M. Gwyn Myles v. Department Of Corrections ( 2018 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
July 24, 2018
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
M. GWYN MYLES, individually and as No. 49928-2-II
Personal Representative of the Estate of
WILLIAM LOYD MILES, deceased,
Respondent,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, a governmental UNPUBLISHED OPINION
entity; JOHN DOE EMPLOYEE(S) and JANE
DOE EMPLOYEE(S), employees of the State
of Washington,
Appellants,
CLARK COUNTY, a municipality; JOHN
DOE EMPLOYEE(S) and JANE DOE
EMPLOYEE(S), employees of Clark County;
CARLOS VILLANUEVA-VILLA and JANE
DOE VILLANUEVA-VILLA, husband and
wife, and the marital community composed
thereof; and R.H. BRUSSEAU and JANE
DOE BRUSSEAU, husband and wife, and the
marital community composed thereof,
Defendants.
JOHANSON, J. — M. Gwyn Myles, individually and as the personal representative of her
husband William Myles’s estate, sued the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) for
the wrongful death of her husband, William Myles, in a vehicle accident caused by Carlos
No. 49928-2-II
Villanueva-Villa in January 2006. Myles alleged that the DOC’s negligent supervision of
Villanueva-Villa led to her husband’s death. The superior court denied the DOC’s summary
judgment motion. We granted the DOC’s motion for discretionary review.1
Because the DOC lacked the authority (1) to supervise Villanueva-Villa on his felony
conviction under former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), (2) to toll Villanueva-Villa’s misdemeanor
probation, and (3) to supervise him on his misdemeanor conviction after May 10, 2005 under
former RCW 9.94A.501 (2005), Myles fails to establish that the DOC had a duty to prevent
Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles.2 Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s
order denying the DOC’s motion for summary judgment and remand for the superior court to
dismiss the DOC from this case.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
A. 2003 CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES
In April 2003, nearly three years before Villanueva-Villa was involved in an accident that
caused William Myles’s death, Villanueva-Villa pleaded guilty to misdemeanor second degree
vehicle prowling and felony bail jumping.3 The superior court sentenced him on April 14, 2003.
1
See Ruling Granting Review, Myles v. State, No. 49928-2-II (Wash. Ct. App. June 20, 2017).
2
The DOC also argues that there was no question of fact as to proximate cause. Because we hold
that there was no duty, we do not address proximate cause.
3
Villanueva-Villa committed the misdemeanor offense on August 8, 2001, and the felony offense
on April 1, 2002.
2
No. 49928-2-II
On the felony conviction, the superior court imposed a sentence of 61 days in custody, with
credit for 61 days served, and 12 months of community custody under DOC supervision. Among
other conditions, Villanueva-Villa’s community custody for the felony conviction required him to
not violate any laws and to notify his community corrections officer (CCO) of any change in
address. The superior court also imposed legal financial obligations (LFOs).
On the misdemeanor conviction, the superior court imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail,
with credit for 61 days and 304 days suspended, and 12 months of probation supervised by the
DOC. The conditions of his misdemeanor probation required him to report regularly, to not violate
any laws, to notify the DOC within 48 hours of any arrest or citation, and to obtain permission to
move.
B. POST-SENTENCE ACTIVITY AND STATUTORY CHANGES
1. 2003
At his May 5, 2003 DOC intake, the DOC classified Villanueva-Villa “as an ‘RM-D’
offender.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 46, 257. RM-D offenders are at the lowest risk to reoffend.
Villanueva-Villa also successfully reported at a reporting kiosk.
On May 21, DOC’s mail to Villanueva-Villa was returned as undeliverable. On June 17,
the DOC attempted a “skip trace” and contacted Villanueva-Villa’s brother, who informed them
Villanueva-Villa was in the process of moving. CP at 257 (capitalization omitted).
On July 1, former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) came into effect. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 379, § 3.
