United States v. Nuzzo ( 2021 )


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  • This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.
    Before
    GASTON, PENNIX, and MYERS
    Appellate Military Judges
    _________________________
    UNITED STATES
    Appellee
    v.
    Michael NUZZO III
    Culinary Specialist Third Class (E-4), U.S. Navy
    Appellant
    No. 202000072
    Decided: 9 August 2021
    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
    Military Judge:
    Chad C. Temple
    Sentence adjudged 10 December 2019 by a general court-martial
    convened at Naval Base San Diego, California, consisting of a military
    judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to
    E-1, confinement for 24 months, and a bad-conduct discharge.
    For Appellant:
    Captain Kimberly D. Hinson, JAGC, USN
    For Appellee:
    Lieutenant Commander Nicholas N. Joy, JAGC, USN
    Lieutenant Kevin G. Edwards II, JAGC, USN
    United States v. Nuzzo, NMCCA No. 202000072
    Opinion of the Court
    _________________________
    This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
    may be cited as persuasive authority under
    NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.
    _________________________
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of
    aggravated assault and two specifications of assault consummated by a
    battery, in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice
    [UCMJ], 1 for strangling a fellow service member, biting her, and striking her
    in the face.
    Appellant raises as his sole assignment of error that the convening au-
    thority erred by taking no action on the sentence for offenses that were
    committed prior to 1 January 2019; he asks us to remand for remedial post-
    trial processing. We find the convening authority’s lack of action on the
    sentence amounts to harmless error, and we affirm the findings and
    sentence.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The Charge and specifications that Appellant was convicted of occurred in
    November 2017 and were referred to court-martial in October 2019. At trial,
    Appellant was sentenced to reduction to E-1, confinement for 24 months, and
    a bad-conduct discharge. His clemency request asked the convening authority
    to “favorably recommend[ ] that the Naval Clemency and Parole Board grant
    [him] parole at the earliest opportunity.” 2 The convening authority stated in
    his subsequent action, “I take no action on the findings or sentence in this
    case.” 3
    1   
    10 U.S.C. § 928
    .
    2 Clemency    Request at 1.
    3 Convening    authority action at 2.
    2
    United States v. Nuzzo, NMCCA No. 202000072
    Opinion of the Court
    II. DISCUSSION
    As we have previously discussed, “the version of Article 60, UCMJ, in
    effect at the time of an appellant’s earliest offense is applicable to the extent
    it: requires convening authority action on the sentence . . . and authorizes the
    convening authority to approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the
    sentence.” 4 We retain jurisdiction for cases where the convening authority
    fails to take action on the sentence for offenses that occurred prior to 1
    January 2019 if those cases were referred to court-martial after 1 January
    2019. 5 As this is such a case, we retain jurisdiction and test any errors for
    prejudice under Article 59(a), UCMJ. 6
    Under the version of Article 60, UCMJ, in effect at the time of the earliest
    of Appellant’s offenses resulting in conviction, the convening authority’s
    options were to “approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence of a
    court-martial in whole or in part.” 7 Since the statement, “I take no action on
    the findings or sentence in this case,” does not satisfy any of these options, we
    find the convening authority’s action was erroneous.
    However, we find Appellant was not prejudiced by the error. Appellant’s
    clemency request, as noted in the staff judge advocate’s review, was for the
    convening authority to favorably endorse Appellant’s parole request to the
    4  United States v. Pearson, 
    81 M.J. 592
    , 601 n.21 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021)
    (citing 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec.
    Order 13,825, 
    83 Fed. Reg. 9,889
    , 9,890, sec 6.(b) (Mar. 1, 2018)). We are aware of our
    superior court’s recent decision in United States v. Brubaker-Escobar, ___ M.J. ___,
    No. 20-0345/AR, 
    2021 CAAF LEXIS 508
     at *8, 10 (C.A.A.F. June 4, 2021) (holding
    that the President’s Executive Order “is inconsistent with the [Military Justice Act of
    2016 [MJA]] to the extent it orders convening authorities to apply pre-MJA post-trial
    procedures to cases in which no UCMJ action was taken before the MJA’s effective
    date, January 1, 2019,” and that the Executive Order can no longer be used to apply
    the old Article 60, UCMJ “to cases in which no action was taken under the UCMJ
    before January 1, 2019”). We are also aware of CAAF’s subsequent vacation of that
    holding and granting of reconsideration in that case due to the appellant and
    appellee’s joint motion “citing for the first time a statute directly relevant to the
    granted issue.” United States v. Brubaker-Escobar, ___ M.J. ___, No. 20-0345/AR,
    
    2021 CAAF LEXIS 683
     at *1 (C.A.A.F. July 19, 2021). As CAAF’s interpretation of
    the law is currently unsettled, we maintain and apply the precedent we established
    in Pearson.
    5   Brubaker-Escobar, ___ M.J. ___, 
    2021 CAAF LEXIS 683
     at *17.
    6   See 
    id.
    7 Article     60(c)(2)(B) (2016), UCMJ.
    3
    United States v. Nuzzo, NMCCA No. 202000072
    Opinion of the Court
    Naval Clemency and Parole Board, and thus does not contain any “matters
    that may reasonably tend to affect the convening authority’s decision
    whether to disapprove any findings of guilty or to approve the sentence.” 8 As
    the clemency request was beyond the scope of R.C.M. 1105, we find that any
    lack of response by the convening authority is not prejudicial and therefore,
    as in Pearson, “the convening authority’s failure to take action on the
    sentence constitutes harmless error.” 9
    III. CONCLUSION
    After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel,
    we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and
    fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights
    occurred. 10
    The findings and sentence in the Entry of Judgment are AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    RODGER A. DREW, JR.
    Clerk of Court
    8 Rule   for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 1105(b).
    9   Pearson, 
    2021 CCA LEXIS 130
    , at *18.
    10   Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 202000072

Filed Date: 8/9/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/7/2021