Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Rick Lange ( 2011 )


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  •                United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 11-6062
    ________________
    In re:                                    *
    *
    Negus-Sons, Inc.,                         *
    *
    Debtor                           *
    *
    Rick D. Lange, Chapter 7 Trustee,         *
    * Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff – Appellee,            * Bankruptcy Court for the
    * District of Nebraska
    v.                         *
    *
    Mutual of Omaha Bank,                     *
    *
    Defendant – Appellant,           *
    *
    United States Treasury, Internal          *
    Revenue Service; Contractors,             *
    Laborers, Teamsters and Engineers         *
    Pension Plan; Contractors, Laborers,      *
    Teamsters and Engineers Health and        *
    Welfare Plan; International Union of      *
    Operating Engineers, Local No. 571        *
    *
    Defendants – Appellees           *
    _____
    Submitted: November 30, 2011
    Filed: December 22, 2011
    _____
    Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, SCHERMER, AND VENTERS, Bankruptcy Judges.
    _____
    VENTERS, Bankruptcy Judge.
    Defendant Mutual of Omaha Bank appeals the order of the bankruptcy court1
    granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Rick D. Lange, the
    Chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee”) of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The Trustee sought,
    and the bankruptcy court entered, an order determining that Mutual of Omaha does
    not have a security interest in certain of the Debtor’s personal property (“Property”).
    Defendant–Appellee United States and Defendant–Appellees the Contractors,
    Laborers, Teamsters and Engineers Pension Plan; the Contractors, Laborers,
    Teamsters and Engineers Health and Welfare Plan; and the International Union of
    Operating Engineers, Local No. 571 (collectively, the “Union Plans”) filed briefs in
    support of the Trustee’s position.2
    For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions are
    reviewed de novo.3 The bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed
    de novo.4
    1
    The Honorable Timothy J. Mahoney, United States Bankruptcy Judge for
    the District of Nebraska.
    2
    As indicated in the caption, Mutual of Omaha was one of several
    defendants named in the Trustee’s complaint to determine the existence, validity,
    and extent of liens claimed in the Debtor’s personal property. A trial was set on
    issues remaining after the entry of summary judgment on Mutual of Omaha’s
    interests, but a stipulation among the Trustee, the IRS, and Union Plans negated
    the need for a trial. On August 18, 2011, a judgment was entered on the entire
    adversary proceeding.
    3
    See In re Waterman, 
    248 B.R. 567
    , 570 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000).
    4
    See U.S. v. Horras, 
    443 B.R. 159
    , 161–62 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011) (citing
    Taylor v. St. Louis County Bd. of Election Commissioners, 
    625 F.3d 1025
    , 1028
    (8th Cir. 2010)).
    2
    BACKGROUND
    Debtor Negus-Sons, Inc., was a Nebraska company primarily engaged in earth
    moving for commercial construction projects. Mutual of Omaha Bank is the
    successor in interest to Nebraska State Bank of Omaha (“NSB”).
    On December 30, 2003, the debtor executed a business loan agreement and
    promissory note with NSB for Loan 21040-03 (“Loan No. 3”) in the amount of
    $1,469,077.63. The maturity date was June 30, 2008, and the loan was secured by a
    deed of trust and guaranty, both dated December 30, 2003.5
    On May 15, 2006, the debtor executed a promissory note with NSB for Loan
    2104007 (“Loan No. 7”) in the amount of $1,030,217.00. The maturity date was June
    10, 2008, and the loan was secured by a commercial security agreement dated May
    15, 2006, a deed of trust dated May 15, 2006, and a guaranty dated April 4, 2005.
    The security agreement covered essentially all of the Debtor’s assets. To perfect its
    interest in the Debtor’s personal property, NSB filed two UCC financing statements
    with the Nebraska Secretary of State: Financing Statement 9803165525-1 (“Financing
    Statement 1”) dated June 3, 2003, evidences the blanket lien on the Debtor’s assets;
    and Financing Statement 9903287503-4 (“Financing Statement 4”), on July 28, 2003,
    amends Financing Statement 1 with regard to certain property pursuant to a
    subordination agreement with Nebraska Machinery Company.
    In September 2007 the Debtor and Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc.,
    entered into a financing arrangement for a revolving loan secured by certain
    5
    At oral argument, counsel for Mutual of Omaha alluded to the existence of
    a security agreement securing Loan No. 3 but could not direct the Court to it in the
    record. Upon careful review of the record, including the documents filed in
    support of Mutual of Omaha’s Motion for Summary Judgment, we were unable to
    find a security agreement securing Loan No. 3 and will, for purposes of this
    appeal, assume that one does not exist.
