Fred L. Sims v. Sauer-Sundstrand ( 1997 )


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  •                           United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 96-4192
    ___________
    Fred L. Sims,                            *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    *
    v.                                 * Appeal from the United States District
    * Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
    Sauer-Sundstrand Co.,                    *
    *
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 9, 1997
    Filed: December 1, 1997
    ___________
    Before LOKEN and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and FENNER,1 District Judge.
    ___________
    ROSS, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Fred Sims, age 54, was laid off by appellee Sauer-Sundstrand
    Company (Sauer-Sundstrand) after more than 27 years of service. Sims filed suit under
    the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.,
    claiming that Sauer-Sundstrand (1) discriminatorily selected him for layoff because of
    his age, and (2) subsequently refused to rehire him in retaliation for the charge of
    discrimination Sims filed as a result of his layoff. The jury found for Sauer-Sundstrand
    1
    The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    on the age discrimination claim and for Sims on the retaliatory refusal to rehire claim.
    However, the district court2 reversed the jury’s finding with respect to the retaliation
    claim by granting Sauer-Sundstrand’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 50, and entered judgment for Sauer-Sundstrand on all claims. The only issue
    on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting the motion for judgment as a
    matter of law in favor of Sauer-Sundstrand on the retaliation charge.
    I.
    On March 22, 1965, at the age of 27, Sims was hired by Sauer-Sundstrand at its
    LaSalle, Illinois facility as an hourly-paid employee. After various promotions, he was
    elevated to the position of process engineer in 1982 and senior process engineer in
    1988 or 1989. In late June, 1986, he was laid off in what was termed a permanent
    reduction in force, but he was subsequently recalled in less than a month. Six years
    later, in June of 1992, Sims was laid off a second time in what was again called a
    permanent reduction in force, which significantly reduced the number of employees at
    the LaSalle facility. At the time of the June, 1992 layoff, Sims was 54 years of age.
    Due to his years of service, if he had been working for Sauer-Sundstrand on his 55th
    birthday he would have vested in lifetime medical benefits. Because of this medical
    benefit, Sims was interested in being recalled to work. At the time of the layoff,
    company officials assured Sims that he would be considered for recall when job
    openings for which he was qualified became available, and accordingly Sims kept some
    contact with Sauer-Sundstrand’s human resource department. Sims filed a charge of
    discrimination with the EEOC on March 18, 1993, claiming that his selection for layoff
    had been for age-related reasons. He filed his lawsuit with respect to that claim on
    March 24, 1994.
    2
    The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern
    District of Iowa.
    -2-
    In March, 1994, almost two years after Sims’s layoff and one year after the
    EEOC claim was filed, Rick Brimeyer, manager of manufacturing at the LaSalle
    facility, interviewed Denis Bedingfield for an open position for process engineer at the
    Ames facility. Sims claims he neither knew about nor was he called to interview for
    this position. Bedingfield, like Sims, became a senior process engineer without having
    a college degree.
    On April 4, 1995, nearly three years after his layoff, Sims sent a letter and
    attached a résumé to Gregory Wuhs, Sauer-Sundstrand’s vice president of
    administration in Ames, Iowa, requesting consideration “for any job openings in
    processing, supervision, tooling and trouble-shooting.” On May 15, 1995, Doris
    Johnson, manager of human resources for the Ames facility, notified Sims by letter that
    he would not be invited for an interview because he did not meet the requirements for
    any of the current open positions at the Ames, Iowa and Freeport, Illinois facilities,
    more particularly he did not hold a technical degree nor did he have heavy exposure to
    computer-directed machining or recent experience regarding current manufacturing
    processes.
    On December 12, 1995, Sims filed a new charge with the EEOC, this time
    claiming that Sauer-Sundstrand’s refusal to consider him for open positions amounted
    to retaliation for his prior 1993 EEOC charge and his then pending lawsuit.
    Subsequently, he was granted leave to amend his lawsuit to add the claim of retaliation.
    Sims listed two charges of claimed retaliation, first that the award of the process
    engineer position at the Ames facility to Denis Bedingfield on May 2, 1994, was in
    retaliation for his initial EEOC claim, and second, that he was denied consideration for
    positions following the submission of his résumé on April 4, 1995, for retaliatory
    reasons. Near the end of the trial, after noting concern that the Bedingfield issue was
    time barred because no EEOC charge had been filed with regard to that claim, Sims
    withdrew the Bedingfield claim, leaving Sauer-Sundstrand’s response to Sims’s letter
    -3-
    and résumé of April 4, 1995, the only instance of claimed retaliation submitted to the
    jury.
    II.
