William Armstrong v. Mike Kemna ( 2010 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-2495
    ___________
    William A. Armstrong,                   *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Missouri.
    Mike Kemna,                             *
    *
    Appellant.                 *
    __________
    Submitted: September 22, 2009
    Filed: January 5, 2010
    ___________
    Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    RILEY, Circuit Judge.
    This case is before us for the third time. After William A. Armstrong
    (Armstrong) was convicted in Missouri state court of first-degree murder and various
    other charges, Armstrong filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied Armstrong’s application, and this court
    remanded for the district court to consider Armstrong’s claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 
    365 F.3d 622
    , 630 (8th Cir. 2004)
    (Armstrong I). The district court found Armstrong’s counsel acted reasonably and
    again denied Armstrong’s application. On appeal, this court found Armstrong’s
    counsel did not exercise reasonable diligence and remanded for the district court to
    determine whether counsel’s errors prejudiced Armstrong. See Armstrong v. Kemna,
    
    534 F.3d 857
    , 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2008) (Armstrong II). On remand, the district court
    found Armstrong was prejudiced and granted Armstrong’s application for habeas
    relief. The government appeals the district court’s finding of prejudice. We reverse
    and deny the writ.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    At approximately 11:00 p.m., on January 5, 1996, Armstrong and his
    companions—Armstrong’s biological brother, Solomon Armstrong (Solomon);
    Armstrong’s foster brother, Antwon Hamilton (Antwon); Antwon’s biological brother,
    Tyreese Hamilton (Tyreese); and Armstrong’s friend, Charles Brown
    (Brown)—decided to drive from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Hayti Heights, Missouri,
    to visit Antwon’s and Tyreese’s biological family. The group arrived in Hayti Heights
    on January 6, 1996, at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 a.m., and drove to 108 North
    Martin Luther King Drive. Armstrong later learned it was the residence of Channelle
    Davis (Channelle), Antwon’s and Tyreese’s cousin.
    That evening, several people came to Channelle’s residence, and the group
    eventually decided to go to C.J.’s, a local nightclub. While the group was at C.J.’s,
    an argument erupted between Diane Davis (Diane)1 and Terrell McGee (Terrell), who
    were dating. The argument became heated, and several people witnessed Terrell slap,
    push, or grab Diane. Tyreese joined in the argument to defend his cousin, Diane,
    which prompted Terrell’s brother, Carlos McGee (Carlos), to join in the argument to
    protect Terrell. As the argument escalated, other friends and family members of the
    Davises, including the Hamiltons and the Armstrongs, became involved in the
    altercation with the McGees. The bar owner, Charles Jones (Jones), pulled out a
    handgun and ordered everyone out of the bar. Those involved in the argument left the
    1
    Most of the Davises referenced in this opinion are siblings. Diane is the sister
    of Channelle, Levonne, J., Devonne, and T. Davis. Each of the Davis siblings are
    cousins of Antwon and Tyreese, and several of them were also friends with
    Armstrong.
    -2-
    bar and resumed the argument in the parking lot. During the melee, several gunshots
    were fired, killing Carlos, and wounding Devonne Davis (Devonne) and Yolanda
    Childress (Yolanda).2
    After the shootings, Armstrong’s companions—Solomon, Antwon, Tyreese,
    and Brown—returned to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and did not return to Missouri for
    Armstrong’s trial. A jury convicted Armstrong of first-degree murder, two counts of
    first-degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal action.
    Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and a motion for post-conviction relief
    in the Missouri courts, Armstrong filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Missouri. Armstrong raised various grounds for relief, including a claim
    that Armstrong’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure the testimony of
    Armstrong’s out-of-state witnesses. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on
    February 14, 2002.
    Before discussing the merits of Armstrong’s application, the district court
    recognized Armstrong’s state post-conviction motion was filed five days late. As a
    result, the claims in his habeas application were procedurally defaulted. The district
    court determined that a state-employed prison librarian provided Armstrong with the
    wrong deadline for filing his post-conviction motion; therefore, Armstrong
    demonstrated cause to excuse his procedural default. However, the district court
    concluded Armstrong’s “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is without
    merit, and, therefore, he cannot demonstrate prejudice arising from his procedural
    default of the issue.”
    2
    Yolanda is a cousin of Carlos and Terrell.
    -3-
    Armstrong appealed, and this court remanded “for the limited purpose of
    considering whether trial counsel’s failure to secure the attendance of the out-of-state
    witnesses or a continuance in light of the Uniform Act [To Secure the Attendance of
    Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Proceedings] constituted ineffective
    assistance of counsel under Strickland.”3 Armstrong 
    I, 365 F.3d at 630
    . On remand,
    the district court again denied Armstrong’s application for habeas relief. The district
    court concluded Armstrong’s “trial counsel took reasonable steps to secure” the
    testimony of Armstrong’s out-of-state witnesses, and counsel’s actions “were
    sufficient to satisfy her burden under Strickland.” With regard to the continuance
    issue, the district court found Armstrong failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice as
    required under Strickland.
    On appeal, this court concluded Armstrong’s trial counsel did not exercise
    reasonable diligence and failed to take sufficient measures to secure the attendance of
    out-of-state witnesses. See Armstrong 
    II, 534 F.3d at 865-66
    . Thus, we found
    Armstrong satisfied the first Strickland prong, which requires defendants to show trial
    counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See 
    id. at 866;
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688-91 (1984). Because the record did
    not contain sufficient evidence to determine whether Armstrong was prejudiced by the
    absence of the out-of-state witnesses at trial, this court “remanded to the district court
    to provide Armstrong with a fair opportunity to develop the record concerning the
    actual content of the absent witnesses’ testimony, and for the district court to conduct
    an analysis of whether Armstrong has demonstrated prejudice under Strickland.”
