United States v. Karen Hatton , 360 F. App'x 718 ( 2010 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-2216
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                   *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Karen Diane Hatton,                      *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 11, 2010
    Filed: January 19, 2010
    ___________
    Before MURPHY and BYE, Circuit Judges, and STROM,1 District Judge.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Karen Hatton pleaded guilty to unlawfully using the access devices of another
    (credit card fraud) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5). The district court2
    sentenced her to twenty-four months of imprisonment followed by three years of
    supervise release, denying Hatton's request for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.
    1
    The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of
    Nebraska, sitting by designation.
    2
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3E1.1. Hatton appeals, contending the
    district court erred in denying her request for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.
    Hatton's offense conduct consisted of using her employer's credit accounts to
    charge unauthorized personal expenses. Over the course of less than a year, Hatton
    made over $89,000 in unauthorized charges. Her plea agreement provided in relevant
    part that "any actions . . . which become known to the government subsequent to this
    agreement and are inconsistent with the defendant's acceptance of responsibility, but
    not limited to criminal conduct, are grounds for the loss of acceptance of
    responsibility pursuant to Section 3E1.1."
    After Hatton pleaded guilty, the government learned Hatton had been making
    personal purchases using her mother's credit card, essentially continuing the same
    pattern of conduct with which she was charged, but substituting her mother's credit
    card for her employer's. Between November 29, 2007, and January 28, 2009, the
    balance on the mother's credit card rose from $80.31 to $20,200.10. The abusive use
    of the mother's credit card continued after Hatton pleaded guilty. In the course of its
    investigation into the use of the credit card, the government also discovered Hatton
    had withdrawn more than $42,000 from her mother's certificates of deposit and a
    savings account. Although Hatton was a trustee of her mother's accounts and
    therefore authorized to make the withdrawals, the funds in the accounts were intended
    to provide support for Hatton's seventy-nine year-old mother, and the withdrawals
    were made without her mother's knowledge. Some of the withdrawals occurred after
    Hatton pleaded guilty. Based on this conduct, the district court denied Hatton's
    request for a two-level reduction in the calculation of her advisory Guidelines range
    under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
    "We review a district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility
    adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for clear error." United States v. Winters, 
    416 F.3d 856
    , 860 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Patten, 
    397 F.3d 1100
    , 1104-05
    -2-
    (8th Cir. 2005)). "A district court's factual determination on whether a defendant has
    demonstrated acceptance of responsibility is entitled to great deference and should be
    reversed only if it is so clearly erroneous as to be without foundation." 
    Id. (citing United
    States v. Arellano, 
    291 F.3d 1032
    , 1034 (8th Cir. 2002)).
    Hatton argues the district court erred in denying acceptance of responsibility
    because Hatton was authorized to use her mother's card, and thus her abusive use of
    the credit card was not "criminal conduct." Hatton contends § 3E1.1 limits a district
    court's consideration to criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1 (providing
    a district court may consider "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal
    conduct or associations"). We disagree. The list of factors a district court may
    consider in determining whether a defendant qualifies for acceptance of responsibility
    is not exhaustive. See 
    id. ("In determining
    whether a defendant qualifies [for
    acceptance of responsibility], appropriate considerations include, but are not limited
    to, the following . . .") (emphasis added). The abusive use of the mother's credit card
    was clearly similar to the unlawful manner in which she abused her employer's credit
    accounts and thus could be considered by the district court. Cf. United States v.
    Rodriguez, 
    979 F.2d 138
    , 140 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant's demonstrated
    propensity to repeatedly commit conduct similar to the charged conduct can be
    considered by the district court in evaluating defendant's acceptance of responsibility).
    We therefore conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying a reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility.
    We affirm.
    ______________________________
    -3-