This statute limited the DOC’s authority to supervise felony offenders to only those offenders who
(1) were assessed “in one of the two highest risk categories,” (2) had current or prior convictions
for one of several enumerated offenses, (3) were subject to chemical dependency treatment as a
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No. 49928-2-II
condition of community custody, placement, or supervision, (4) were sentenced under a first-time
offender waiver or special sex offender sentencing alternative, or (5) were subject to supervision
under the interstate compact for adult offender supervision (RCW 9.94A.745). Former RCW
9.94A.501(2), (3) (2003). Villanueva-Villa did not qualify for supervision under any of these
categories.
On November 18, the DOC again attempted to contact Villanueva-Villa about his LFOs by
mail and the mail was returned. On December 29, prompted by Villanueva-Villa’s failure to notify
the DOC that his address had changed, Villanueva-Villa’s CCO filed a violation notice related to
the misdemeanor sentence and informed Villanueva-Villa that “any violations will be addressed
by the Court on the misdemeanor portion” of his case.4 CP at 338. The violation notice also stated
that the misdemeanor sentence would expire April 13, 2004, after which the DOC would “no
longer have an interest in this Cause.” CP at 339. The DOC recommended a sanction of 10 days
incarceration for each of the three violations, to be served consecutively. It also noted a violation
hearing for March 4, 2004.
2. 2004
In late January 2004, the DOC again tried to contact Villanueva-Villa by mail and the mail
was returned as undeliverable. When Villanueva-Villa failed to appear for the March 4 violation
hearing, the superior court issued a bench warrant.
On April 29, the DOC closed supervision on the felony sentence because Villanueva-Villa
did “not meet the criteria for continued supervision by the [DOC]” under former RCW 9.94A.501
4
These violations included (1) failure to report an address change, (2) failure to pay LFOs, and (3)
failure to pay the costs of supervision.
4
No. 49928-2-II
(2003). CP at 342. On April 30, the DOC closed supervision on the misdemeanor sentence
because that sentence expired on April 13, 2004, and the DOC determined that the existence of the
warrant did not toll the closure of the misdemeanor supervision. These closure reports were filed
with the superior court on May 6.
On May 24, the Clark County Prosecutor filed a motion for an order modifying or revoking
“the Judgment and Sentence previously imposed” on the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 5 CP
at 347. The prosecutor also requested a bench warrant for Villanueva-Villa’s arrest. That same
day, the superior court issued a bench warrant to secure Villanueva-Villa’s presence for a hearing
on the State’s motion to modify or revoke the felony and misdemeanor sentences.
According to the DOC’s chronology notes, on July 30, the DOC reopened supervision of
the felony sentence and requested a “Secretary’s warrant,” apparently because the DOC believed
that the felony supervision had been tolled while Villanueva-Villa was not reporting.6 CP at 48.
The DOC alleged that Villanueva-Villa had failed to report a change of address in January 2004
and had failed to pay LFOs. The DOC recommended that Villanueva-Villa be required to report
“by kiosk” for 30 days and serve 30 days on a state work crew. CP at 241. A “secretary’s warrant”
was entered August 3.
5
The prosecutor’s motion listed four violations that occurred between April 14, 2003 and March
4, 2004: (1) failure to provide a change of address, (2) failure to pay LFOs, (3) failure to pay cost
of supervision, and (4) failure to appear at the March 4, 2004 hearing.
6
In his declaration supporting the DOC’s motion for summary judgment, Robert Story, a former
community corrections supervisor for the DOC who had worked with Villanueva-Villa’s case,
opined that this rescission was in error and that the DOC lost the authority to supervise Villanueva-
Villa on July 1, 2003, when former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) became effective.
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No. 49928-2-II
On August 12, the DOC filed a report in Clark County Superior Court on Villanueva-
Villa’s felony conviction.7 In this report, the DOC requested that supervision be reopened,
apparently because the DOC failed to toll Villanueva-Villa’s felony supervision due to his abscond
status.
3. 2005
In 2005, the legislature amended the criteria for DOC supervision, former RCW 9.94A.501
(2003), to include misdemeanors. LAWS OF 2005, ch. 362, § 1. The 2005 amendment took effect
May 10, 2005. LAWS OF 2005, ch. 362, § 5.