    Armstrong 
    II, 534 F.3d at 868
    .
    On January 20, 2009, the district court held a second evidentiary hearing. Four
    witnesses testified at the hearing, including (1) Armstrong; (2) Armstrong’s biological
    brother, Solomon; (3) Armstrong’s foster brother, Antwon; and (4) Erik Thomas
    3
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984).
    -4-
    (Thomas), a witness for the government. After the hearing, the district court
    concluded Armstrong was prejudiced by the absence of Solomon and Antwon from
    Armstrong’s trial; therefore, Armstrong satisfied the second Strickland prong. The
    district court granted Armstrong’s application for habeas relief. The government
    appeals claiming (1) the district court erred in finding Strickland prejudice; and
    (2) even if Armstrong were prejudiced under Strickland, Armstrong has not shown he
    was sufficiently prejudiced to overcome his procedural default.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    A.     Standard of Review
    “When considering an appeal from the granting of habeas corpus relief on the
    ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court may engage in its own
    independent review of the district court’s conclusion, because the issue of ineffective
    assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Laws v.
    Armontrout, 
    863 F.2d 1377
    , 1381 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (citations omitted). “The
    district court’s findings of fact, however, are reviewable under the clearly erroneous
    standard.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    B.     Strickland Prejudice
    “To show prejudice [under Strickland], ‘[t]he defendant must show that there
    is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
    the proceeding would have been different.” McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 
    97 F.3d 1104
    ,
    1105 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    ). “A reasonable probability
    is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “‘[I]n determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court must consider the
    totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’” 
    Id. (internal marks
    omitted)
    (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
    477 U.S. 365
    , 381 (1986)). Thus, to conduct our
    analysis, we should add the testimony of Armstrong’s uncalled witnesses to the body
    of evidence actually presented at his trial. See 
    id. at 1105-06.
    In doing so, we shall
    consider: “(1) the credibility of all witnesses, including the likely impeachment of the
    -5-
    uncalled defense witnesses; (2) the interplay of the uncalled witnesses with the actual
    defense witnesses called; and (3) the strength of the evidence actually presented by
    the prosecution.” 
    Id. at 1106.
    1.    State’s Trial Evidence
    We begin our analysis by evaluating “the strength of the evidence actually
    presented by the prosecution.” 
    Id. At Armstrong’s
    trial, nineteen people testified for
    the state. These nineteen witnesses essentially comprise four different groups:
    (1) staff from C.J.’s nightclub, (2) relatives of the Davises, (3) friends and relatives
    of the McGees, and (4) police and other investigators or medical personnel.
    a.     Nightclub Staff
    Jones, the owner of C.J.’s nightclub, testified that on the night of January 6,
    1996, he witnessed Diane and Terrell pushing and arguing with each other inside his
    bar. Jones stated the situation began to escalate as other people became involved in
    the argument, so Jones took a handgun from his pocket and ordered those involved to
    leave the bar. Jones did not see anyone else with a gun, but stated Armstrong looked
    like he might have a gun, based upon the way Armstrong put his hand in his right
    pocket and “backed sideways outside the door.”
    Charles Doby (Doby) was working as the doorman at C.J’s nightclub on
    January 6, 1996. Doby testified Armstrong went to the back of the club and got a gun
    from someone. When Armstrong was standing beside Doby, Armstrong pulled the
    gun out of his pocket and raised it up, not aiming at anyone, and Armstrong made
    some gang references. Doby told Armstrong to get out of the bar, Armstrong left the
    bar, and sometime thereafter, Doby heard shots fired outside. Doby did not see
    anyone else with a gun that night.
    -6-
    b.    The Davises4
    Six Davis siblings testified at Armstrong’s trial. Levonne Davis (Levonne)
    testified she met Armstrong before the date of the shooting when she went to visit her
    cousins, Antwon and Tyreese, in Milwaukee. The other Davis siblings did not say
    whether they knew Armstrong before the date of the shooting,5 but they all visited
    with Armstrong on January 6, 1996, when he stayed at Channelle’s house. That
    evening a group of people, including the Davises, the Hamiltons, the Armstrongs, and
    Terrell, gathered at Channelle’s house. J. Davis (J.), who was sixteen, testified he saw
    Armstrong with a gun on the table at Channelle’s house. J. also saw the gun in
    Armstrong’s hand.
    Later, the group decided to go to C.J.’s nightclub. Two trips were made to the
    bar that night. The first trip consisted only of the Armstrongs, the Hamiltons, and
    Brown. Armstrong testified that after about one hour at the bar, his brothers could not
    drive because they had been drinking heavily so Armstrong returned to Channelle’s
    house and picked up the others. Although there is some confusion about who was in
    the vehicle during the second trip to the nightclub, most parties said Armstrong
    returned to Channelle’s residence and drove Channelle, Devonne, Diane, Terrell, and
    another young woman named Diane Vaughn, back to C.J.’s nightclub. Channelle
    testified she was in the front passenger seat of Armstrong’s vehicle when she saw a
    gun in the car Armstrong was driving. Channelle stated the radio had been removed
    from the vehicle, and a gun, which was covered with wires, had been placed in the
    radio compartment.
