CDI Energy Services v. West River Pumps ( 2009 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-1031
    ___________
    CDI Energy Services, Inc.,                *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellant,       *
    *    Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 *    District Court for the District
    *    of North Dakota.
    West River Pumps, Inc.;                  *
    John Martinson; Dale Roller;             *
    Kent Heinle,                             *
    *
    Defendants - Appellees.      *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 13, 2008
    Filed: May 29, 2009
    ___________
    Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
    CDI Energy Services, Inc. (“CDI”), sells and services equipment for use in the
    oilfield industry. CDI maintained a field office in Dickinson, North Dakota, with
    three employees, John Martinson, Dale Roller, and Kent Heinle. CDI alleges that
    these men started a competing company, West River Pumps, Inc. (“West River”), stole
    proprietary information, and solicited business from CDI’s clients while still
    employed by CDI. Upon discovering its employees’ actions, CDI filed the present
    diversity action asserting, among other claims, state-law claims of breach of loyalty,
    trade-secret misappropriation, and business interference. CDI obtained an initial, ex
    parte temporary restraining order and moved for preliminary injunctive relief. After
    the parties briefed the matter and submitted affidavits, the district court1 denied the
    motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order.
    CDI appeals, and we affirm.
    I.    Background
    In February 2000, CDI entered the market for selling and servicing oilfield
    equipment in Dickinson, North Dakota, by hiring Martinson and Roller to open a CDI
    field office. At that time, Martinson and Roller were experienced in the industry, had
    client contacts in the area, and were working for one of CDI’s competitors. While the
    men still were working for their previous employer, CDI encouraged them to solicit
    business from the competitor’s clients and bring those clients with them to CDI.
    Roller and Martinson did so. One of the clients Roller brought with him to CDI
    subsequently accounted for approximately half of CDI’s business.
    At CDI, Martinson served as the district manager in North Dakota, and Roller
    served as the sales and service representative. Martinson hired defendant Kent Heinle
    in 2007 to work for CDI as a service technician.
    In 2007, while employed by CDI, the three men formed West River and
    contacted CDI’s clients. They informed CDI’s clients of their plan to commence
    operations as a separate business and asked those clients to do business with West
    River. They also secured permission from several clients to move the clients’
    equipment from CDI’s shop to West River’s new location. On October 16, 2007, the
    three men resigned from CDI.
    1
    The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the District of North Dakota.
    -2-
    Martinson, Roller and Heinle were CDI’s only employees in the area, and when
    they left CDI, CDI no longer had a presence in the local market. CDI’s nearest field
    office was over 140 miles away in eastern Montana.
    CDI argues that it made substantial investments to train Martinson, Roller, and
    Heinle, develop business in the Dickinson area, and develop trade-secret information.
    CDI argues that these investments and efforts support its breach of loyalty and trade-
    secret claims because the investments demonstrate the value that the defendants took
    from CDI. For example, CDI asserts that it provided extensive training to the men
    regarding marketing strategies and several aspects of CDI’s business operations. The
    defendants argue that CDI provided no education or formal training but that CDI hired
    them specifically because they already had experience in the industry and, in fact, had
    customers they could bring to CDI.
    CDI argues that it took efforts reasonable under the circumstances to protect
    certain information as trade secrets. CDI identifies customer lists, customer contact
    information, business strategies, customer repair and purchase histories, and CDI
    pricing information as trade secrets. CDI argues that it had policies in place informing
    employees that information was confidential and that employees were to maintain the
    information as confidential. The defendants assert that CDI’s Dickinson office was
    open, the purportedly trade-secret materials were unguarded and unmarked, and CDI
    made no substantial efforts to ensure that the materials were kept confidential.
    The defendants admit that Martinson, Roller, and Heinle took limited records
    with them when they left CDI. They provided the district court with a description of
    all the documents that they took, however, and claim that they returned those
    documents to CDI. They assert none of the materials are trade secrets.