On October 10, 2005, Villanueva-Villa was arrested for driving a vehicle with expired tags
and without insurance and was held on the outstanding warrants. On October 11, the superior
court issued an order modifying Villanueva-Villa’s sentence, which imposed a 30-day sanction.8
The order did not specify whether it was addressing the felony or the misdemeanor, but the
memorandum of disposition issued the same day lists only the felony conviction. The DOC noted
in its chronology that Villanueva-Villa’s sentence had been tolled from November 18, 2003 (the
date the DOC’s second letter to Villanueva-Villa was returned) through October 10, 2005 (the date
of his arrest).
The DOC held a negotiated sanction hearing with Villanueva-Villa on October 20. On
October 21, the negotiated sanction requiring Villanueva-Villa to report to the DOC for 30 days
7
It is not clear why the DOC’s chronology notes state that the DOC had reopened supervision on
July 30, but the report was not filed in the superior court until August 12.
8
The order lists four violations: (1) failing to provide a change of address between May 21, 2003
and November 18, 2003, (2) failing to pay LFOs, (3) failing to pay the cost of supervision, and (4)
failing to appear for the March 4, 2004 hearing.
6
No. 49928-2-II
and to provide a valid address immediately was entered in the superior court. The negotiated
sanction form noted that the supervision on the felony offense would end March 5, 2006 due to
tolling. The negotiated sanction form lists only the felony offense.
Villanueva-Villa was released on bail on October 21, and reported to the DOC as directed.
From October 21 until the end of December, he substantially complied with the negotiated
sanctions, although he occasionally missed a day of reporting. The DOC advised Villanueva-Villa
that he would not get reporting credit for the days he missed. During this reporting period,
Villanueva-Villa also failed to advise the DOC before he moved.
Meanwhile, on November 26, Villanueva-Villa was arrested for driving under the influence
(DUI) in Clark County. When he failed to appear for the December 5 hearing on this matter, an
arrest warrant was issued. But on December 6, unaware of the November 26 DUI, the DOC
completed a “review checklist” and noted that Villanueva-Villa was in compliance with his
conditions and that he had not committed any new law violations. CP at 259 (capitalization
omitted).
On December 23, Villanueva-Villa was arrested for a second DUI in Clark County. When
he failed to appear for the December 29 hearing on this matter, another arrest warrant was issued.
4. 2006
Villanueva-Villa did not report to the DOC the week ending January 6, 2006. When the
DOC attempted to contact him on January 8, his roommate said that Villanueva-Villa had moved.
On January 13, the DOC requested a warrant because Villanueva-Villa had failed to report
a change of address and had failed to report daily. This led to a file review of Villanueva-Villa’s
case, and the DOC determined that Villanueva-Villa’s supervision for the felony should have been
7
No. 49928-2-II
closed July 1, 2003, the effective date of former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003). Once this was
discovered, the DOC requested that the warrant request be cancelled and terminated DOC
supervision as of January 13.
On January 27, 2006, Villanueva-Villa caused the accident that killed William Myles.
Following this accident, Villanueva-Villa was again cited for driving under the influence, and the
State charged him with vehicular homicide. Villanueva-Villa pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide
and hit and run (death).
II. PROCEDURE
On January 20, 2009, Myles filed a wrongful death action against the DOC and other
defendants. Myles alleged that the DOC’s negligence in failing to adequately monitor or supervise
Villanueva-Villa while he was on “community custody” led to William Myles’s death. CP at 19.
The DOC moved for summary judgment. The DOC argued that it did not owe a duty to
William Myles or to his estate and that Myles had failed to establish proximate cause. In support
of its summary judgment motion, the DOC presented a declaration from former community
corrections supervisor Story.
Story stated that Villanueva-Villa had been classified as an RM-D offender, the lowest risk
level the DOC assigned. According to Story, the “[s]upervision of ‘RM-D’ offenders was
essentially administrative supervision to monitor whether or not the offender was current in
payments on [legal financial obligations (LFOs)].” CP at 43.