    4
    Diane, Channelle, Levonne, J., Devonne, and T. Davis testified. We need not
    reference T.’s testimony as he was not present at the time of the shootings at issue in
    this appeal.
    5
    Armstrong testified he previously met both Levonne and Devonne during their
    visits to Milwaukee.
    -7-
    Inside the nightclub, J., Diane, Devonne, and Channelle, each testified Diane
    and Terrell became involved in an argument which began to escalate as more people
    got involved. Some of the Hamiltons and the Armstrongs intervened in the dispute
    on Diane’s behalf, while some of the McGees intervened on Terrell’s behalf. At that
    point, Jones, the bar owner, displayed a handgun and ordered the group out of the bar.
    Devonne testified she saw Armstrong with a gun while inside the bar. Channelle
    testified Armstrong was yelling, “G.D.,” which stands for “Gangster Disciple.” Diane
    also heard Armstrong yelling “G.D.,” but Diane did not know what it meant.
    After Jones ordered everyone to leave the nightclub, Levonne, J., Devonne,
    Channelle, and Diane each testified they went outside and stood in the parking lot.
    Each testified the argument continued outside the nightclub and they saw Armstrong
    with a gun. Devonne, Channelle, and Diane testified they did not see anyone else in
    the parking lot with a gun. Levonne witnessed Armstrong shooting down toward the
    ground at Carlos, who had fallen. Devonne stated she saw Armstrong shoot at Carlos,
    saw Carlos fall to the ground, and observed Armstrong begin shooting down toward
    the ground. Channelle witnessed Armstrong shoot at Carlos as Carlos tried to run
    away, Channelle then saw Carlos get shot and fall to the ground. Diane also testified
    Armstrong began shooting at Carlos and Carlos fell to the ground. J. said he saw
    Armstrong shooting, but J. ducked and did not see who Armstrong was shooting
    toward. Devonne related that as Armstrong was firing at Carlos, Armstrong also shot
    Devonne and Yolanda.
    Immediately after the shooting, Armstrong, Solomon, Antwon, Tyreese, and
    Brown ran to Solomon’s car in an attempt to flee. Both Devonne and Levonne
    testified Devonne, wounded, followed the men to Solomon’s car and got in the car.
    When the men realized the car was stuck in mud, the men left the car and ran to
    Channelle’s residence, leaving Devonne behind.
    -8-
    Armstrong, Solomon, Antwon, and Tyreese were arrested soon after the
    shooting and, with the exception of Armstrong, they were released the following day.
    After their release, the men returned to Milwaukee. Devonne and J. also traveled to
    Milwaukee after the shooting and J. testified he stayed for about one year.
    c.     Friends and Relatives of the McGees
    Several friends and relatives of the McGees were at C.J.’s on the night of
    January 6, 1996, including Terrell and Carlos, their mother Rosie McGee (Rosie),
    Rosie’s live-in boyfriend, Steve Winters (Steve), and Steve’s cousin, Michael Winters
    (Michael). Also present were Terrell’s and Carlos’s first cousins, Yolanda and Felicia
    Moore (Felicia). Terrell, Rosie, Michael, Yolanda, and Felicia each testified at
    Armstrong’s trial.
    Terrell met Armstrong earlier that day at Channelle’s house. Terrell testified
    he saw Armstrong with a gun at Channelle’s house and Armstrong stated he had the
    gun so “when he go to the club, nobody trip with him.” Terrell also reported that on
    the way to the bar, Terrell noticed the radio was missing from the car Armstrong was
    driving, and there was a gun in the radio compartment.
    Later that evening, after Terrell and Diane began to argue at the bar, Yolanda,
    Michael, Felicia, and Terrell each described Armstrong becoming involved in the
    argument, pulling a handgun, and “hollering G.D.” Rosie denied seeing Armstrong
    with a gun inside the bar, but someone told her Armstrong had a gun. Jones drew his
    gun and told the group to leave the bar. The argument resumed in the parking lot, and
    Terrell, Rosie, Michael, Yolanda, and Felicia affirmed they saw Armstrong take out
    a gun and begin to fire, resulting in Carlos’s death and wounding Devonne and
    Yolanda. After the shooting, Armstrong and his group fled.
    -9-
    d.      Police, Investigators, and Medical Personnel6
    Officer Durrell Hayes (Officer Hayes) and Deputy Sheriff Billy Woodall
    (Deputy Woodall) went to 108 North Martin Luther King Drive to arrest Armstrong,
    Solomon, Antwon, and Tyreese, for their suspected involvement in the shootings.
    Officer Hayes and Deputy Woodall testified that during the arrest, shots were fired
    from outside the house, hitting Officer Hayes in the chest. Emerson Branch, a relative
    of the McGees, was later tried and convicted of shooting Officer Hayes.
    Deputy Sheriff Len Welsh (Deputy Welsh) was also involved in the shooting
    investigation and reported on the evidence collected during the investigation. Deputy
    Welsh described how a .32 caliber bullet was removed from Officer Hayes, and a .32
    caliber bullet was found on Carlos’s gurney.
