Shirley Phelps-Roper v. Jeremiah Nixon ( 2008 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1295
    ___________
    Shirley Phelps-Roper,                   *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellant,      *
    *
    v.                                *
    *
    Jeremiah Nixon,                         *
    * Appeal from the United States
    Defendant - Appellee,       * District Court for the Western
    * District of Missouri.
    Mark Goodwin,                           *
    *
    Defendant,                  *
    *
    Matt Blunt,                             *
    *
    Defendant - Appellee.       *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 15, 2007
    Filed: October 31, 2008
    ___________
    Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BYE, Circuit Judge.
    Shirley Phelps-Roper brought suit in the Western District of Missouri,
    challenging the validity of sections 578.501 and 578.502 of the Missouri revised
    statutes under the freedom of speech protection of the First Amendment of the U.S.
    Constitution.1 Phelps-Roper requested a preliminary injunction to prevent
    enforcement of section 578.501 until the statute could be reviewed; the district court
    denied her motion, holding she did not demonstrate she was likely to succeed on the
    merits, did not demonstrate irreparable harm, and the public interest weighed in favor
    of upholding the challenged statutory provisions. Phelps-Roper appealed, and this
    panel reversed the district court's decision, finding Phelps-Roper met the standard for
    the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 
    509 F.3d 480
    (8th
    Cir. 2007). We then granted a petition for rehearing to consider and incorporate the
    modified standard this court articulated in Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
    Rounds, 
    530 F.3d 724
    , 732 (8th Cir. 2008), for demonstrating a sufficient likelihood
    of success on the merits. Because the result is the same under the modified standard,
    we revise our opinion accordingly and reverse the district court's decision.
    I
    Phelps-Roper is a member of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) in Topeka,
    Kansas. Phelps alleges members of her church believe God is punishing America for
    what WBC considers the sin of homosexuality by killing Americans, including
    soldiers. As part of her religious duties, she believes she must protest and picket at
    certain funerals, including the funerals of United States soldiers, to publish the
    church's religious message: that God's promise of love and heaven for those who obey
    him in this life is counterbalanced by God's wrath and hell for those who do not.
    Phelps believes funerals are the only place where her religious message can be
    delivered in a timely and relevant manner.2
    1
    Section 578.502 is a fall-back provision to be enacted if section 578.501 is
    declared unconstitutional. It is not ripe for review at this time since we are only
    reviewing the propriety of a preliminary injunction, not determining the
    constitutionality of the statute.
    2
    Although the exact content of WBC's group speech at the funerals of soldiers
    is not part of the record to date, in previous funeral protests the WBC has conveyed
    -2-
    On August 5, 2005, Phelps-Roper and other WBC members held a picket and
    protest near the location of the funeral of Army Spc. Edward Lee Myers in St. Joseph,
    Missouri. In direct response to the protest, Missouri enacted section 578.501, which
    criminalizes picketing "in front or about" a funeral location or procession, and section
    578.502, which criminalizes picketing within 300 feet of a funeral location or
    procession, in the event section 578.501 is declared unconstitutional. Section 578.501
    states, in pertinent part:
    (1) This section shall be known as "Spc. Edward Lee Myers' Law."
    (2) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in picketing or other
    protest activities in front of or about any location at which a funeral is
    held, within one hour prior to the commencement of any funeral, and
    until one hour following the cessation of any funeral. Each day on which
    a violation occurs shall constitute a separate offense. Violation of this
    section is a class B misdemeanor, unless committed by a person who has
    previously pled guilty to or been found guilty of a violation of this
    section, in which case the violation is a class A misdemeanor.
    (3) For the purposes of this section, "funeral" means the ceremonies,
    processions and memorial services held in connection with the burial or
    cremation of the dead.
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.501.
    Phelps-Roper brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging these laws invade
    her First Amendment rights. She seeks: (1) entry of a declaratory judgment finding
    sections 578.501 and 578.502 unconstitutional; (2) issuance of a preliminary and
    messages including "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "God Blew Up The Troops,"
    "God Hates Fags," and "AIDS Cures Fags." See The Westboro Baptist Church Home
    Page, http://www.godhatesfags.com/written/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (last visited
    October 23, 2008) (describing the messages on the "large, colorful signs" they display
    during their "daily peaceful sidewalk demonstrations opposing the homosexual
    lifestyle of soul-damning, nation-destroying filth.").
    -3-
    permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of sections 578.501 and 578.502; and (3)
    an award of costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
