defendant was a minor participant may only be reversed if clearly
    erroneous. 
    Id. at 1017-18
    .
    In addressing Salvador’s request for a reduction the district court stated:
    . . . I tell you that I cannot grant your lawyer’s motion or his request that
    you be considered a minor participant. You knowingly participated in
    a drug crime, and your lawyer says mostly what you did was interpret.
    To some extent he is correct. But you were caught in an automobile, in
    the front seat of an automobile, with a loaded firearm between you and
    the driver. A firearm with which some good people who were not
    -6-
    breaking the law could potentially have been killed. And that does not
    suggest a minor participant to me.3
    Salvador asserts that he was a minor player in the conspiracy because he had
    no decision-making authority and is therefore less culpable than the majority of his
    co-conspirators. However, establishing that a defendant is less culpable than others
    does not entitle the defendant to a minor role reduction if he is “deeply involved” in
    the offense. United States v. Bush, 
    352 F.3d 1177
    , 1182 (8th Cir. 2003). Although
    Salvador’s primary role in the conspiracy was as a translator, this does not mean that
    he did not play an important role. He was present at all three of the methamphetamine
    transactions, and his ability to speak English facilitated the negotiations with the
    undercover officer. He handed the drugs to the undercover officer at one transaction.
    He rode to another transaction in a vehicle containing a loaded weapon. Thus, despite
    his lack of decision-making authority, his role could reasonably be deemed significant.
    The fact that Salvador received little money from his role in the conspiracy is not
    dispositive. Belitz, 
    141 F.3d at 819
     (finding no clear error in the failure to grant a
    minor participant reduction although the defendant had received no profits from his
    role in the conspiracy). Evaluating the above factors, we find no clear error in the
    district court’s determination that Salvador was not a minor player.
    3
    Salvador argues that the district court denied him the minor role reduction
    solely because of the involvement of the firearm. We do not read the district court’s
    statement so narrowly. After a careful review of the record, we find no clear error in
    the district court’s decision, and we do not intend our opinion to stand for the
    proposition that the possession of a firearm, in and of itself, prevents a reduction in
    sentence for serving a minor role in a conspiracy.
    -7-
    IV. Conclusion
    We find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict
    Urquidez-Tellez on each count he appeals. We also find no clear error in the district
    court’s denial of a sentence reduction to Salvador. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgments of the district court.
    ______________________
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