    Andy Wagoner (Wagoner) is a firearms and tool marks examiner at the
    Southeast Missouri Regional Crime Laboratory. In addition to the .32 caliber bullet
    found on Carlos’s gurney, Wagoner testified another .32 caliber bullet was removed
    from Carlos during an autopsy. Wagoner testified the bullet on Carlos’s gurney and
    the bullet removed from Carlos’s body were fired from the same gun. Wagoner
    concluded the bullet removed from Officer Hayes was fired from a different gun than
    the bullets identified with Carlos because Carlos’s two bullets had class characteristics
    “that [were] six lands and grooves inclined to the left,” and the bullet taken from
    Officer Hayes had class characteristics “that [were] five lands and grooves inclined
    to the right.” No gun was ever recovered and the gunshot residue tests performed on
    Armstrong, Solomon, Antwon, and Tyreese, proved inconclusive.
    6
    The state presented testimony from the coroner and from the doctor who
    performed Carlos’s autopsy, but their testimony is not relevant for purposes of this
    appeal.
    -10-
    2.     Actual Defense Witnesses and Uncalled Witnesses
    a.     Actual Defense Witnesses
    The defense called three witnesses to testify at trial on Armstrong’s behalf.
    First, the defense recalled Felicia who previously told a police officer she heard
    Armstrong’s gun make a clicking sound. Armstrong’s defense counsel may have been
    attempting to show Armstrong’s gun was not the same type of gun as the gun used to
    shoot the three victims at C.J.’s nightclub.
    The second witness, Tonya Williamson (Tonya), Jones’s niece, saw part of the
    argument between Diane and Terrell. Tonya also explained how other bar patrons
    became involved in the altercation, and she heard Rosie encouraging her sons to fight.
    Tonya stated that during the argument, her uncle pushed everyone outside and ordered
    Tonya and her sister to go back inside, and they hid behind the bar. Tonya did not see
    anyone with a gun inside the bar that night, but she knew her uncle kept a gun at the
    bar.
    Armstrong was the third and final witness for the defense. Armstrong testified
    he went to Hayti Heights, Missouri, with Solomon, Antwon, Tyreese, and Brown to
    visit Antwon’s and Tyreese’s cousins. Armstrong referred to Solomon, Antwon, and
    Tyreese as his brothers. Armstrong explained the group went to Channelle’s
    residence, played ball, slept, and then decided to go out. Armstrong and his brothers
    went to C.J.’s, where his brothers were “drinking real heavy,” and could not drive.
    Armstrong stated he only had a couple of drinks, so he went to pick up Channelle,
    Terrell, Devonne, Diane, and Diane Vaughn, and brought them back to C.J.’s.
    Armstrong admitted there was a hole in the car dashboard where the radio should have
    been, but Armstrong denied having a gun in the radio compartment. Armstrong also
    denied observing an argument inside the nightclub.
    Armstrong said he was having a conversation with Jones, when Jones
    exclaimed, “[W]ait a minute,” got up, and ran past Armstrong to the back of the bar.
    -11-
    Armstrong described how all the club patrons rushed outside. Armstrong did not
    know where his brothers were, so he started calling for them, and then he heard
    Tyreese’s voice outside. Armstrong slipped through the people crowded at the door,
    and was still standing in the club when Armstrong asked Tyreese what was happening.
    Tyreese said, “man, they all here tripping.” Armstrong claimed he tried to encourage
    Tyreese to “just let it go,” when a man behind Armstrong said, “get out, get out, get
    out,” and showed Armstrong a gun. Armstrong does not know who the man was, and
    said the man did not testify. Armstrong claimed he had never seen a gun before, so
    he put his hands in the air and said, “okay, man, let me get my coat.” Armstrong
    grabbed his coat and walked backwards outside.
    Armstrong testified he saw Tyreese, Diane, and Antwon standing eight to
    fifteen feet from the door, while Diane and Terrell were arguing with some other
    people. Armstrong stated he asked Tyreese what was going on and tried to calm
    Tyreese down by stating, “we didn’t come down here for that, let’s go.” Armstrong
    said Tyreese stopped arguing and responded, “all right, let’s go.” Armstrong
    described how he walked over to get Antwon, but Antwon was engaged in an
    argument in another area of the parking lot and refused to leave. Armstrong reported
    he began walking toward Carlos, but Michael cut Armstrong off and stated, “I advise
    you to get your brothers.” Armstrong testified, the man had his hands in his pockets
    and “the way he looked at me, he made a straight eye contact. . . . And at that time I
    felt that maybe he had a gun on him.” Armstrong stated he backed away from
    Michael and walked to Antwon who was telling the crowd he would fight them all.
    The crowd approached them and Antwon asked, “What’s up?” Armstrong claims
    someone responded, “this is what’s up,” and started shooting.
    Armstrong ran to the car, but it was stuck in the mud. As the group tried to get
    the car out of the mud, the same person started shooting again, so they ran to 108
    North Martin Luther King Drive to hide. Armstrong insisted he did not brandish a
    gun at C.J.’s nightclub, and he did not shoot Carlos, Devonne, or Yolanda.
    -12-
    During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, “are you saying you saw
    somebody shoot, but you don’t know who they were?” Armstrong responded, “I
    never saw a gun. The only thing I saw was the shots, well, when the fire come out of
    it just fired and I ducked and ran.”
