United States v. Juan Marquez-Alvarad ( 2007 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-3827
    ___________
    United States of America,               *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * Southern District of Iowa.
    Juan Marquez-Alvarado,                  *
    *
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 15, 2007
    Filed: September 6, 2007
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Juan Marquez-Alvarado appeals from his conviction for, inter alia, conspiracy
    to distribute marijuana in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B). We affirm.
    I.
    Prior to the start of the charged conspiracy, Marquez-Alvarado, a friend of a
    drug dealer named Callacho, was present when Callacho sold cocaine and marijuana
    to Derek Thompson on three occasions in late 1998 or early 1999. Although
    Marquez-Alvarado did not take money or directly deal drugs in those instances, he
    intervened by speaking with Callacho in Spanish as Thompson haggled with Callacho
    over the price of marijuana. Thereafter, Callacho acceded to Thompson’s price
    demands.1 After the arrest of certain members of Callacho’s operation, Coplin Dunn
    began dealing marijuana and cocaine to Thompson instead. In 2000 or 2001,
    Marquez-Alvarado was also present at approximately three transactions between
    Thompson and Dunn.
    The charged conspiracy extended from the summer of 2001 to April 19, 2004,
    during which time Marquez-Alvarado operated as a supplier of marijuana to a number
    of co-conspirators who distributed it. He was responsible for the introduction of large
    quantities of marijuana into Iowa hidden in cement statues and furniture, which he had
    delivered to the home of Long Ly (Long), Bao Ly (Bao), or other conspiracy members
    with whom he dealt. Long, Bao, Theodore Tuon, and Tommy Le would then break
    open the delivered containers with a sledgehammer and distribute amongst themselves
    the marijuana that they needed, with Marquez-Alvarado retaining any undistributed
    marijuana. Once they sold their respective shares, Long would frequently collect the
    pooled proceeds and pay Marquez-Alvarado in one lump sum. Marquez-Alvarado
    dealt more than 2000 pounds of marijuana in this fashion over the course of the
    conspiracy. Each of the members testified to their involvement in, and understanding
    of, the arrangement. Additionally, Tuon was captured on videotape selling marijuana
    obtained from Marquez-Alvarado to undercover officers, and both Tuon’s girlfriend
    and Marquez-Alvarado’s wife provided testimony corroborating details expressed by
    co-conspirators.
    Marquez-Alvarado was charged with, among other things, conspiring to
    distribute marijuana. Over Marquez-Alvarado’s objection, the jury heard testimony
    concerning Marquez-Alvarado’s presence at Thompson’s cocaine and marijuana drug
    purchases prior to the commencement of the charged drug conspiracy as well as
    1
    Although Thompson observed the conversations, he does not speak Spanish
    and could not understand what was said.
    -2-
    testimony concerning Marquez-Alvarado’s trips to Kansas City to purchase cocaine.
    The jury found Marquez-Alvarado guilty, and the district court2 imposed a sentencing
    enhancement for Marquez-Alvarado’s role as a leader or organizer of the conspiracy
    pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a).
    II.
    Marquez-Alvarado contends that the district court erred by allowing the jury to
    hear testimony regarding unrelated and prejudicial cocaine transactions that took place
    prior to and during the charged marijuana conspiracy. He also contends that he should
    not have received a sentencing role enhancement.
    A.
    We review for abuse of discretion rulings pertaining to the admission of
    evidence over a party’s objection. United States v. Abdul-Aziz, 
    486 F.3d 471
    , 475
    (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the
    introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts for use as character or
    propensity evidence, but permits the admission of such evidence for other purposes
    related to the charged crime, such as for “proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” To be
    admissible under this rule, the evidence must “(1) be relevant to a material issue raised
    at trial, (2) be similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged, (3) be supported
    by sufficient evidence to support a finding by a jury that the defendant committed the
    other act, and (4) not have a prejudicial value that substantially outweighs its
    probative value.” United States v. Johnson, 
    439 F.3d 947
    , 952 (8th Cir. 2006)
    (citation omitted). We will reverse a decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b)
    2
    The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of Iowa.
    -3-
    only where evidence of wrongdoing “‘clearly had no bearing on the case and was
    introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity’ to engage in criminal
    misconduct.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Brown, 
    148 F.3d 1003
    , 1009 (8th Cir.
    1998)).
    The evidence pertaining to Marquez-Alvarado’s involvement in Thompson’s
    cocaine and marijuana deals prior to the charged conspiracy and the evidence
    concerning the trips to Kansas City with Tuon and Long to purchase cocaine during
    the conspiracy is relevant because it assisted in demonstrating that Marquez-Alvarado
    had the necessary knowledge and intent to pursue the marijuana conspiracy.
