United States v. Blaine Lee Willey ( 2003 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-1336
    ___________
    *
    *
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Plaintiff-Appellant,       *
    *
    v.                                     *   Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Southern
    Blaine Lee Willey,                     *   District of Iowa.
    *
    Defendant-Appellee.        *
    ___________
    Submitted: October 21, 2003
    Filed: December 2, 2003
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
    In this case the government appeals a downward departure granted by the
    district court. Blaine Lee Willey was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute
    500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(B) and 846.
    After imposing a two level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and
    declining to credit Willey for acceptance of responsibility, the district court departed
    downward and sentenced him to 60 months. We reverse and remand.
    Willey distributed cocaine in Iowa City, Iowa from approximately June 1997
    to October 1998. He received cocaine on a weekly basis from Mark Murphy, a
    Chicago dealer, and supplied it to Thomas Kaut for redistribution. Willey usually
    supplied Kaut with approximately two to four grams of cocaine each week and
    charged him roughly $800 per half ounce of cocaine. Most of the transactions
    occurred at Kaut's home. Some were witnessed by Tim Anding, a government
    informant who purchased cocaine from Kaut which he had obtained from Willey.
    The laboratory analysis of the three purchases Anding made from Kaut showed that
    they involved approximately 4.8, 5.41, and 2.05 grams of cocaine. Willey also used
    his place of business in Cedar Rapids to conduct drug transactions, and he sold
    cocaine to Kaut there on at least three occasions. When Mark Murphy was arrested
    and imprisoned on a drug charge in June 1998, his brother Scott became Willey's
    source of cocaine. Willey bought approximately 1 to 1.5 ounces of cocaine from
    Scott Murphy on at least four occasions after Mark went to prison.
    Willey's wife learned he was using cocaine in late 1998. She confronted him
    about it and gave him an ultimatum to stop using drugs. Shortly thereafter, Willey
    quit using cocaine and voluntarily separated himself from the Iowa City drug scene.
    The FBI investigated Willey in March 2000. Willey told an investigating agent
    that he had purchased and used cocaine in Iowa City two years before but that he had
    since stayed away from the drug scene. He did not reveal that he had sold cocaine,
    however. The reason he gives for not having provided information on his drug
    dealing or for not assisting the federal investigation is that he feared for his life.
    Willey had no further contact with law enforcement until he was indicted and arrested
    in April 2002.
    At trial, Thomas Kaut, Mark Murphy, and Tim Anding testified as to Willey's
    involvement in cocaine distribution. Their testimony was corroborated by pen
    registers, wire interception of several phone calls between Willey and Kaut, and
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    surveillance of Kaut's home. Willey also testified. He admitted to knowing both
    Kaut and Mark Murphy, but denied knowing Scott Murphy. He claimed that he had
    merely purchased small quantities of cocaine from Kaut for his own personal use. He
    also testified that his phone calls with Kaut dealt with real estate, not cocaine. This
    testimony was in direct conflict with evidence showing that the phone conversations
    were not about real estate, and Kaut, Murphy, and Anding all testified that they never
    saw Willey use any cocaine. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Willey
    guilty of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.
    Because of the amount of cocaine the jury attributed to Willey, his base offense
    level under the federal sentencing guidelines was 26. The district court imposed a
    two level enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 because Willey had
    testified falsely at trial. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 3C1.1
    (2002) [USSG]. The court declined to grant an acceptance of responsibility
    adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1. Willey sought a downward departure for post
    offense conduct and minor participation in the drug conspiracy. See USSG § 5K2.0;
    § 3B1.2.
    At the sentencing hearing, the district court addressed possible bases for
    departing downward. The court stated that it could not grant a downward departure
    "with regard to the post offense conduct in connection with that being an offshoot of
    acceptance of responsibility." Sentencing Transcript at 26. Willey had been given
    an opportunity long before trial to accept responsibility by pleading guilty and
    cooperating with law enforcement officials, but he chose not to do so. The district
    court also denied Willey's request for a downward departure for minor participation
    on the basis that such a departure would only be appropriate if he had played a small
    role in the transactions, such as that of a carrier.