    Armstrong testified Antwon, Solomon, Tyreese, and Brown returned to
    Milwaukee sometime after the shooting. Armstrong noted that, while he was
    incarcerated, Devonne and J. went to Milwaukee to stay with Armstrong’s brother and
    Armstrong spoke to Devonne and J. on the telephone.
    b.    Uncalled Defense Witnesses
    On January 20, 2009, the district court held Armstrong’s habeas corpus hearing,
    and two of Armstrong’s out-of-state witnesses testified.7 Solomon, Armstrong’s
    biological brother, was the first witness. Solomon testified his foster brother, Antwon,
    wanted to go to Hayti Heights, Missouri, to visit family, so Solomon, Armstrong,
    Antwon, Tyreese, and Brown traveled together. Solomon claimed he did not see
    anyone in the car with a firearm. Solomon stated they went to 108 North Martin
    Luther King Drive, which Solomon believed was the home of Diane Davis. That
    night, the group decided to go to C.J.’s nightclub, and while they were at the
    nightclub, a fight broke out between Diane and Terrell. Solomon walked over to the
    fight with Antwon, but Armstrong remained seated at the table. Solomon stated the
    bouncer had a firearm and asked Solomon’s party to leave. Solomon reported he
    heard Rosie encourage Carlos and Terrell to fight.
    Solomon went outside and Antwon, Tyreese, and the McGees followed.
    Armstrong was still inside the bar getting his jacket. Solomon walked over to his car
    and tried to get the car out of the mud. Solomon claims it was so dark outside he
    7
    Armstrong briefly testified on his own behalf, but we do not believe it is
    necessary to recount his testimony here.
    -13-
    could only see approximately five feet in front of him. When Solomon could not get
    his car out of the mud, he went back and forth from his brothers to his car a couple of
    times, trying to get them to help him. Solomon was walking back to his car when he
    heard the gunshots. Solomon testified the gunshots came from the area of the parking
    lot where “the McGees and my family was actually standing.” Solomon could not see
    the people because it was too dark.
    Solomon then stated, “[W]hen I the heard the gunshots, I immediately kind of
    took cover behind my car to see what was going on, and that’s when pretty much
    everybody just scattered.” Solomon heard between five and twelve shots, and never
    saw anyone with a gun, but he did see the gun flash. Again, Solomon testified the
    flash came from near the front entrance of the bar “where the McGees and also my
    family were standing.” Solomon does not recall Armstrong in that area. Solomon
    maintains Armstrong and the three other men joined Solomon at his car and tried to
    push the car out of the mud, when someone started shooting at them. When the men
    could not get the car extracted, the group ran to North Martin Luther King Drive, past
    the men who were shooting at them. Solomon stated they went to either Channelle’s
    or Diane’s house. While they were at the residence on North Martin Luther King
    Drive, someone shot at the house. The men turned off the lights and hid in a hallway
    where there was no phone to call for help. Solomon testified there was a series of
    three drive-by shootings, and during the last drive-by shooting, Officer Hayes was
    shot. Solomon, Armstrong, Tyreese, and Antwon were arrested. Solomon said, the
    next morning everyone but Armstrong was released, and Solomon and the others
    eventually returned to Milwaukee.
    Solomon explained, before Armstrong’s trial, Armstrong’s defense attorney
    called Solomon and asked him to testify on Armstrong’s behalf. Solomon told
    Armstrong’s counsel he had no money or method of transportation, and counsel told
    him to borrow the money and she would reimburse him. Solomon said he would have
    attended Armstrong’s trial if he had the means.
    -14-
    During cross examination, Solomon again stated Armstrong did not know about
    the fight between Diane and Terrell, and Armstrong was still inside the bar when
    Solomon and the others walked outside, followed by the McGees. Solomon claimed
    he was in his car trying to get it out of the mud when the shots were fired. The
    prosecutor asked, “So you were in the car, working it back and forth or whatever, at
    the time you heard the shots?” Solomon replied, “Yes.” Solomon again indicated the
    shots were coming from the front entrance of the bar. The prosecutor clarified that
    Armstrong had been inside the bar and later exited the front entrance of the bar, which
    is where the shots came from. Solomon stated he saw a flash from the area near the
    front entrance of the bar, but he did not identify who fired the gun. Solomon then
    took cover either behind or on the side of his car when the shots were fired. Solomon
    asserted he continued to take cover until Armstrong pulled him and they started to run.
    Solomon did not see Armstrong until after the shots were fired and Armstrong ran to
    the car. Solomon again testified he never saw the shooter.
    Armstrong’s foster brother, Antwon, also testified at Armstrong’s habeas
    corpus hearing. At the time of the hearing, Antwon was incarcerated for a 1999
    controlled substance conviction. Antwon testified he was sentenced to serve over
    sixteen years imprisonment. Antwon explained he did not have any convictions at the
    time of Armstrong’s trial. Antwon reported that on January 6, 1996, Antwon,
    Armstrong, Solomon, Tyreese, and Brown drove to his cousin Diane’s home in Hayti
    Heights, Missouri. Antwon testified various people came over to Diane’s home that
    day, including Diane’s boyfriend Terrell, whom Antwon knew from previous visits
    and considered to be a friend. Antwon testified he left for C.J.’s nightclub with
    Armstrong, Solomon, Tyreese, and Brown. Antwon stated Diane and Terrell met
    them at the club later. After a time in the nightclub, Antwon saw a commotion in the
    front of the club, and when he asked what was going on, Terrell got defensive.
    Tyreese said Terrell slapped Diane, so Antwon confronted Terrell. Antwon told
    Terrell they should take it outside, so Antwon walked out and Terrell and his family
    followed.