    3
    equipment. In connection with the revolving loan, a collateral analyst for Wells
    Fargo, Jennifer Fry, wrote to NSB on September 20, 2007, requesting payoff figures
    for the two financing statements. The letter specifically referenced Financing
    Statements 1 and 4 and contained the following language:
    This letter is to confirm that upon receipt of funds from Wells Fargo
    Equipment Finance, Inc. for the entire payoff of all accounts that you
    agree to terminate your security interest in all the collateral [of Negus-
    Sons, Inc.] . . .
    We have prepared an amendment to your UCC filing(s) to effectuate
    these terminations. Please indicate your consent to the filing of these
    amendments, and your authorization for us to file them on your behalf,
    by signing in the space provided below.6
    An eight-page list of equipment and other personal property was attached to the letter.
    Bruce Cramer, a senior vice-president at NSB, signed the consent requested by
    Wells Fargo on September 21, 2007. In his deposition, Cramer admitted that his
    signature on the letter gave the appearance that he consented to the release of all of
    the liens securing Loan No. 7, not just liens on the equipment listed on the
    attachment. He testified:
    Q. I don't want to beat a dead horse about Exhibit 1. But after all this
    discussion, I mean, do you feel like you made a mistake signing this
    without contacting Jennifer Fry?
    A. Well, after seeing it the way it is, yes, I think I did.
    Q. Because you're saying your intent was never to release anything but
    the lien on the equipment?
    6
    Emphasis added.
    4
    A. Yes.
    Q. But you admit that this document purports to release all liens?
    A. That's the way it looks to me, yes.
    Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that you made a mistake by signing
    this?
    A. That's the way it would look to me, yes.7
    The next day, an NSB administrative assistant responded with the payoff
    amount as of September 28, 2007. The total was $853,984.08. The letter noted that
    “[u]pon receipt of payoff all liens will be released.”8 Loan No. 7 was paid in full on
    September 28, 2007, but NSB never filed any termination statements. Instead, Wells
    Fargo terminated the two financing statements associated with Loan No. 7
    approximately a year later by filing two financing statement “Amendments” on
    August 11, 2008.
    On May 15, 2008, after Loan No. 7 had been paid, the Debtor executed a
    promissory note with Mutual of Omaha Bank for Loan 2104009 (“Loan No. 9”), in
    the amount of $303,262.50. The maturity date was November 15, 2008, and the loan
    was secured by a commercial security agreement, a deed of trust, and guaranties, all
    of which were dated May 15, 2008.
    Negus-Sons, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on September 23,
    2009. The case was converted to one under Chapter 7 on February 18, 2010, on the
    7
    Deposition of Bruce Cramer, 72:6-72:21, Bankruptcy Court for the District
    of Nebraska, Case No. 10-8064, Doc. No. 36.
    8
    Emphasis added.
    5
    motion of the United States Trustee, and Appellee Rick D. Lange was appointed as
    the Chapter 7 trustee of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
    DISCUSSION
    The parties (as well as the bankruptcy court) have framed this dispute largely
    in terms of whether the Amendments to NSB’s Financing Statements filed by Wells
    Fargo were effective in terminating Mutual of Omaha’s interest in the Property. The
    Trustee, United States, and Union Plans all argue that the uncontroverted facts
    establish that Wells Fargo had the authority to file the Amendments terminating
    Financing Statements 1 and 4. Alternatively, they argue that the Amendments were
    effective in terminating NSB’s Financing Statements even if Wells Fargo didn’t
    authorize them. The bankruptcy court determined that NSB authorized Wells Fargo
    to terminate the financing statements associated with Loan No. 7 and granted the
    Trustee’s motion for summary judgment primarily on that basis.
    The record supports the bankruptcy court’s determination that Wells Fargo had
    the authority to terminate NSB’s financing statements. However, we also affirm on
    the basis that termination of the financing statements was unnecessary because NSB’s
    (and thus Mutual of Omaha’s) security interest in the Property was extinguished when
    Loan No. 7 was paid in full in September 2007.9 In light of these rulings, we do not
    need to address the more general question of whether unauthorized termination
    statements are effective.10
    9
    We can affirm on any ground supported by the record. Phipps v. FDIC,
    
    417 F.3d 1006
    , 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).
    10
    We are also hesitant to endorse the holding in Roswell Capital Partners
    LLC v. Alternative Const. Technologies, 
    2010 WL 3452378
    , 8 (S.D. N.Y. 2010),
    relied on by the Trustee, that a termination statement filed by a third party is
    effective regardless of whether it was authorized. Neb. Rev. St. U.C.C. § 9-
    513(b), which governs the effectiveness of termination statements, states: “Except
    as otherwise provided in section 9-510, upon the filing of a termination statement
    6
    A.     Wells Fargo authorized the termination of all liens perfected by Financing
    Statements 1 and 4.
    The bankruptcy court found that Wells Fargo authorized the termination
    statements based on the “four corners” of the written communications between Wells
    Fargo and NSB regarding the payoff of Loan No. 7 and termination of NSB’s liens.