Story also stated that from 2003 to 2006, the “DOC did not receive reports from law
enforcement agencies for contact that ‘RM-D’ offenders may have had with law enforcement.”
CP at 43. Thus, the DOC did not have knowledge of any new offenses unless the new crime was
8
No. 49928-2-II
discovered during the quarterly reviews that occurred before the scheduled closure date or the
offender self-reported contact with law enforcement.
Myles responded to the DOC’s summary judgment motion. Myles asserted that (1) the
DOC had the authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa on the misdemeanor conviction until May
10, 2005 due to tolling and because the negotiated sanction agreement created a special
relationship between the DOC and Villanueva-Villa and (2) DOC still had the responsibility to
report violations even if it was not “‘actively’” monitoring Villanueva-Villa. CP at 294. Nothing
in Myles’s response contradicted Story’s affidavit.
The trial court denied the DOC’s motion for summary judgment.
The DOC moved for discretionary review of the order denying summary judgment. We
accepted discretionary review. See Ruling Granting Review, Myles v. State, No. 49928-2-II
(Wash. Ct. App. June 20, 2017).
ANALYSIS
The DOC argues that Myles did not establish that the DOC had a duty to prevent
Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles under the special relationship doctrine because
Myles failed to show that the DOC had a take-charge relationship with Villanueva-Villa.
Specifically, the DOC argues that there was no take-charge relationship because (1) the DOC had
no authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa on the felony conviction after July 1, 2003, the effective
date of former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), (2) the DOC’s ability to supervise Villanueva-Villa on the
misdemeanor conviction ended when the one-year probationary period expired on April 13, 2004
and was not subject to tolling by the DOC, and (3) the DOC had no authority to supervise
9
No. 49928-2-II
Villanueva-Villa on the misdemeanor conviction after May 10, 2005 under former RCW
9.94A.501 (2005). We agree.
I. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
We review summary judgment orders de novo, performing the same inquiry as the superior
court. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wash. 2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005).
“Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Vallandingham, 154 Wash. 2d at 26 (quoting CR 56(c)). When reviewing a summary judgment, we
consider all facts and reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Vallandingham, 154 Wash. 2d at 26.
To establish the elements of negligence, Myles must show (1) the existence of a duty, (2)
breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) causation. Couch v. Dep’t of Corr., 113 Wn.
App. 556, 563, 54 P.3d 197 (2002). Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law. Hertog v.
City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999).
II. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE AND TAKE-CHARGE RELATIONSHIP
“In general, an actor ‘has no duty to prevent a third person from causing physical injury to
another.’” Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 564 (quoting Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 218, 822 P.2d
243 (1992)). One exception to this rule is when there is “‘a special relationship’ between the actor
and the third person.’” Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 564 (quoting Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 218). “Such
a relationship must be ‘definite, established[,] and continuing,’ but it need not be custodial.”
Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 564 (quoting Hertog, 138 Wash. 2d at 276-77, 288; citing Bishop v. Miche,
10
No. 49928-2-II
137 Wash. 2d 518, 524, 973 P.2d 465 (1999); Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 219; Honcoop v. State, 111
Wash. 2d 182, 193, 759 P.2d 1188 (1988)).
One form of special relationship that can result in a duty is a “take-charge” relationship
between a parole officer and a parolee. Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 218-20. In Joyce v. Department of
Corrections, 155 Wash. 2d 306, 315-16, 119 P.3d 825 (2005), our Supreme Court extended the
special relationship doctrine to CCOs who have a take-charge relationship with a convicted person.
To determine whether a supervising officer has “taken charge” of [a
convicted person] within the meaning of Taggart and Restatement [of Torts] §§
315 and 319, a court must examine “the nature of the relationship” between the
officer and that person, including all of that relationship’s “[v]arious features[.]” In
most cases, two of the most important features, though not necessarily the only
ones, will be the court order that put the [convicted person] on the supervising
officer’s caseload and the statutes that describe and circumscribe the officer’s
power to act. A community corrections officer must have a court order before he
or she can “take charge” of [a convicted person]; and even when he or she has
such an order, he or she can only enforce it according to its terms and applicable
statutes.
Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 565 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)
(quoting Bishop, 137 Wash. 2d at 527; Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 219).
III. FELONY SUPERVISION
The DOC contends that after July 1, 2003, just two months after Villanueva-Villa’s initial
intake and two and a half years before William Myles’s death, it could not have formed a take-
charge relationship with Villanueva-Villa based on the felony conviction because under former
RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), the DOC lacked the authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa. We agree.
Former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), which took effect July 1, 2003, required the DOC to
perform a risk assessment of the felony offender and to “classify the offender into one of at least
four risk categories.” Former RCW 9.94A.501(1) (2003). It further required the DOC to supervise
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No. 49928-2-II
a felony offender sentenced to terms of community custody if the offender’s risk assessment was
in one of the two highest risk categories, or, regardless of the offender’s risk category, if
(1) the offender had a current or prior conviction for a sex offense, a violent
offense, a crime against a person, a felony domestic violence offense, residential
burglary, or one of several drug offenses;
(2) the offender’s community custody included chemical dependency
treatment;
(3) the offender was sentenced under a first-time offender waiver or a
special sex offender sentencing alterative; or
(4) the offender was subject to supervision under the interstate compact for
adult offender supervision.
Former RCW 9.94A.501(2) (2003). But most importantly for this case, former RCW 9.94A.501(3)
(2003) provided that “[t]he [DOC] is not authorized to, and may not, supervise any offender
sentenced to a term of community custody, community placement, or community supervision
unless the offender is one for whom supervision is required under subsection (2) of this section.”
In May 2003, the DOC determined that Villanueva-Villa’s risk classification was RM-D,
the lowest risk to reoffend. And Villanueva-Villa did not fall under any of the categories
specifically enumerated in former RCW 9.94A.501(2) (2003). Thus, after July 1, 2003, former
RCW 9.94A.501(3) (2003) expressly precluded the DOC from supervising Villanueva-Villa on
his felony conviction.
As we acknowledged in Couch, among the “most important features” establishing a take-
charge relationship are “the statutes that describe and circumscribe the [supervising] officer’s
power to act.” 113 Wash. App. at 565. Even if there is a court order placing a defendant on the
supervisor’s case load, the CCO “can only enforce [the order] according to [the order’s] terms and
applicable statutes.” Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 565; see also Terrell C. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
Servs., 120 Wash. App. 20, 28, 84 P.3d 899 (2004) (“[I]n cases where there is no underlying statutory
12
No. 49928-2-II
authority to control or [to] take charge of the offender’s behavior, no special relationship has been
imposed.”). Thus, after July 1, 2003, two and a half years before the accident that killed William
Myles, the DOC had no authority to control Villanueva-Villa and, therefore, no take-charge
relationship with respect to Villanueva-Villa under the felony conviction. Because Myles does
not establish a take-charge relationship, Myles cannot establish that the DOC had a duty to prevent
Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles based on a failure to supervise Villanueva-Villa on
his felony conviction.9
Myles argues that under RCW 9.94A.345, former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) does not apply
because the superior court must apply the sentencing statutes in effect at the time of the crime. We
disagree.
RCW 9.94A.345 provides that defendants must be sentenced under the law in effect at the
time the crime was committed. According to the statutory note accompanying RCW 9.94A.345,
the legislature intended RCW 9.94A.345 to cure any ambiguity as to what law to use when
calculating a convicted defendant’s offender score for purposes of sentencing and “to clarify the
9
Myles asserts that “[i]f it was the intent of the legislature to make conditions of an offender’s
sentence contingent upon DOC’s risk assessment findings, the statute would specifically state such
contingency -- but it does not.” Resp’t’s Opening Br. at 17. But that is precisely what former
RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) states in relation to the DOC’s role in supervising a felony offender’s
community custody. Former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) did not, however, eliminate the court’s
ability to enforce sentencing conditions.