    -15-
    Antwon testified he was under the influence of alcohol to the point “it made
    [him] do things that [he] normally wouldn’t do in character,” for example, he felt more
    aggressive. Antwon was ready to fight and the crowd gathered around him. Brown
    notified Antwon’s friends and family in the bar that Antwon was going to get jumped,
    so his brothers, including Armstrong, came outside to stand by him. Antwon said he
    never saw a gun inside the bar, and outside the bar it was “real dark.” Antwon
    testified Rosie was encouraging Carlos and Terrell to fight, while Solomon,
    Armstrong, Tyreese, and Brown were next to Antwon trying to calm him down.
    Armstrong told Antwon to let it go and said, “They got guns, man.” Antwon testified
    he did not see anyone with a firearm. Armstrong tried to grab Antwon, but Antwon
    resisted, and that is when Antwon heard the gunshots.
    Antwon stated he and his group were standing facing the bar, while the McGees
    were standing facing the road. Antwon asserted he turned around and saw fire from
    gunshots as the shots were fired from the street toward the direction of the club.
    Antwon testified he ran to their car, which was stuck in the mud, and put the car in
    reverse, but the wheels were just spinning. Antwon said Solomon was in the car with
    him, while Armstrong, Tyreese, and Brown were outside of the car. When the men
    could not get the car out, they jumped out of the car and began to run toward the road.
    Antwon stated they ran inside Channelle’s house. Antwon claimed he called his aunt
    and told her someone was shooting at them. The police arrived and ordered Antwon
    and his three brothers to lie on the floor. While they were being arrested, an officer
    was shot and fell on top of them. Antwon described how someone walked into the
    house where they were lying, pointed at them, and said they were the men at the
    nightclub that night. Armstrong, Solomon, Antwon, and Tyreese were then arrested.
    Antwon also testified that before Armstrong’s trial, Antwon was contacted by
    an investigator for Armstrong’s attorney. Antwon does not recall whether the
    investigator asked Antwon to testify at Armstrong’s trial. Antwon stated, if he had
    been asked to testify, he would have, but only “[i]f they would have made the
    -16-
    arrangements to get [him] there and protect [him],” because he was afraid for his life.
    During cross-examination, Antwon denied telling an investigator from the attorney
    general’s office that the shots came from directly behind him and to the right.
    After Antwon testified, the state called Thomas, an investigator with the Public
    Safety Unit of the Missouri Attorney General’s Office. Thomas conducted an
    interview of Antwon on January 6, 2009, at the Federal Correctional Center where
    Antwon was housed. Thomas asked Antwon about the shooting, and Antwon said he
    was outside the club at the time of the shooting. Antwon stated Armstrong was
    standing behind and to the right of Antwon. When Thomas asked Antwon where the
    shots came from, Antwon explained, “[T]he shots came from right here,” and gestured
    behind him and to the right. Antwon insisted Armstrong was not the shooter and said,
    “I know for a fact he wasn’t the shooter and that he did not have a gun with him.”
    Thomas asked Antwon if he would have returned to Missouri if Antwon had been
    subpoenaed. Antwon replied he would not have returned because he was afraid of
    getting shot.
    3.    Credibility of All Witnesses
    We must also consider the credibility of the uncalled witnesses to determine
    whether Armstrong was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance. See
    
    McCauley-Bey, 97 F.3d at 1106
    . Armstrong’s two uncalled witnesses are both subject
    to impeachment. Antwon and Solomon have close personal relationships with
    Armstrong—Antwon is Armstrong’s long-time foster-brother, and Solomon is
    Armstrong’s biological brother. This relationship creates a potential bias and a motive
    to provide false information, which could lead to the release of Antwon’s and
    Solomon’s brother from prison. See Williams v. United States, 
    452 F.3d 1009
    , 1013
    (8th Cir. 2006) (noting the extent of the witness’s personal relationship with the
    defendant should be considered in evaluating the credibility of the witness). Neither
    Antwon nor Solomon came forward to testify at Armstrong’s trial, despite receiving
    telephone calls from Armstrong’s counsel or her investigator providing them with
    -17-
    information about the trial and offering to reimburse them for their travel. See
    
    McCauley-Bey, 97 F.3d at 1106
    (recognizing the witness’s failure to come forward
    promptly may impact the credibility of the witness).
    At the time of the habeas hearing, Antwon was serving a 200-month prison
    sentence for a 1999 drug conviction, which he received three years after Armstrong’s
    trial. Antwon could not have been impeached for this offense at the time of
    Armstrong’s trial, and we have already held Armstrong’s attorney should have
    secured Antwon’s attendance at the time of Armstrong’s initial trial. However, we
    must also weigh the credibility of the testimony Antwon provided at the habeas
    hearing, and Antwon’s felony conviction certainly weakens his credibility. See Fed.
    R. Evid. 609(a)(1), (b).
    In addition to Antwon’s and Solomon’s close relationship with Armstrong, and
    Antwon’s criminal history, the credibility of Armstrong’s uncalled witnesses must
    also be questioned on the basis of their inconsistent testimony. Solomon twice
    changed his testimony when referencing where he was at the time of the shooting.
    Solomon initially claimed he was walking toward his car and then took cover by his
    car when the shots were fired. Solomon next asserted he was inside his car, trying to
    get it out of the mud when the shooting started. Finally, Solomon claimed he was
    standing beside his car, taking cover when the shots were fired. Despite Solomon’s
    poor memory of his location at the time the shooting began, he testified the shooting
    came from near the front entrance of C.J.’s nightclub, he could only see approximately
    five feet in the dark, he did not see who was responsible for the shooting, and he did
    not see Armstrong until after the shooting began and Armstrong met Solomon at the
    car. Even if Solomon’s testimony were believed, Solomon’s testimony that he did not
    see Armstrong at the time of the shooting, or who did the shooting, is not particularly
    beneficial to Armstrong’s defense.