    Phelps-Roper appeals the denial of her motion for preliminary injunction against
    Jeremiah Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and Matt Blunt, Governor of
    Missouri.3
    II
    The standard of review for the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction is
    abuse of discretion. Entergy, Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 
    210 F.3d 887
    , 898 (8th Cir.
    2000); Kirkeby v. Furness, 
    52 F.3d 772
    , 774 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's
    denial of a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin City of Fargo from enforcing
    an anti-picketing ordinance). A court considering a motion for preliminary injunction
    must consider (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the
    balance between this harm and the injury in granting the injunction will inflict on the
    other party; (3) the probability of the movant succeeding on the merits; and (4) the
    public interest. 
    Id. (citing Dataphase
    Sys. Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 
    640 F.2d 109
    , 113 (8th
    Cir. 1981) (en banc)). The district court weighed these considerations and concluded
    3
    Phelps-Roper does not appeal with respect to Mark Goodwin, the prosecuting
    attorney for Carroll County, Missouri. Goodwin and Phelps-Roper filed a stipulation
    for entry of consent judgment, which would permanently enjoin Goodwin, in his
    official capacity as prosecuting attorney for Carroll County, and his employees,
    representatives, agents, servants, assigns, and successors, from enforcing or
    attempting to enforce §§ 578.501 and 578.502. The district court deferred ruling on
    the proposed consent judgment until a final judgment has been entered as to the
    constitutionality of Missouri's funeral protest statutes. Notwithstanding the agreement
    between Phelps-Roper and the local prosecutor, we have jurisdiction over this appeal
    between Phelps-Roper and the governor and attorney general of Missouri. See
    Reprod. Health Servs. v. Nixon, 
    428 F.3d 1139
    , 1145 (8th Cir. 2005); but see 
    id. at 1146-48
    (Bye, J., dissenting) (concluding Article III jurisdiction is lacking over a
    Missouri action to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute, where
    the local prosecutor charged with enforcing the statute is not part of the appeal).
    -4-
    Phelps-Roper was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. We have weighed these
    same considerations and come to a contrary conclusion.
    III
    Peaceful picketing is an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.
    Olmer v. Lincoln, 
    192 F.3d 1176
    , 1179 (8th Cir. 1999). It is well-settled law that a
    "loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
    constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 
    427 U.S. 347
    , 373 (1976) (plurality).
    If Phelps-Roper can establish a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of her
    First Amendment claim, she will also have established irreparable harm as the result
    of the deprivation. See Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, 
    97 F.3d 1137
    , 1140-41 (8th
    Cir. 1996); 
    Kirkeby, 52 F.3d at 775
    . Likewise, the determination of where the public
    interest lies also is dependent on the determination of the likelihood of success on the
    merits of the First Amendment challenge because it is always in the public interest to
    protect constitutional rights. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 
    154 F.3d 281
    , 288 (6th
    Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); 
    Kirkeby, 52 F.3d at 775
    (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 
    487 U.S. 474
    , 479 (1988)). The balance of equities, too, generally favors the
    constitutionally-protected freedom of expression. In a First Amendment case,
    therefore, the likelihood of success on the merits is often the determining factor in
    whether a preliminary injunction should issue. McQueary v. Stumbo, 
    453 F. Supp. 2d 975
    , 979 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction to WBC precluding
    enforcement of Kentucky statute imposing time, place and manner restrictions on
    gatherings near funerals) (citing Connection Distrib. 
    Co., 154 F.3d at 288
    ).
    We begin with an assessment of the likelihood of success on the merits. In
    Planned 
    Parenthood, 530 F.3d at 732-33
    , this Court clarified what is required to
    demonstrate a sufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits. In general,
    "courts should still apply the familiar 'fair chance of prevailing' test where a
    preliminary injunction is sought to enjoin something other than government action
    -5-
    based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes." 
    Id. Where a
    party seeks to
    enjoin preliminarily the implementation of a duly enacted statute – as is the case here
    – district courts must make "a threshold finding that a party is likely to prevail on the
    merits." 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The Court reasoned that by re-emphasizing "this more
    rigorous standard for determining a likelihood of success on the merits in these cases,
    we hope to ensure that preliminary injunctions that thwart a state's presumptively
    reasonable democratic processes are pronounced only after an appropriately
    deferential analysis." 
    Id. at 733.
    In such cases, it is only after finding a party is likely
    to prevail on the merits that a district court should weigh the other Dataphase factors.
    