Myles also appears to assert that because the legislature failed to pass a prior bill that would
have allowed the DOC to “eliminate” or “terminate” community custody in 2002, the elimination
or termination of community custody was not the legislature’s intent in 2003. Resp’t’s Opening
Br. at 18. But whether the legislature passed a different bill a year earlier is irrelevant. Also, the
2003 amendment did not allow the DOC to eliminate or terminate community custody, it just
limited the DOC’s ability to enforce community custody from 2003 until the statute expired in
2010. Even if the DOC could not enforce community custody, the superior court could.
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No. 49928-2-II
applicability of statutes creating new sentencing alternatives or modifying the availability of
existing alternatives.” LAWS OF 2000, ch. 26, § 1. RCW 9.94A.345 was not intended to limit the
legislature’s ability to define the scope of the DOC’s authority. Additionally, former RCW
9.94A.510 (2003) did not prevent the superior court from sentencing Villanueva-Villa under the
statutes in effect when the crimes were committed, it merely determined who had the authority to
enforce the sentence.
Myles further argues that State v. McClinton, 186 Wash. App. 826, 347 P.3d 889 (2015), and
State v. Medina, 180 Wash. 2d 282, 324 P.3d 682 (2014), demonstrate that former RCW 9.94A.501
(2003) does not apply to sentences imposed before July 1, 2003. But these cases are not persuasive.
McClinton addressed whether the DOC could “use GPS (global positioning system)
monitoring to keep track of a sex offender who [was] serving the community portion of a sentence”
when the statutes in effect at the time of the offense “did not specifically provide the [DOC] with
authority to use GPS monitoring.” McClinton, 186 Wash. App. at 828. Division One of this court
recognized that “[t]he terms of a defendant’s sentence are governed by the version of the
Sentencing Reform Act [of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW] in effect when the crime was committed.”
McClinton, 186 Wash. App. at 829. But McClinton addressed whether the DOC had the authority
to use a new method of monitoring the offender that was not statutorily authorized rather than the
DOC’s authority to enforce community custody conditions generally. Unlike here, where the
change in the law related only to the DOC’s enforcement authority, requiring the offender to wear
a new monitoring system not expressly authorized changed the nature of the punishment imposed.
In Medina, our Supreme Court addressed whether an offender should receive credit for
time served in programs that he participated in as a condition of release after his original conviction
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No. 49928-2-II
was vacated but before he was reconvicted. 180 Wash. 2d at 284-87. After stating that a “defendant
must be sentenced in accordance with the law in effect at the time of his or her offense,” the court
examined the law in effect at the time of the offense to determine if Medina was entitled to credit
for time served. Medina, 180 Wash. 2d at 287. Again, Medina addressed a matter that related to the
severity of the punishment because it could increase or decrease the offender’s time in custody,
rather than the DOC’s general authority to enforce community custody conditions.
Myles asserts that the final bill report for engrossed substitute senate bill 5990, the bill that
enacted former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), establishes that the DOC had some remaining active
supervisory duty of Villanueva-Villa. Final B. Rep. on Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5990, 58th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003). As Myles notes, the bill report states that offenders with low risk
classifications “are actively supervised only if a violation of a release condition is brought to the
attention of the [DOC].” FINAL B. REPORT, supra, at 2. But that section of the bill report describes
the background of the bill—in other words, what the statute formerly required—not what the
amended statute required. FINAL B. REPORT, supra, at 2. In fact, the bill report expressly states
that under former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), the DOC did not have the authority to actively
supervise someone unless that person fell into the specific categories described in the statute.
FINAL B. REPORT, supra, at 2-3. Thus, the bill report does not support the conclusion that the DOC
had an active supervisory duty after the 2003 amendment. Accordingly, this argument is not
persuasive.
Finally, Myles also asserts that the felony conditions should have been tolled. Even if the
conditions should have been tolled, the DOC lacked the authority to enforce them after July 1,
2003 under former RCW 9.94A.501(3) (2003).