    -18-
    Antwon also provided inconsistent testimony at the habeas hearing. Most
    significantly, Antwon claimed the shots were fired from the road, whereas the other
    eyewitnesses who identified the location of the shooting, including Solomon, testified
    the shooting took place near the front entrance of C.J.’s nightclub. Additionally, both
    Antwon and Solomon placed themselves inside the vehicle after the shooting, trying
    to work the car out of the mud. Antwon was also the only witness to testify there was
    access to a telephone at Channelle’s house after the shootings, and instead of
    contacting the police, Antwon called his aunt. Antwon insists Armstrong did not have
    a gun in C.J.’s parking lot, but like Solomon, Antwon did not see who was responsible
    for the shootings. This testimony is contradicted by the government’s nine
    eyewitnesses8 who testified they saw Armstrong shoot Carlos, Devonne, and
    Yolanda.9 See 
    McCauley-Bey, 97 F.3d at 1106
    (discounting the credibility of an
    uncalled witness whose testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of the other
    witnesses).
    Armstrong attempts to challenge the credibility of the government witnesses,
    claiming the relationship of the victims and the witnesses creates a motive to fabricate.
    This relationship did not exist with the employees of C.J.’s nightclub, including the
    doorman who testified he saw Armstrong display a gun, as Armstrong stood beside
    the doorman inside the club. C.J’s owner testified Armstrong acted as if he had a gun.
    We are unconvinced any of the Davises had a recognizable motive to falsely
    accuse Armstrong of murder. The Davises are each biologically related to Antwon
    and Tyreese, and Armstrong considers Antwon and Tyreese brothers. Armstrong
    8
    Levonne, Yolanda, Michael, Diane, Felicia, Devonne, Channelle, Terrell, and
    Rosie.
    9
    J. also saw Armstrong begin to fire his weapon, but J. ducked and did not see
    Armstrong actually shoot Carlos. When J. got up, he saw that his sister, Devonne, had
    been shot.
    -19-
    knew Devonne and Levonne from their visits to Milwaukee, and Armstrong met the
    other Davises, those who testified at trial, at Channelle’s house that day. When Diane
    and Terrell began to argue, some of the Hamiltons and the Armstrongs came to
    Diane’s defense, putting them on the same side of the argument as the Davises. After
    the shooting was over, Devonne, who had been shot in the thigh, went to the car
    Armstrong had driven to the bar and asked for a ride. When Solomon, Antwon, and
    Tyreese returned to Milwaukee, J. and Devonne followed and stayed with them.
    Armstrong reported he continued talking to Devonne and J. while he was incarcerated.
    The relationship Armstrong had with the Davises does not support Armstrong’s claim
    the Davises had a motive to fabricate information about his guilt.
    Armstrong charges the McGees were biased because they were seeking
    vindication for Carlos’s death. Armstrong puts forth a theory that Carlos was hit by
    friendly fire and the McGees wanted to pin the death on Armstrong. The remarkable
    consistency of the McGees’s statements with the testimony of the unrelated witnesses
    lends credibility to the McGees’s testimony. We must consider, of course, that the
    McGees were involved in an altercation with the Armstrongs and the Hamiltons, and
    would have a bias against Armstrong for that reason.
    4.     Analysis
    On remand for the second time, the district court found Antwon and Solomon
    were credible witnesses because (1) neither had given a prior statement that could be
    used to impeach them, (2) neither had a criminal conviction at the time of trial, and
    (3) “while small details may have varied between the accounts the two men gave more
    than thirteen years after the fact, they were unequivocal in their assertions that
    [Armstrong] never possessed a firearm.” In considering the interplay of the uncalled
    witnesses with the actual defense witnesses called, the district court concluded
    Solomon’s and Antwon’s testimony would not have been cumulative, and they “could
    have provided a defense for [Armstrong] had they been called to testify.” Finally, the
    district court considered the strength of the prosecution’s case and noted “there was
    -20-
    some confusion regarding both the ballistic reports from the shootings of [Carlos] and
    [Officer Hayes], and the chains of custody of the bullets from the shootings.” The
    district court also emphasized that the close relationship of Antwon and Solomon with
    Armstrong “is neutralized by the fact that all the State’s witnesses had personal
    relationships with the victims and/or with each other.”
    The district court did not give proper weight to the credibility of the uncalled
    witnesses, the interplay between the uncalled witnesses and the actual defense
    witnesses called, and the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution. See
    
    McCauley-Bey, 97 F.3d at 1106
    -07. Taking into consideration each of the McCauley-
    Bey factors, we conclude Armstrong failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
    the outcome of his trial would have been different had it not been for defense
    counsel’s ineffectiveness.
    First, Armstrong’s uncalled witnesses offered inconsistent testimony, in part,
    and were patently impeachable. In contrast, the government’s witnesses were largely
    consistent with one another, and several had no rational basis for prevarication. The
    district court erred in finding Armstrong’s relationship with Antwon and Solomon was
    “neutralized” by the relationships many of the state’s witnesses had with the victims.