    Id. at 732.
    When analyzing the merits of Phelps-Roper's claim, the district court correctly
    concluded the statute's speech restrictions are content-neutral and subjected the statute
    to intermediate judicial scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
    512 U.S. 622
    ,
    642, 653 (1994). We reject Phelps-Roper's contention that section 578.501 is content-
    based because it targets funeral picketing and was enacted for the purpose of silencing
    her speech in particular. The plain meaning of the text controls, and the legislature's
    specific motivation for passing a law is not relevant, so long as the provision is neutral
    on its face. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 
    535 U.S. 425
    , 448 (2002) (Kennedy,
    J., concurring) (stating "whether a statute is content neutral or content based is
    something that can be determined on the face of it . . . ."); Hill v. Colorado, 
    530 U.S. 703
    , 724-25 (2000) (stating "the contention that a statute is 'viewpoint based' simply
    because its enactment was motivated by the conduct of the partisans on one side of a
    debate is without support" and finding a statute content-neutral despite being enacted
    to end harassment outside clinics by abortion opponents); 
    Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482
    (1988) (finding statute content-neutral despite being enacted in response to anti-
    abortion protesters).
    Section 578.501 regulates traditional public fora. A traditional public forum is
    one traditionally used as a forum for expression, such as a public street or a sidewalk.
    -6-
    Boos v. Barry, 
    485 U.S. 312
    , 318 (1988); 
    Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1179
    . While we
    recognize a cemetery is a nonpublic forum,4 section 578.501 restricts expressive
    activity not just within or on the premises of a cemetery or a church, but also on
    traditional public fora such as the adjacent public streets and sidewalks. The statute
    must therefore satisfy the standard of review for traditional public fora.
    A content-neutral time, place and manner regulation may be imposed in a public
    forum if it: (1) serves a significant government interest; (2) is narrowly tailored; and
    (3) leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. Ward v. Rock Against
    Racism, 
    491 U.S. 781
    , 791 (1989); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 
    248 F.3d 738
    , 744 (8th
    Cir. 2001) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of a Fargo ordinance prohibiting
    the targeted picketing of a residence as a content neutral time, place and manner
    restriction).
    A
    The district court found the state has a significant interest in preserving and
    protecting the sanctity and dignity of memorial and funeral services, as well as
    protecting the privacy of family and friends of the deceased during a time of mourning
    and distress. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 
    504 F. Supp. 2d 691
    , 696 (W.D. Mo. 2007).
    The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, but has recognized the state's interest
    in protecting citizens from unwanted communications while in their homes, 
    Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482
    , and when otherwise "captive," Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 
    512 U.S. 753
    , 768 (1994). One other circuit court, which recently analyzed the
    constitutionality of similar funeral protest statutes, has extended Frisby and
    acknowledged the state has an interest in protecting mourners, which were found to
    4
    Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 
    420 F.3d 1308
    , 1310 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005);
    Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 
    288 F.3d 1309
    , 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Warren v.
    Fairfax County, 
    196 F.3d 186
    , 201 (4th Cir. 1999); Jackson v. City of Stone
    Mountain, 
    232 F. Supp. 2d 1337
    , 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
    -7-
    be a captive audience, from unwanted speech during a burial or funeral. See Phelps-
    Roper v. Strickland, 
    539 F.3d 356
    , 362-67 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding the state interest
    was significant); McQueary v. Stumbo, 
    453 F. Supp. 2d 975