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No. 49928-2-II
Because the DOC did not have the authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa on his felony
conviction after July 1, 2003, Myles fails to establish that the DOC had a take-charge relationship
with Villanueva-Villa under the felony sentence. Thus, Myles fails to establish that the DOC had
a duty under the felony sentence to prevent Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles.
IV. MISDEMEANOR PROBATION
We next turn to whether Myles has established that the DOC had a duty to prevent
Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles under the misdemeanor conviction. The DOC
argues that it did not have any duty under the misdemeanor conviction because (1) its authority
expired on April 14, 2004, when Villanueva-Villa’s one-year probationary supervision ended and
the DOC had no authority to toll the probationary period, and (2) it had no authority to supervise
Villanueva-Villa after May 10, 2005, under former RCW 9.94A.501(3) (2005). We agree.
A. NO TOLLING
When Villanueva-Villa’s misdemeanor probation period ended on April 13, 2004, DOC
policy prohibited the DOC from tolling misdemeanor supervision unless specifically ordered by
the trial court. DOC Policy 320.160.10 Although there was statutory authority permitting the DOC
to toll felony supervision,11 the statutes addressing misdemeanor probation did not give the DOC
the authority to toll a misdemeanor probation period. Instead, RCW 9.95.230 provided that the
10
Available at http://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/defaults.aspx?show=300.
11
See former RCW 9.94A.545 (2003). Former RCW 9.94A.545 (2003) applied only to
“offenders,” which at that time included those convicted of only felony offenses. Former RCW
9.94A.030(30) (2002). The definition of “offender” was not amended to include misdemeanor or
gross misdemeanor probationers until 2009. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 375, § 4.
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No. 49928-2-II
court had the authority any time before the entry of an order terminating probation to modify an
order suspending the defendant’s sentence.
Because the DOC did not have the authority to toll Villanueva-Villa’s misdemeanor
probation, its relationship with Villanueva-Villa based on the misdemeanor conviction ended on
April 13, 2004, barring any extension by the superior court.12 Without any authority over
Villanueva-Villa, there was no “‘definite, established[,] and continuing,’” relationship between the
DOC and Villanueva-Villa, and therefore no “‘special relationship’” based on the misdemeanor
conviction that resulted in any duty to protect William Myles.13 Couch, 113 Wash. App. at 564
(quoting Hertog, 138 Wash. 2d at 276, 288).
12
To the extent Myles is arguing that the DOC’s failure to supervise Villanueva-Villa before April
13, 2004, was negligent, we note that the DOC reported Villanueva-Villa’s pre-April 13, 2004
violations to the superior court and a bench warrant was issued for Villanueva-Villa’s arrest before
the DOC closed the misdemeanor case. The issuance of the warrant terminated any special
relationship that may have resulted under the misdemeanor conviction up to that point. See Smith
v. Dep’t of Corr., 189 Wash. App. 839, 849, 359 P.3d 867 (2015) (special relationship between the
DOC and defendant terminates after the defendant has absconded and an arrest warrant was
issued), review denied, 185 Wash. 2d 1004 (2016).
13
Myles also argues that even if there was no statutory authority allowing the DOC to toll a
misdemeanor probation sentence, common law allows for tolling. But Myles does not direct us to
any cases that allow the DOC to toll a misdemeanor probation sentence—the cases he cites all
address the court’s tolling authority. See City of Spokane v. Marquette, 146 Wash. 2d 124, 134, 43
P.3d 502 (2002) (examining tolling of suspended sentence by municipal court); State v. V.J., 132
Wash. App. 380, 384, 132 P.3d 763 (2006) (examining tolling of community supervision by juvenile
court); State v. Haugen, 22 Wash. App. 785, 787-88, 591 P.2d 1218 (1979) (examining tolling of
probation by trial court); State v. Frazier, 20 Wash. App. 332, 333, 579 P.2d 1357 (1978) (examining
tolling of probation by trial court); Gillespie v. State, 17 Wash. App. 363, 366-67, 563 P.2d 1272
(1977) (examining tolling of probation by superior court).