    In assessing the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief, the district court
    applied the factors from Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 
    640 F.2d 109
    ,
    -3-
    114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The court found CDI had not made a showing
    sufficient to demonstrate that any of the materials the defendants took constituted
    trade secrets under North Dakota law. Accordingly, the court found CDI had not
    established a likelihood of success on the merits of the trade-secret claim. Regarding
    the men’s solicitation of CDI’s customers while still employed by CDI, the court
    found CDI was likely to succeed on the merits of a statutory claim for breach of
    loyalty.2 See N.D. Cent. Code. § 34-02-14. Proceeding with the Dataphase analysis,
    the court examined the threat of irreparable harm and the balance of the harms of
    granting or not granting injunctive relief. Finally, the court examined the public’s
    interest and held that injunctive relief was not warranted.
    II.   Discussion
    “A district court has broad discretion when ruling on preliminary injunction
    requests, and we will reverse only for clearly erroneous factual determinations, an
    error of law, or an abuse of discretion.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 
    382 F.3d 774
    , 782
    (8th Cir. 2004). In Dataphase, we held that the relevant factors to consider when
    assessing the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief include: (1) the likelihood of
    success on the merits; (2) the presence or risk of irreparable harm; (3) the balancing
    of the harms of granting or denying an injunction; and (4) the public’s interest.
    
    Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114
    . “The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of
    proving these factors.” Lankford v. Sherman, 
    451 F.3d 496
    , 503 (8th Cir. 2006). We
    review the district court’s application of these factors in turn.
    a.     Likelihood of Success on the Merits
    We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that CDI failed to meet its
    burden to prove that the defendants had taken trade-secret information or that CDI
    2
    The court did not expressly address the likelihood of success on the merits as
    to several other business-tort claims, and we interpret the district court’s treatment of
    those claims as similar to the breach-of-loyalty claim.
    -4-
    itself had taken reasonable steps to protect any purported trade secrets. The
    information at issue was of the type that may, in some industries, be treated as trade-
    secret information (customer names, contact information, pricing information, etc.).
    CDI, however, failed to show that any of the information in this case actually was a
    trade secret, i.e., information that has economic value by virtue of having been kept
    secret and that cannot be “ascertain[ed] by proper means.” See N.D. Cent. Code § 47-
    25.1-01(4) (“‘Trade secret’ means information . . . that: a. Derives independent
    economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
    readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
    value from its disclosure or use; and b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
    under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”).
    It appears undisputed that the potential customers for CDI and West River in
    the area surrounding Dickinson are a small collection of easily identifiable, locally
    operating oilfield companies. Information about these companies would be easily
    obtainable, if not already known, by relevant actors in the local oilfield service and
    equipment industry. Also, the record shows little effort by CDI to conceal data as
    trade secrets, and the defendants’ affidavits contest CDI’s assertions regarding those
    efforts. Because we review the district court’s assessment of the factual record only
    for clear error, 
    Coca-Cola, 382 F.3d at 782
    , we find no basis to disturb the district
    court’s conclusion regarding the trade-secret claim.
    With no likelihood of success on the merits, there is little justification for
    granting a preliminary injunction regarding the trade-secret claim. See Oglala Sioux
    Tribe v. C & W Enters., Inc., 
    542 F.3d 224
    , 233 (8th Cir. 2008) (ceasing a Dataphase
    analysis after finding no likelihood of success on the merits). Regardless, because the
    district court determined CDI was likely to succeed on the merits of its other claims,
    we address the remaining factors below.
    -5-
    Regarding a likelihood of success on the statutory breach-of-loyalty claim under
    North Dakota Century Code § 34-02-14, the defendants do not seriously contest the
    district court’s finding that CDI is likely to prevail. North Dakota law is clear in
    setting forth a duty of loyalty that precludes employees from soliciting their
    employer’s customers while still working for the employer. 
    Id. CDI argues
    that this
    finding alone mandates a grant of equitable relief in the form of a preliminary
    injunction. In so arguing, CDI misconstrues Eighth Circuit law. While the absence
    of a likelihood of success on the merits strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive
    relief should be denied, a finding of a likelihood of success on the merits only justifies
    preliminary relief if there is a risk of irreparable harm and the balance of the factors
    support an injunction. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 
    811 F.2d 414
    , 420
    (8th Cir. 1987) (“The failure to show irreparable harm is, by itself, a sufficient ground
    upon which to deny a preliminary injunction, for the basis of injunctive relief in the
    federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.”)