    In reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must analyze the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts of
    evidence in favor of that party, give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable
    inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts, and deny the motion, if, in
    light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the conclusion that could be
    drawn from the evidence. Summit v. S-B Power Tool, 
    121 F.3d 416
    , 420-21 (8th Cir.
    1997). On review the matter is considered de novo on the legal question as to whether
    the district court properly concluded that there was no legally sufficient evidence to
    support the jury’s verdict.
    To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show participation
    in a protected activity, subsequent adverse action by the employer, and a causal
    connection between the two. Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. School Dist., 
    65 F.3d 98
    , 100
    (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 1319
    (1996) . The district court granted Sauer-
    Sundstrand’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the evidence
    presented was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find a causal connection
    between Sims’s age discrimination complaint and the much later adverse employment
    action. We agree that Sims failed to establish the necessary connection between his
    EEOC claim and Sauer-Sundstrand’s subsequent failure to consider Sims for open
    positions.
    The adverse employment action, namely the failure of Sauer-Sundstrand to
    consider Sims for available positions following the submission of his résumé on April
    4, 1995, occurred more than two years after the filing of the EEOC complaint and more
    than one year after filing this lawsuit. We have held that “[t]he passage of time
    -4-
    between events does not by itself foreclose a claim of retaliation; rather, it weakens the
    inference of retaliation that arises when a retaliatory act occurs shortly after a
    complaint.” Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 
    109 F.3d 1261
    , 1266 (8th Cir. 1997).
    Doris Johnson, the manager of human resources, stated in her letter in response
    to Sims’s résumé that he would not be considered for the two open positions because
    he did not hold the requisite degree for the positions, nor did he possess the alternative
    recent experience. Sims’s evidence at trial to support the element of causal connection
    consisted of his claim that other persons, including himself, had previously been hired
    for engineer positions without having a degree, and that therefore the new requirement
    of a degree for subsequent open positions was imposed in order to disqualify him as a
    candidate in retaliation for his EEOC complaint. Also in connection with this claim,
    Sims argues the causal element is established because Sauer-Sundstrand refused to
    consider his 27 years of employment with the company as an alternative to the required
    degree.
    The simple fact of not being hired or asked to interview for a position after an
    EEOC filing is, by itself, insufficient to prove causal connection, particularly when the
    incident occurred more than two years after the protected activity. Cf. Feltmann v.
    Sieben, 
    108 F.3d 970
    , 977 (8th Cir. 1997). Further, proof of causal connection in this
    case fails where no showing was made that persons without a degree were eventually
    hired for the two open positions at the Ames and Freeport facilities, or at any similar
    position following the imposition of the degree requirement. Finally, the addition of
    a degree requirement for the open positions at the Ames and Freeport facilities in the
    area of manufacturing engineering does not, by itself, support a claim of causal
    connection where Sims failed to produce evidence that his experience as a process
    engineer at the LaSalle facility three years earlier was sufficient to qualify him for the
    positions in manufacturing engineering open at the Ames and Freeport facilities. With
    these failures of proof, Sims was unable satisfy his burden of proving a causal
    -5-
    connection between his discrimination complaint and Sauer-Sundstrand’s subsequent
    failure to consider him for open positions which occurred after the EEOC filing.
    Even if we were to conclude that Sims satisfied his burden of establishing a
    prima facie case of discrimination, he would nevertheless fail because Sauer-
    Sundstrand set forth legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its imposition of a
    degree requirement for the Ames and Freeport facilities, specifically that the assembly
    processing conducted at those facilities involved a significant increased level of
    complexity than the machine processing conducted at the LaSalle facility, thus
    explaining the need for a degree or an advanced level of expertise. Sims failed to prove
    that these articulated reasons were mere pretext for discrimination. Sauer-Sundstrand
    offered evidence showing that the engineering work performed at the Ames and
    Freeport facilities required more complex engineering skills. Sims failed to rebut this
    testimony with any evidence regarding the actual duties of the open positions, what
    qualifications competing applicants possessed, or whether those persons actually hired
    for the positions were less qualified. In fact, there was no evidence presented that the
    positions were ever filled. Sims’s only evidence that he had the requisite skills to
    perform the duties of the open positions at Ames or Freeport was the testimony of Vito
    Straznickas, who testified that Sims had done and could do the work that was required
    of a process engineer at the Ames facility. However, Straznickas also testified that he
    had not visited the Ames facility since 1989, six years prior to the date of Sims’s
    application and long before the plant had introduced its current assembly processes.
    Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Sims, this evidence was inadequate
    to show that Sauer-Sundstrand’s stated reasons for requiring a degree for the open
    positions was pretext for discrimination. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
    properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sauer-Sundstrand.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    -6-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -7-