    Specifically, the bankruptcy court found that the September 20, 2007 letter from
    Wells Fargo requesting payoff figures and the termination of (or authority to
    terminate) NSB’s security interest in “all the collateral of [Negus-Sons, Inc.]” and
    NSB’s unqualified, signed consent to that letter gave Wells Fargo authority to
    terminate Financing Statements 1 and 4 in their entirety. We agree.
    As emphasized above, the September 20, 2007 letter from Wells Fargo
    specifically identified Financing Statements 1 and 4 (by filing number) and stated
    unequivocally that Wells Fargo was seeking “the entire payoff of all accounts [and]
    that you agree to terminate your security interest in all the collateral [of Negus-Sons,
    Inc.] . . .” NSB gave its unqualified consent to this request not once, but twice: first
    by signing the September 20 letter as requested by Wells Fargo, and second by stating
    in its payoff letter the next day that “Upon receipt of payoff all liens will be released.”
    The unambiguous reference to “all” accounts, “all” collateral, and “all” liens leaves
    with the filing office, the financing statement to which the termination statement
    relates ceases to be effective. . . .” (Emphasis added.) § 9-510(a) states: “A filed
    record is effective only to the extent that it was filed by a person that may file it
    under Section 9-509.” And § 9-509 states: “A person may file an amendment
    other than an amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement or
    an amendment that adds a debtor to a financing statement only if: (1) the secured
    party of record authorizes the filing. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Roswell’s holding
    appears to be contrary to the plain language of the Uniform Commercial Code.
    See William H. Henning & Fred H. Miller, 45 The Uniform Commercial Code
    Law Letter 1, 4 (2011) (criticizing Roswell as being contrary to the law).
    7
    no question that Wells Fargo sought and NSB consented to the release of all of NSB’s
    liens in the Debtor’s collateral covered by Financing Statements 1 and 4.
    Mutual of Omaha contends that the reference to and attachment of a list of
    specific collateral in the September 20, 2007 letter limits the authority sought and
    consent granted to a termination of the liens against only the collateral listed. But
    nothing in the text of the letter conveys such a limitation. To the contrary, the
    repeated use of the word “all” in the letter, and NSB’s September 21, 2007 response
    stating that “all liens will be released,” indicates that the parties intended just that –
    a release of all of NSB’s liens.
    Moreover, to the extent the reference to specific collateral creates an ambiguity
    in the communications, that ambiguity is resolved – against NSB (and, thus, against
    Mutual of Omaha) – by NSB Senior Vice President Bruce Cramer’s admission that
    NSB’s consent to the September 20, 2007 letter mistakenly gave Wells Fargo the
    authority to release all of the liens securing Loan No. 7, not just liens on the
    equipment listed on the attachment.
    Therefore, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s determination that Wells Fargo had
    the authority to terminate Financing Statements 1and 4 in August 2008, thereby
    terminating Mutual of Omaha’s security interest in the Debtor’s personal property.
    B.    Mutual of Omaha’s interest in the Property was extinguished when NSB
    was paid in full.
    In its ruling, the bankruptcy court alluded to the fact that “when the bank
    received its requested payout for Loan No. 7, there was no basis for its continued
    assertion of an interest in the personal property collateral for that loan.” That is the
    strongest basis for affirming the bankruptcy court’s determination that Mutual of
    Omaha no longer has a security interest in the Property.
    8
    “A security interest cannot exist independent of the obligation it secures.”11
    Consequently, once the loan associated with Financing Statements 1 and 4 (Loan No.
    7) was paid off – and Mutual of Omaha concedes that it was – NSB’s security in the
    Property was extinguished, regardless of whether the Financing Statements were
    terminated by NSB or Wells Fargo (with or without authority).
    Mutual of Omaha contends that the Property also served as security for Loan
    No. 3, but, as noted above, Mutual of Omaha could not point to such a security
    agreement in the record, and we were, indeed, unable to find one. And the deed of
    trust securing Loan No. 3 only covers personal property attached to the real property
    subject to the deed of trust. There has been no suggestion that the Property is
    attached to that real property.
    Therefore, we affirm the bankruptcy court on the additional ground that Mutual
    of Omaha's interest in the Property was extinguished when Wells Fargo paid off
    NSB’s Loan No. 7 in September 2007.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the bankruptcy court
    granting the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment and denying Mutual of Omaha’s
    motion for summary judgment.
    11
    In re Advanced Aviation, Inc., 
    101 B.R. 310
    , 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
    See also Unisys Fin. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
    979 F.2d 609
    , 611 (7th Cir.
    1992) (“A lien is parasitic on a claim. If the claim disappears—poof! the lien is
    gone.”); In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc., 
    194 B.R. 859
    , 861 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996)
    (“A security interest cannot exist ... independent from the obligation which it
    secures.”).
    9