    , 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
    (assuming, without finding, for the purpose of preliminary injunction, the state has an
    interest in protecting funeral attendees from unwanted communications so obtrusive
    they are impractical to avoid).
    We note our own opinion in Olmer v. Lincoln, 
    192 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (8th Cir.
    1999), which affirmed a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of an
    ordinance that "restrict[ed] to certain areas the 'focused picketing' of churches and
    other religious premises thirty minutes before, during, and thirty minutes after any
    scheduled religious activity" because it violated the First Amendment. In Olmer, we
    held the government has no compelling interest in protecting an individual from
    unwanted speech outside of the residential context. 
    Id. at 1182
    (refusing to allow
    other locations, even churches, to claim the same level of constitutionally protected
    privacy afforded to the home by Frisby). We stated:
    As the Supreme Court said in Frisby, 'the home is different,' and, in our
    view, unique. Allowing other locations, even churches, to claim the
    same level of constitutionally protected privacy would, we think, permit
    government to prohibit too much speech and other communication. We
    recognize that lines have to be drawn, and we choose to draw the line in
    such a way as to give the maximum possible protection to speech, which
    is protected by the express words of the Constitution.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Because of our holding in Olmer, we conclude Phelps-Roper
    is likely to prove any interest the state has in protecting funeral mourners from
    unwanted speech is outweighed by the First Amendment right to free speech.
    -8-
    B
    For a statute to be narrowly tailored, it must not burden substantially more
    speech than necessary to further the state's legitimate interests. Bd. of Tr. of State
    Univ. of New York v. Fox, 
    492 U.S. 469
    , 478 (1989); 
    Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485
    . An
    overbroad statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn
    statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it. City Council of
    L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
    466 U.S. 789
    , 798 (1984). To prevail, a plaintiff must
    show the challenged law either "could never be applied in a valid manner" or it is
    "written so broadly that [it] may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third
    parties." 
    Id. The district
    court did not engage in a meaningful analysis of whether
    section 578.501 is narrowly tailored or overbroad; it found only that the statutory
    language has plain meaning, which a person of ordinary intelligence could ascertain.
    Since we do not decide the merits of Phelps-Roper claim, we decline to engage
    in a rigorous analysis of whether section 578.501 is overbroad. We do point out the
    cases upon which the district court relied to support section 578.501's "in front or
    about" language, e.g., Frisby, 
    487 U.S. 474
    (1988) (upholding ordinance concerning
    targeted picketing "in front of" a particular residence); Douglas v. Brownwell, 
    88 F.3d 1511
    (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding a ban on picketing "before, about, or
    immediately adjacent to" a residence), are distinguishable because they involve
    residences and fixed locations. Section 578.501, by contrast, defines a "funeral" to
    include "processions" held in connection with burial and cremation.5 Mo. Rev. Stat.
    § 578.501(3). Its "floating" buffer-zones, therefore, provide citizens with no
    guidance as to what locations will be protest and picket-free zones and at what times.
    See 
    Phelps-Roper, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20
    (holding the language of the statute
    applicable to funeral processions was substantially overbroad and burdened
    5
    A funeral procession may be as few as two cars, according to statute. Mo.
    Ann. Stat. § 194.500.3.
    -9-
    substantially more speech than necessary to serve the state's interest), aff’d Phelps-
    Roper v. Strickland, 
    529 F.3d 356
    (6th Cir. 2008).6
    In addition, Section 578.501 does not limit itself to activity that targets,
    disrupts, or is otherwise related to the funeral, memorial service or procession.7 See
    
    Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180
    (finding an ordinance overbroad because it "purports to make
    the carrying of signs at the indicated times and places unlawful, no matter what the
    signs say or depict, and this prohibition is much broader than necessary. . . . [T]he
    ordinance bans certain forms of communication even if all of those to whom it is
    directed in fact wish to hear it."). While the Sixth Circuit concluded a similar
    ordinance was limited to activity that was directed at a funeral or burial service, the
    statute involved in that case defined "other protest activities" to include "any action
    that is disruptive or undertaken to disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service."
    
    Phelps-Roper, 539 F.3d at 368
    (emphasis added). Because the Missouri statute does
    not contain any such provisions, Phelps-Roper is likely to prove the statute does not
    limit its coverage to activity that targets or disrupts a funeral or burial service.
    We conclude there is enough likelihood Phelps-Roper will be able to prove
    section 578.501 is not narrowly tailored or is facially overbroad to the point she is
    likely to prevail on the merits of her claim.
    6
    The district court’s order striking down the portion of the Ohio statute applying
    to funeral processions was not challenged on appeal.
    7
    We note the Eighth Circuit has found the term "picketing" to include a wide
    range of activities, including prayer. 
    Veneklase, 248 F.3d at 743
    ; 
    Douglas, 88 F.3d at 1521
    .
    -10-
    C
    The remaining requirement the state must satisfy to defend its time, place and
    manner restrictions is such restrictions must leave open ample alternative channels
    for communication of the information. See 
    Ward, 491 U.S. at 791
    . As the Supreme
    Court has stated, "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
    appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
    Schneider v. New Jersey, 
    308 U.S. 147
    , 151-52 (1939).
    The Eighth Circuit has found other anti-picketing regulations did not leave open
    ample alternative channels for communication of the information. When addressing
    whether a permanent injunction should issue in Kirkeby, the Court reasoned:
    [P]laintiffs wish to express an opinion about an individual to that
    individual and others, and they wish to direct their message at that
    individual. . . . Therefore, allowing them to picket in the town square or
    even the next block does not satisfy the second Ward requirement [of
    leaving open ample alternative channels for communication]. These time
    limits do not give the plaintiffs enough opportunity to direct their
    intended message at their intended recipients.
    Kirkeby v. Furness, 
    92 F.3d 655
    , 662 (8th Cir. 1996). By analogy, Phelps-Roper
    presents a viable argument that those who protest or picket at or near a military funeral
    wish to reach an audience that can only be addressed at such occasion and to convey
    to and through such an audience a particular message. Contra 
    Phelps-Roper, 539 F.3d at 372-73
    . She is likely to prevail in proving section 578.501 fails to afford open,
    ample and adequate alternative channels for the dissemination of her particular
    message.
    -11-
    IV
    Because we conclude Phelps-Roper has demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing
    on the merits of her claim, we find she will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary
    injunction is not issued. The injunction will not cause substantial harm to others, and
    the public is served by the preservation of constitutional rights. The district court
    abused its discretion when it concluded the balance of harms weighed toward denying
    the motion for a preliminary injunction based on its erroneous determination as to
    Phelps-Roper being unlikely to succeed on the merits.
    We emphasize again we do not today determine the constitutionality of section
    578.501. We hold only that Phelps-Roper is entitled to a preliminary injunction while
    the constitutionality of section 578.501 is thoroughly reviewed. The contrary
    judgment of the district court is reversed.
    ____________________________
    -12-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1295

Filed Date: 10/31/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

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PLANNED PARENT. MN, N. DAKOTA, S. DAKOTA v. Rounds , 530 F.3d 724 ( 2008 )

Phelps-Roper v. Strickland , 539 F.3d 356 ( 2008 )

Connection Distributing Co. v. The Honorable Janet Reno , 154 F.3d 281 ( 1998 )

marilyn-olmer-an-individual-john-kelly-an-individual-theresa-lane-an , 192 F.3d 1176 ( 1999 )

reproductive-health-services-of-planned-parenthood-of-the-st-louis-region , 428 F.3d 1139 ( 2005 )

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Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc. , 640 F.2d 109 ( 1981 )

Phelps-Roper v. Nixon , 509 F.3d 480 ( 2007 )

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Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington) , 60 S. Ct. 146 ( 1939 )

McQueary v. Stumbo , 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 ( 2006 )

Phelps-Roper v. Nixon , 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 ( 2007 )

Jackson v. City of Stone Mountain , 232 F. Supp. 2d 1337 ( 2002 )

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