    There is no evidence in the record to support the view that the staff at C.J.’s nightclub
    or the Davises had any bias or motive to testify falsely. The district court’s citation
    that neither Antwon nor Solomon had given a prior statement does not bolster their
    credibility. In fact, their failure to come forward for so many years has the opposite
    effect. And, while it is true neither witness had a conviction at the time of trial,
    Antwon did have a felony conviction at the time of the habeas hearing, which should
    be considered when measuring his hearing credibility. It is also necessary to consider
    the inconsistencies in Solomon’s and Antwon’s testimony. Antwon’s testimony the
    gunfire came from the direction of a nearby road is contrary to each of the
    government’s witnesses, as well as Armstrong’s and Solomon’s.
    -21-
    Second, while Antwon and Solomon are the only witnesses who have attempted
    to corroborate Armstrong’s claim that Armstrong was unarmed at the time of the
    shootings, neither of the uncalled witnesses testified to seeing someone other than
    Armstrong fire the shots which killed Carlos, and injured Devonne and Yolanda.
    Solomon’s testimony described the darkness and actually placed Armstrong in the
    area where the shots were fired at the time the shots were fired.
    Finally, “there is no prejudice if, factoring in the uncalled witnesses, the
    government’s case remains overwhelming.” 
    Id. at 1106
    (citations omitted). At
    Armstrong’s trial, the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution was
    overwhelming. Of the government’s nineteen witnesses, ten of the witnesses10
    testified they saw Armstrong with a gun in C.J.’s parking lot. The same ten witnesses
    saw Armstrong shooting the gun. Although J. was ducking and did not see
    Armstrong’s target, the remaining nine witnesses testified they saw Armstrong
    shooting at Carlos. The district court accurately observed there is no physical
    evidence connecting Armstrong to the shooting.11 However, the testimonial evidence
    10
    Levonne, Yolanda, Michael, J., Felicia, Devonne, Channelle, Diane, Terrell,
    and Rosie.
    11
    The district court indicated there was confusion regarding the ballistics reports
    from the shootings of Carlos McGee and Officer Hayes. During Armstrong’s trial,
    Wagoner, a firearms and toolmarks examiner, was the only person to testify on this
    issue. Wagoner concluded the two bullets could not have been fired from the same
    gun. No evidence was presented to contradict this testimony.
    The district court also took issue with the chains of custody of the bullets
    collected after the shootings. During Armstrong’s trial, the prosecution and defense
    stipulated to the chains of custody of the bullets removed from Carlos and Officer
    Hayes. The prosecutor and defense counsel also stipulated there was an incorrect date
    on the chain of custody for some of the shell casings and clarified the appropriate date
    for the jury. Defense counsel declared, “we’re not objecting to the chain of custody
    and [its] correct date.” In light of this stipulation and clarification, no issue regarding
    the chain of custody for the bullets remained.
    -22-
    against Armstrong convinces us there is no reasonable probability the outcome of
    Armstrong’s trial would have been different had Armstrong’s uncalled witnesses
    testified. See 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    . For these reasons, we conclude the district
    court erred in finding prejudice and granting Armstrong’s application for a writ of
    habeas corpus.
    C.     Procedural Default
    The district court, in its initial order, concluded the claims in Armstrong’s
    habeas application were procedurally defaulted when Armstrong filed his state motion
    for post-conviction relief five days after the deadline. The district court found cause
    for Armstrong’s procedural default because a state-employed prison librarian gave
    Armstrong the wrong deadline for filing the motion. The district court then decided
    Armstrong’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless, and as a result,
    Armstrong failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to excuse the default.
    “A claim is procedurally defaulted if a habeas petitioner failed to raise it in state
    proceedings.” Wooten v. Norris, 
    578 F.3d 767
    , 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation
    omitted). “A showing of cause and prejudice may serve to excuse a procedural default
    and open the door to federal review of an applicant’s otherwise defaulted claim.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    12 To demonstrate procedural bar prejudice, Armstrong “must
    shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a
    possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial
    disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”
    United States v. Frady, 
    456 U.S. 152
    , 170 (1982). Our court has “observed that
    [procedural bar] ‘prejudice’ is higher than that required to establish ineffective
    Finally, the district court noted no firearm was introduced at trial. This absence
    of the actual weapon is neither unusual nor particularly significant in this case.
    12
    We need not determine whether the district court properly held Armstrong
    demonstrated sufficient cause to excuse his default, because we decide this issue based
    upon the prejudice inquiry.
    -23-
    assistance of counsel under Strickland.” Charron v. Gammon, 
    69 F.3d 851
    , 858 (8th
    Cir. 1995) (citing Zinzer v. Iowa, 
    60 F.3d 1296
    , 1299 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995)). But see
    Clemons v. Luebbers, 
    381 F.3d 744
    , 752-53 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting the standards
    for prejudice under the Strickland analysis may be similar to the standards for
    prejudice under the procedural default analysis).
    Armstrong has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice under Strickland. It
    necessarily follows that Armstrong has not shown defense counsel’s failure to procure
    the testimony of Antwon and Solomon “worked to [Armstrong’s] actual and
    substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
    dimensions.” 
    Frady, 456 U.S. at 170
    . We likewise conclude Armstrong has failed to
    establish sufficient prejudice to overcome his procedural default. See 
    id. III. CONCLUSION
         We reverse the judgment of the district court and deny, with prejudice,
    Armstrong’s § 2254 application.
    ______________________________
    -24-