    Marquez-Alvarado’s presence at some of Thompson’s deals with Callacho and Dunn
    suggests that Marquez-Alvarado may have been laying the groundwork for the future
    conspiracy. Because the packaging of the marijuana that Thompson purchased from
    Callacho and Dunn shared unique characteristics that were also present in the
    packaging of the marijuana that Marquez-Alvarado supplied to the conspiracy, a jury
    could find that Marquez-Alvarado supplied marijuana between 1998 and 2001 and
    therefore had the expertise, knowledge, and resources to supply the conspiracy with
    marijuana from 2001 onwards.3 Furthermore, his trips with Tuon and Long to Kansas
    City, in addition to demonstrating that Marquez-Alvarado knew and had relationships
    with out-of-state drug dealers, also demonstrated the nature of the drug-related
    business relationship between Marquez-Alvarado and his two traveling companions.4
    The trips additionally provided evidence demonstrating Marquez-Alvarado’s
    familiarity with techniques relating to the clandestine transportation of drug-related
    3
    The marijuana was consistently surrounded by brown tape in peculiarly thin,
    flat packages.
    4
    In return for their accompanying Marquez-Alvarado on each respective trip,
    Marquez-Alvarado offered Tuon money and Long a discounted price on the cocaine
    purchased in Kansas City.
    -4-
    contraband between states.5 This is of particular relevance to the marijuana
    conspiracy because Marquez-Alvarado was responsible for coordinating the
    movement of marijuana into Iowa. These events all occurred either during, or within
    a reasonable temporal proximity of, the charged conspiracy. See United States v.
    Love, 
    419 F.3d 825
    , 828 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Proximity in time is one factor in
    determining the relevance of a prior drug conviction, but the standard is
    reasonableness, not an absolute number of years.”). That they involved a different
    drug – cocaine – is not determinative; as the transactions with Thompson demonstrate,
    cocaine and marijuana were frequently dealt concurrently to the same individuals.
    See Llach v. United States, 
    739 F.2d 1322
    , 1327 (8th Cir. 1984) (permitting evidence
    of methamphetamine and marijuana transactions even though defendant was charged
    with cocaine distribution because the individuals involved in the cocaine transactions
    also dealt in the other drugs); cf. United States v. Cook, 
    454 F.3d 938
    , 941 (8th Cir.
    2006) (holding that the evidence of a prior drug offense involving marijuana was
    erroneously admitted in a cocaine distribution case because, in relevant part, the prior
    offense of possession was functionally dissimilar to the charged offense of
    distribution). The direct testimony about Marquez-Alvarado’s involvement in the
    prior acts sufficed to support a jury finding concerning them. Llach, 
    739 F.2d at 1327
    .
    Finally, Marquez-Alvarado has not demonstrated that the prejudicial impact of the
    challenged evidence outweighed its probative value. We conclude, therefore, that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence.
    B.
    We review for clear error the district court’s findings regarding a role
    enhancement under the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. White, 
    241 F.3d 1015
    , 1024 (8th Cir. 2001). The sentencing guidelines provide for an upward
    5
    Tuon testified that Marquez-Alvarado concealed the cocaine in the bumper of
    their vehicle.
    -5-
    adjustment of four levels if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal
    activity that involved five or more participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (2002).
    Marquez-Alvarado does not contest the involvement of five or more individuals.
    Instead, he contends that his own involvement was that of a supplier who distributed
    marijuana at arms’ length and who did not organize, lead, or otherwise direct the
    conspiracy. We do not agree.
    When determining whether a defendant is an organizer or leader, the court
    should consider factors including
    the defendant’s exercise of decision making authority, the nature of the
    defendant’s participation in the commission of the offense, the
    recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the
    fruits of the crime, the degree to which the defendant participated in
    planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal
    activity, and the degree of control and authority the defendant exercised
    over others.
    United States v. Mickle, 
    464 F.3d 804
    , 807 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 1308
     (2007) (citations omitted).
    Although it is true that “one’s status as a distributor of narcotics would not,
    standing alone, transform one into a manager or supervisor,” United States v.
    Plancarte-Vazquez, 
    450 F.3d 848
    , 853 (8th Cir. 2006), there is sufficient evidence to
    support the district court’s determination that Marquez-Alvarado’s influence extended
    beyond that of a distributor. Marquez-Alvarado determined the timing and size of the
    marijuana shipments and allowed a cyclical arrangement whereby those who received
    his marijuana had time to sell their respective shares before paying him and repeating
    the delivery process. Perhaps most significantly, Marquez-Alvarado did not simply
    sell marijuana to the co-conspirators in marketable form, but instead made them
    responsible for extracting it from the furniture and statues that he had used to smuggle
    the drug into Iowa. Finally, the evidence suggests that Marquez-Alvarado exerted
    -6-
    direct control over an individual named Carlos, who delivered the furniture and statues
    at the behest of Marquez-Alvarado, sometimes collected payments for Marquez-
    Alvarado, occasionally assisted in breaking down the furniture or statues, and carted
    off the remnants of the broken containers once the marijuana had been removed.
    Given these circumstances, the district court did not err in imposing the role
    enhancement.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -7-