    The district court asked the parties to address whether the overall
    circumstances removed Willey's case from the heartland so as to warrant a downward
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    departure. The government argued that Willey's case was not so exceptional as to be
    outside the heartland because he failed to assist the FBI with its investigation and to
    accept responsibility and he testified falsely at trial. The government stated that he
    should not be able to benefit just because he had not been prosecuted closer to the
    time of his drug offense, and a downward departure would undermine the
    enhancement for obstruction of justice. The government requested that he be
    sentenced at the low end of the guideline range to 78 months. Willey stated that he
    had not misled or obstructed the FBI investigation but had declined to assist the
    prosecution because of a genuine fear for his life. He also argued that he had
    dramatically altered his lifestyle by ending his drug habit and separating himself
    voluntarily from the Iowa City drug scene. Thirty four letters in his support were
    submitted from various individuals.
    The district court granted a downward departure under USSG § 5K2.0 on the
    ground that Willey's circumstances took him outside the heartland of cases. The court
    cited a number of discouraged guideline factors, including Willey's relationship with
    his wife, educational achievement, professional success, and community status. It
    ruled that these factors taken together with his voluntary drug rehabilitation removed
    his case from the heartland. The government appeals the departure. It contends that
    a downward departure was not warranted because Willey had obstructed justice and
    did not accept responsibility and the court relied on factors discouraged by the
    guidelines. Willey counters that his voluntarily giving up drugs two years prior to
    any contact with law enforcement officials and that his good standing in the
    community for the past few years merited the departure.
    Under the PROTECT Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (e) as amended by § 401(d) of the
    Act, 108 Pub. L. 21, 
    117 Stat. 650
    , 670, April 30, 2003, we review de novo the
    application of the guidelines to the facts and review the district court's factual
    findings for clear error. United States v. Gonzales-Ortega, 
    346 F.3d 800
    , 801 (8th
    Cir. 2003); United States v. Hutman, 
    339 F.3d 773
    , 775 (8th Cir. 2003); United States
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    v. Aguilar-Lopez, 
    329 F.3d 960
    , 962 (8th Cir. 2003). This standard of review applies
    even though Willey was sentenced before the Act became law because it is procedural
    in nature. Hutman, 
    339 F.3d at 775
    . Unless otherwise barred, a court may depart
    from the sentencing guidelines if it "finds that there exists an aggravating or
    mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
    consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (b); see also USSG
    § 5K2.0.
    Downward departures for exceptional post offense conduct have been
    approved where a defendant has demonstrated a fundamental change in attitude by
    genuinely accepting responsibility for his crimes, ending all criminal activity, and
    radically altering his lifestyle. See United States v. DeShon, 
    183 F.3d 888
    , 890 (8th
    Cir. 1999); United States v. Kaptizke, 
    130 F.3d 820
    , 823 (8th Cir. 1997). Although
    Willey undoubtedly altered his lifestyle by ending his drug use, the district court's
    finding that he obstructed justice by testifying falsely at his trial was not clearly
    erroneous. That finding shows that Willey's post offense rehabilitation was not
    sufficient to prevent his violating the law by giving false testimony. "The touchstone
    of extraordinary rehabilitation is a fundamental change in attitude." United States v.
    Craven, 
    239 F.3d 91
    , 99 (2d Cir. 2001). Willey was also not forthcoming earlier
    when the FBI questioned him about his connection to drugs. We conclude that
    Willey’s rehabilitation record was not sufficient to support a downward departure.
    The question then is whether the fact that Willey had ended his drug use could
    be combined with the several discouraged factors relied on by the district court to
    support a downward departure. The court relied on Willey's professional credentials
    as an engineer, his college education, and the support of his wife and family. These
    factors have been specifically considered by the Sentencing Commission and
    designated by it as discouraged factors for departures. See USSG § 5H1.5
    (employment); § 5H1.2 (education); and § 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities).
    Willey cites cases predating the PROTECT Act which were affirmed although
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    discouraged factors were among the reasons for a downward departure, but these
    were cases where the defendant was credited for acceptance of responsibility and
    there was no enhancement for obstruction. See United States v. Decora, 
    177 F.3d 676
    , 679-80 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Big Crow, 
    898 F.2d 1326
    , 1331-32 (8th
    Cir. 1990).
    The circumstances in Willey's case are not of a kind or degree not adequately
    considered by the Commission in providing for discouraged factors. See USSG §
    5K2.0. The discouraged factors and incomplete post offense rehabilitation are not
    enough to support a downward departure here. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
    for resentencing within the guideline range.
    ______________________________
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