Richard Oslund v. United States ( 2019 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-3359
    ___________________________
    Richard Ashton Oslund
    Petitioner - Appellant
    v.
    United States of America
    Respondent - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis
    ____________
    Submitted: October 18, 2018
    Filed: February 8, 2019
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Richard Ashton Oslund was sentenced to two life sentences in 2006. One life
    sentence resulted from an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act
    (ACCA). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). The sentencing court based Oslund’s
    ACCA enhancement, in part, on a prior second-degree burglary conviction under
    Minnesota Statutes § 609.582, subd. 2.
    In Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    , 2557, 2563 (2015), the Supreme
    Court held that the ACCA residual clause was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
    subsequently held that Johnson announced a “new rule” that is retroactive on
    collateral review. Welch v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1257
    , 1264-65 (2016).
    Following Johnson and Welch, Oslund made a successive motion to vacate his ACCA
    life sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Oslund argued that, in light of our recent
    decision in United States v. McArthur, 
    850 F.3d 925
    (8th Cir. 2017), his prior
    burglary conviction fell under the ACCA residual clause and not the ACCA
    enumerated clause. See 
    id. at 940
    (concluding that Minnesota’s third-degree burglary
    statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3, which contains similar language to § 609.582,
    subd. 2, did not qualify under the ACCA’s enumerated clause). Relying on
    McArthur, the district court concluded that Oslund’s claim set forth a valid Johnson
    challenge. The court explained that although the sentencing judge “did not explicitly
    state that he applied the residual clause when finding Oslund’s second-degree
    burglary conviction was a ‘violent felony,’ where the record is unclear the petitioner
    must only show that [the ACCA] does not authorize the sentence imposed after the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson.” D. Ct. Order of Oct. 13, 2017, at *6 n.6
    (relying upon United States v. Winston, 
    850 F.3d 677
    , 682 (4th Cir. 2017), as one of
    the “majority of courts [that] have adopted this analysis”). The district court
    nonetheless denied Oslund’s claim under the concurrent-sentence doctrine. Cf.
    United States v. Olunloyo, 
    10 F.3d 578
    , 581-82 (8th Cir. 1993).
    In Walker v. United States, 
    900 F.3d 1012
    , 1014-15 (8th Cir. 2018), we
    declined to follow Winston. Instead, we sided with our sister circuits that have
    concluded that to rely on Johnson’s new rule, a movant must “show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the residual clause led the sentencing court to
    apply the ACCA enhancement.” 
    Id. at 1015
    (citing United States v. Washington, 
    890 F.3d 891
    , 896 (10th Cir. 2018); Dimott v. United States, 
    881 F.3d 232
    , 243 (1st Cir.),
    cert. denied, No. 17-1251, 
    138 S. Ct. 2678
    (June 25, 2018); Beeman v. United States,
    
    871 F.3d 1215
    , 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2017)). In undertaking this analysis, “the district
    -2-
    court may consider ‘the relevant background legal environment at the time of . . .
    sentencing’ to ascertain whether the movant was sentenced under the residual clause.”
    
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting 
    Washington, 890 F.3d at 896
    ). “By contrast, ‘[i]f
    it is just as likely that the sentencing court relied on the elements or enumerated
    offenses clause, solely or as an alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant
    has failed to show that his enhancement was due to use of the residual clause.’” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting 
    Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1222
    ).
    We remand to the district court to determine whether Oslund has shown by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause
    to apply the ACCA enhancement. In light of our remand, we decline to address in the
    first instance whether the district court correctly applied the concurrent-sentence
    doctrine.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3359

Filed Date: 2/8/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021