United States v. Raymond Smith ( 2004 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    Nos. 03-2862/3494
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeals from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    Raymond Damon Smith,                     *
    also known as "Cap,"                     *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 14, 2004
    Filed: August 4, 2004
    ___________
    Before SMITH, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    In a two-count indictment, the government charged Raymond Damon Smith
    with multiple federal drug offenses.1 At trial, the jury convicted him on all counts. On
    appeal, Smith argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the
    district court2 erred in its denial of his request for a new trial. We affirm.
    1
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
     and 846, as well as 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
     and 323.
    2
    The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District
    Court for the District of Minnesota.
    First, Smith argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
    violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. We decline however to address the merits
    of Smith's ineffective assistance claim because no hearing was held permitting his
    trial counsel an opportunity to respond to Smith's claim. Claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel are more properly raised in a post-conviction motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , not on direct appeal. United States v. Pherigo, 
    327 F.3d 690
    , 696 (8th
    Cir. 2003). In the absence of an adequate record below, we decline to review the issue
    at this time.
    Second, Smith claims that the district court should have stopped the
    government's "continual" use of leading questions during direct examination, even
    though his trial counsel chose not to object. Smith alleges that the district court erred
    by not sua sponte ordering the government to stop leading its witnesses. Smith claims
    that this error was so prejudicial that the judgment should be reversed–and that he
    should receive a new trial–despite the fact that no objections were offered below. He
    argues that "[t]he inappropriate nature of the government's direct examination of its
    own witnesses should have been obvious to the court, even if it was not obvious to
    the government or defense counsel."
    Ordinarily, we defer to the trial court in determining when leading questions
    are necessary, reviewing only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Grassrope,
    
    342 F.3d 866
    , 869 (8th Cir. 2003). However, because no objection was made below,
    we review Smith's claim for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Our review under
    Rule 52(b) is limited to determining if there is an error that is plain and that affects
    substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993). When a forfeited
    error meets these standards, we may order correction, United States v. Montanye, 
    996 F.2d 190
    , 192 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc), but we will not exercise our discretion unless
    -2-
    the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 732
    .
    Smith has not shown that the district court erred by failing to limit the
    government's direct examination. Generally, leading questions are best reserved for
    cross-examination. However, leading questions may properly be used on direct
    examination with certain witnesses–such as an adverse party or a potentially hostile
    witness. Fed. R. Evid. 611(c).3
    In this case, the district court–either under its discretionary authority or because
    no objection was lodged–allowed several leading questions at various stages of the
    trial. However, the district court also properly instructed the jury that an unanswered
    leading question provides no information and is not evidence. The district court
    further explained to the jury that an answered leading question should be given only
    the limited weight that it deserves. Additionally, our review indicates that many of the
    leading questions were clearly permissible–taking into account the district court's
    broad discretion–under Rule 611(c). As to the remaining objectionable questions and
    answers, none rise to the level of prejudice that would warrant relief under our plain-
    error standard. Accordingly, we affirm Smith's conviction and sentence, but do so
    without prejudice to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
    ______________________________
    3
    Leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness
    except as may be necessary to develop the witness's testimony. Ordinarily, leading
    questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile
    witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation
    may be by leading questions. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 611(c) state that
    with respect to leading questions, "[t]he matter clearly falls within the area of control
    by the judge over the mode and order of interrogation and presentation and
    accordingly is phrased in words of suggestion rather than command."
    -3-