Edward Allen Moore v. Larry Rowley , 126 F. App'x 759 ( 2005 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-1981
    ___________
    Edward Allen Moore,                     *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    *
    v.                                * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    Larry Rowley,                           * Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Appellee.                   * [UNPUBLISHED]
    ___________
    Submitted: March 7, 2005
    Filed: March 24, 2005
    ___________
    Before BYE, RILEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Missouri inmate Edward Moore appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of
    summary judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action, in which he claimed that Northeast
    Correctional Center Superintendent Larry Rowley violated his rights under the First,
    Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when he refused to mail Moore’s sealed
    bankruptcy petition to the United States Bankruptcy Court in Ft. Worth, Texas.
    1
    The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    Moore also asserted state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice. We
    affirm.
    This court reviews de novo an adverse grant of summary judgment. See
    Meyers v. Neb. Health and Human Servs., 
    324 F.3d 655
    , 658-59 (8th Cir. 2003). The
    summary judgment record shows that after Moore attempted to mail his bankruptcy
    petition, it was returned to him by the mail room clerk with a notation that, under
    prison policy, only privileged mail could be sent out of the institution sealed. Moore
    thereafter grieved the matter to Superintendent Rowley, who denied the grievance.
    Assuming without deciding that Rowley violated the Missouri Department of
    Corrections mail procedures when he refused to mail Moore’s sealed bankruptcy
    petition, a violation of prison policy alone does not give rise to section 1983 liability,
    see Gardner v. Howard, 
    109 F.3d 427
    , 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (no § 1983 liability for
    violating prison policy). And we do not believe Moore had a constitutional right to
    have his bankruptcy petition leave the institution without first being inspected. Cf.
    Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 576-77 (1974) (prison may, in presence of
    inmate, inspect mail from attorney); Martin v. Brewer, 
    830 F.2d 76
    , 78 (7th Cir.
    1987) (questioning whether court filings should receive special treatment under First
    Amendment, because they are “public document[s], which prison personnel could if
    they want inspect in the court’s files”); Jensen v. Kleckler, 
    648 F.2d 1179
    , 1182 (8th
    Cir. 1981) (although legal mail may only be opened in presence of inmate, letter to
    inmate from ACLU was not entitled to such protection as it was not within
    “parameters of the attorney-client privilege”). Although Moore claimed at his
    deposition that his bankruptcy petition was unsealed all along, at the time Rowley
    denied Moore’s grievance, Rowley had no reason to believe--based on what he knew
    from reading the grievances--that the petition was unsealed.
    Moore also failed to establish an independent violation of his right to court
    access, because the record demonstrates that Rowley did not delay or refuse outright
    to send his petition. Rowley merely refused to send the petition sealed. See Lewis
    -2-
    v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 356 (1996) (constitutional right to access courts guarantees
    no particular methodology but rather confers capability of bringing claims); Schrier
    v. Halford, 
    60 F.3d 1309
    , 1313 (8th Cir. 1995) (right of access to courts ensures that
    prison officials may not erect unreasonable barriers to prevent prisoners from
    pursuing or defending all types of legal matters).
    Finally, we agree with the district court that Moore’s potential damages were
    well below the $75,000 required for diversity jurisdiction, and we thus conclude that
    the district court properly dismissed Moore’s state-law claims without prejudice. See
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    ; Missouri ex rel. Pemiscot County v. W. Sur. Co., 
    51 F.3d 170
    , 173
    (8th Cir. 1995) (if district court determines to legal certainty that plaintiff cannot
    recover amount sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirement, it must dismiss suit).
    We also deny Moore’s pending motion.
    ______________________________
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