Myles further asserts that if the DOC could not toll a probationary period “then offenders
who abscond from probation or community supervision will not face any penalties as long as they
don’t get caught within one (1) year of sentencing.” Resp’t’s Opening Br. at 12. But this overstates
the consequences because the court still had the authority to extend the probationary period. RCW
9.95.230.
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No. 49928-2-II
B. FORMER RCW 9.94A.501 (2005)
Furthermore, even if the misdemeanor probation was tolled, the 2005 amendments to
former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003) prevented the DOC from supervising Villanueva-Villa after May
10, 2005, more than eight months before Villanueva-Villa caused the fatal accident.
In 2005, the legislature amended former RCW 9.94A.501 (2003), which had previously
applied to only felony offenders on community custody, placement, or supervision, to include
“every misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor probationer ordered by a superior court to probation
under the supervision of the [DOC].” Former RCW 9.94A.501(2) (2005); LAWS OF 2005, ch. 362,
§ 1. This amendment took effect May 10, 2005. Under former RCW 9.94A.501 (2005),
Villanueva-Villa’s risk level was too low to trigger supervision and he did not fall into any of the
specific categories of offenders that expressly required supervision,14 and thus the DOC lacked the
authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa on his misdemeanor conviction as well as the felony
conviction after May 10, 2005, more than eight months before the fatal accident. As discussed
above in section III, without the authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa, Myles cannot establish a
take-charge relationship. And because Myles does not establish a take-charge relationship, Myles
cannot establish that the DOC had a duty to prevent Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles
based on a failure to supervise Villanueva-Villa under the misdemeanor conviction.
V. OCTOBER 2005 AMENDED SENTENCE AND NEGOTIATED SANCTION
As noted above, on October 11, 2005, after Villanueva-Villa had been arrested and held on
outstanding warrants, the superior court issued an order modifying Villanueva-Villa’s sentence,
14
See former RCW 9.94A.501(2) (2005).
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No. 49928-2-II
which imposed a 30-day sanction. The DOC held a negotiated sanction hearing with Villanueva-
Villa on October 20. On October 21, the negotiated sanction requiring Villanueva-Villa to report
to the DOC for 30 days and to provide a valid address immediately was entered in the superior
court. The negotiated sanction stated that supervision would end March 5, 2006. Myles argues
that the superior court’s October 11, 2005 order, the resulting October 21 negotiated sanctions,
and the DOC’s subsequent monitoring of Villanueva-Villa reestablished a take-charge
relationship.15
Even if the trial court’s October 11, 2005 order extended Villanueva-Villa’s community
custody or misdemeanor probation and DOC was monitoring Myles after October 21, the DOC
had no authority to supervise Villanueva-Villa on his felony or misdemeanor convictions. As
discussed above in section III, as of July 1, 2003, the DOC was no longer authorized to supervise
Villanueva-Villa on his felony conviction. The DOC recognized they lacked authority to supervise
Villanueva-Villa and actually terminated DOC supervision as of January 13, 2006.16 And as of
May 10, 2005, the DOC was no longer authorized to supervise Villanueva-Villa on his
misdemeanor conviction. Because the DOC had no authority to supervise the felony community
custody or misdemeanor probation there was no take-charge relationship and no duty to prevent
Villanueva-Villa from harming William Myles.
Myles fails to establish a take-charge relationship under either the felony or misdemeanor
convictions. Without such a relationship, the DOC had no duty to prevent Villanueva-Villa from
15
We note that Myles does not argue that a duty to protect William Myles arose under the voluntary
assumption of duty doctrine.
16
We are not presented with the question and we do not decide what would have been the result
had DOC not terminated supervision.
19
No. 49928-2-II
harming William Myles, and the trial court erred when it denied the DOC’s motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for the trial court to enter an order
dismissing the DOC.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
JOHANSON, J.
We concur:
MAXA, C.J.
SUTTON, J.
20