United States v. Laron Hill ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-1880
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Laron Isadel Hill
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
    ____________
    Submitted: April 9, 2018
    Filed: August 9, 2018
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Laron Isadel Hill was serving a term of supervised release when he was found
    to be in possession of a controlled substance and a firearm. The district court1
    1
    The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of
    Minnesota.
    revoked his term of supervised release and sentenced him to 30 months’
    imprisonment for violating the conditions of his release. Hill appeals, arguing that
    the district court erroneously admitted laboratory reports into evidence without
    requiring the laboratory technicians who had performed the testing to be available for
    cross-examination. We affirm.
    I. Background
    In 2004, Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with
    intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846. He was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment to
    be followed by a five-year term of supervised release, which began to run in May
    2011.
    The probation office’s January 2016 petition to revoke Hill’s term of
    supervised release alleged eight violations: (1) failure to abstain from illegal activity;
    (2) failure to abstain from possession of a firearm; (3) failure to abstain from
    frequenting places where drugs are sold, used, distributed, or administered; (4) failure
    to abstain from excessive use of alcohol or drug possession; (5) failure to abstain
    from associating with felons; (6) failure to answer truthfully to a probation officer;
    (7) failure to notify the probation office of a change in residence; and (8) failure to
    abstain from excessive alcohol and from purchasing, possessing, using, distributing
    or administering any controlled substance.
    The government called three witnesses at the revocation hearing: Minneapolis
    Police Officers Danielle Evans and Jeffrey Werner, and Probation Officer Elbert
    Shepherd. Officer Evans testified that she participated in the execution of the search
    warrant at Hill’s apartment. The officers handcuffed Hill as they entered the
    apartment, and Evans then patted him down, finding $4,500 in cash in his pocket.
    She thereafter found keys to a storage locker in a common area of Hill’s apartment,
    -2-
    as well as a document indicating the storage locker belonging to Hill. Evans went to
    the storage locker, which was located in the laundry room on the same level as the
    apartment, and found an EAA .357 caliber revolver, .357 caliber ammunition, a
    Taurus .45 caliber pistol, and suspected heroin inside a drawstring camouflage bag
    that matched the pattern of Hill’s bed sheets. Evans turned the firearms and heroin
    over to Officer Werner.
    Officer Werner, the lead investigator in the case, testified that he collected all
    of the evidence seized during the search. He brought the seized substance back to the
    police station, where it field-tested positive for heroin. Werner also collected a DNA
    sample from Hill, and Minneapolis Police crime technicians swabbed the firearms for
    DNA. He then delivered the suspected heroin along with the DNA samples to the
    Bureau of Apprehension Forensic Science Laboratory (Forensic Lab) for further
    testing. Over Hill’s objection, the district court admitted the forensic laboratory
    report that confirmed that the seized substance was 24.853 grams of heroin. It also
    admitted the laboratory report that determined that the DNA collected from the
    Taurus .45 caliber pistol was a mixture of four individuals and that Hill could not be
    excluded as a contributor, unlike 99.91 percent of the general population.
    Probation Officer Shepherd then testified that a condition of Hill’s supervised
    release required him to submit to periodic drug testing, which included wearing sweat
    patches that can detect controlled substances or related metabolites in a person’s
    sweat. Shepherd also discussed the application, wearing, removal, delivery, labeling,
    and results of the sweat patches. Over Hill’s objection, the district court admitted five
    sweat patch laboratory reports, which indicated that Hill had used either cocaine,
    heroine, or both, while wearing the patches.
    In admitting the laboratory reports over Hill’s objections, the district court
    acknowledged that the rules of evidence do not apply to revocation hearings, but also
    determined that the evidence was reliable. The district court then found that Hill had
    -3-
    violated the conditions of his supervised release, that his conduct resulted in a Grade
    A violation, and that he had a criminal history category of IV.2 The United States
    Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) recommended a sentence between
    24 and 30 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a 30-month sentence.
    II. Discussion
    Hill argues that the district court erred in admitting the laboratory reports into
    evidence in the absence of Hill’s opportunity to cross-examine the experts who had
    prepared them. We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions, as well as its
    decision to revoke supervised release, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ray,
    
    530 F.3d 666
    , 667 (8th Cir. 2008). We review de novo questions arising under the
    Constitution. 
    Id.
    The government concedes that it offered the district court no explanation for
    not calling the technicians who had prepared the reports or the chemist who had
    tested the substance. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a
    defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses in criminal prosecutions. U.S. Const.
    amend. VI; see Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 42 (2004). In Melendez-Diaz
    v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 310-11 (2009), the Supreme Court held that a
    defendant in a drug distribution case had the right to confront the analysts who tested
    the seized substance because their certificates of the test results were testimonial and
    the analysts were witnesses for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme
    Court extended this holding in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
    564 U.S. 647
    , 663
    (2011), concluding that a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated had the
    right to confront the analyst who had personally conducted the analysis of the
    defendant’s blood, and that the substitution of a person knowledgeable about the
    2
    Hill challenges the sentence only to the extent that it is based on the Grade A
    violation. He does not challenge his Grade C violations.
    -4-
    testing procedures would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment confrontation requirement.
    Although Hill asks us to extend the Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming holdings to
    supervised release revocation hearings, we conclude that our holding that any error
    in admitting the reports was harmless pretermits our consideration of that request.
    We reach the same conclusion with respect to Hill’s argument that the Due Process
    Clause and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure confer upon him the right to
    cross-examine the laboratory technicians.
    We conclude that any error in admitting the laboratory reports in the absence
    of an explanation by the government of why it did not provide live testimony from
    the laboratory technicians was harmless. Although the laboratory reports supported
    the government’s case, the remaining evidence was clearly sufficient to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Hill had violated his supervised release. United
    States v. Miller, 
    557 F.3d 910
    , 913-47 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3))
    (standard of review); United States v. Williams, 
    982 F.2d 1209
    , 1212 (8th Cir. 1992)
    (“[T]he identity of a controlled substance can also be proved by circumstantial
    evidence and opinion testimony.”). Testimony showed that Hill had $4,500 in cash
    on him when he was searched, that police seized the suspected heroin and the
    firearms from a locker that belonged to Hill, that the substance was concealed in a
    drawstring bag that matched the pattern of Hill’s bed sheets, that the substance was
    separated into numerous individual plastic bags in a manner consistent with drug
    distribution, and that the substance field-tested positive for heroin. See United States
    v. Salsberry, 
    825 F.3d 499
    , 501-02 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the testimony of a
    probation officer, arresting officer, jailer, and the defendant, along with a positive
    field test was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant
    had violated his supervised release). The district court thus did not abuse its
    discretion in revoking Hill’s supervised release and sentencing him in accordance
    with its finding that he had violated the condition not to possess a controlled
    substance or firearm.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -5-