United States v. Thomas Casey , 365 F. App'x 725 ( 2010 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-2205
    ___________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                   * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the Western
    v.                                 * District of Missouri.
    *
    Thomas D. Casey,                         * [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 5, 2010
    Filed: February 17, 2010
    ___________
    Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    After the district court1 denied his motion to suppress a firearm seized from his
    person and statements he made to police, Thomas D. Casey pleaded guilty to being
    a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his
    suppression motion. Following sentencing and entry of judgment, Casey filed this
    appeal challenging the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable John
    T. Maughmer, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
    We review the denial of a suppression motion de novo and the underlying
    factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Sallis, 
    507 F.3d 646
    , 649
    (8th Cir. 2007). At the suppression hearing, the government presented evidence that
    the firearm was discovered during a traffic stop, after a Peculiar, Missouri police
    officer stopped the vehicle in which Casey was a passenger because its windshield
    was cracked. The car’s owner received a citation under Peculiar Ordinance
    § 385.010, which prohibits the driving of a vehicle “in such defective mechanical
    condition as to be reasonably likely, because of such defective mechanical condition,
    to cause damage to persons or property while being so driven.”
    Based on the hearing testimony and plain language of section 385.010, we
    conclude it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that driving a car with
    a cracked windshield violated section 385.010. See United States v. Guel-Contreras,
    
    468 F.3d 517
    , 521 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court’s witness credibility determinations
    are virtually unassailable on appeal); United States v. Martin, 
    411 F.3d 998
    , 1001 (8th
    Cir. 2005) (question is not whether driver actually violated Motor Vehicle Code, but
    whether objectively reasonable police officer could have formed reasonable suspicion
    that driver was committing violation; police officers are not expected to interpret
    traffic laws with subtlety and expertise of defense attorney); United States v. Ramos-
    Caraballo, 
    375 F.3d 797
    , 800-01 (8th Cir. 2004) (vehicle stop is reasonable if it is
    supported by probable cause to believe traffic violation, however minor, has
    occurred). Therefore, Casey’s argument that Missouri statutes do not prohibit
    operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield is unavailing.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
    ______________________________
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