    (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Accordingly, it is necessary to balance the
    likelihood of success on the non-trade-secret claims against the remaining factors.
    b.     Irreparable Harm
    The district court determined that any harm in the present case can be addressed
    through an award of damages because the harm to CDI, to a large extent, has already
    occurred. The non-trade-secret claims rest on the possibly wrongful appropriation of
    CDI’s clients, an act the defendants have already carried out. As such, it is not
    entirely clear how injunctive relief would actually assist CDI in any manner. This
    clearly was the district court’s view of the case, and the court noted further that it did
    not want to order (and lacked the authority to order) the customers to cease doing
    business with defendants and return to CDI.
    Also, the record strongly suggests that, without the individual defendants as
    employees, CDI had no local personnel in place to service the customers. CDI
    -6-
    repeatedly stressed in its brief to our court that Martinson, Roller, and Heinle were
    CDI’s only employees in North Dakota. CDI stated, “West River has taken virtually
    all of CDI sales and service business in Dickinson and the surrounding North Dakota
    area.” The defendants assert that CDI is simply forwarding its calls to a service office
    in Sidney, Montana, 150 miles away, and CDI does not contest this assertion.
    Given this state of affairs, it was appropriate for the district court to view the
    irreparable-harm factor as weighing against the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
    The harm that had already occurred could be remedied through damages. Adam-
    Mellang v. Apartment Search, Inc., 
    96 F.3d 297
    , 300 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
    preliminary injunctive relief unavailable where a plaintiff had “an adequate remedy
    at law, namely, the damages and other relief to which she will be entitled if she
    prevails”). Also, CDI failed to show that an injunction would actually serve to lessen
    any possible ongoing damages by causing customers to return to CDI.
    c.     Balance of Harms
    The district court viewed any potential harm to the defendants in granting
    preliminary relief as substantial and any additional harm to CDI in denying the order
    as minor. The defendants are a small local business and its three owners. The record
    shows the individual defendants are substantially invested in West River. The
    customers that West River took from CDI comprise the majority of the defendants’
    business, and it appears undisputed that an injunction would put the defendants out
    of business. Because CDI asserts that it has already lost almost its entire business in
    North Dakota, it is difficult to appreciate what additional harm to CDI an injunction
    might prevent. Moreover, because former CDI customers might turn to a third party
    for service, the issuance of an injunction, if anything, would seem likely to harm both
    parties. As the district court stated, “It would be detrimental to the customers/clients,
    and not particularly helpful to CDI, if the Court were to enjoin West River . . . from
    servicing those customers without forcing them to return to CDI.”
    -7-
    d.     Public Interest
    Finally, public interest does not factor strongly into the final balance in this case
    because North Dakota has enacted legislation that favors both parties. The need to
    preserve the public’s access to services, however, pushes this factor slightly in favor
    of denying a preliminary injunction. This was the view of the district court, and we
    agree.
    North Dakota generally prohibits contractual restrictions on an employee’s
    ability to practice his “profession, trade, or business.” N.D. Cent. Code § 9-08-06; see
    also Warner and Co. v. Solberg, 
    634 N.W.2d 65
    , 70 (N.D. 2001). Describing this
    prohibition, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated, “It is the right of the public’s
    access to the services offered by the employee that is more significant than the
    employee’s interests.” 
    Warner, 634 N.W.2d at 70
    . As relevant to this Dataphase
    factor, then, North Dakota deems the public’s access to services to be a more pressing
    policy concern than the details of the relationship between a particular employee and
    employer.
    North Dakota also considers employee loyalty to be in the public interest and
    prohibits employees from soliciting their employers’ customers while still working
    for the employer. See N.D. Cent. Code § 34-02-14. This second public policy,
    however, is rather limited in that North Dakota cabins the restriction on solicitation
    to the duration of the employment relationship. 
    Warner, 634 N.W.2d at 73
    (“Our
    decisions . . . prohibit restraints on solicitation after the employment ceases.”). Given
    the limited nature of the restriction on solicitation, the policy precluding contractual
    restrictions on practicing a trade, and the clear public interest in preserving access to
    services, the district court acted well within its discretion when it held the public
    policy factor was a “close call” that weighed “more against the issuance of a
    preliminary injunction.”
    -8-
    Finding no error in the district court’s assessment of the record or abuse of its
    considerable discretion in the application of the Dataphase factors, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
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