State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE No. 20-55893
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation, D.C. No.
2:20-cv-01342-SVW-PVC
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., a
Delaware Limited Partnership; OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
MELBA FERNANDEZ; DOES, 1 through
20, inclusive,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 15, 2021*
Anchorage, Alaska
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: RAWLINSON, CHRISTEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON
In the district court, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. sought
declaratory relief establishing that Penske Truck Leasing Co. and Old Republic
Insurance Co. (collectively, “Defendants”) are required to provide primary liability
coverage to L&L subject to a combined single liability limit of $750,000. We
affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to State Farm.
“We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment
and its interpretation of state law.” Diaz v. Kubler Corp., 785 F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Tabares v. City of Huntington
Beach, 988 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2021). In interpreting California law, we
follow the California Supreme Court’s decisions. Diaz, 785 F.3d at 1329. If there
is no applicable California Supreme Court decision, we rely on state appellate
court opinions, statutes and treatises. Id.
We start with the language of the Rental Agreement. United Nat’l Ins. Co.
v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 2009). “The clear and
explicit meaning of the[] provisions, interpreted in their ordinary and popular
sense, unless used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given
to them by usage[,] controls judicial interpretation.” Bay Cities Paving & Grading,
Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Cal. 1993) (internal quotation
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marks and citations omitted). California courts “construe [insurance policies] as
would a reasonable layperson, not an expert, attorney, or a historian.” E.M.M.I.
Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 84 P.3d 385, 391 n.2 (Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). “A
provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more
constructions, both of which are reasonable.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NASA
Servs., Inc., 957 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting MacKinnon v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1213 (Cal. 2003)).
We agree with the district court that the Penske Provides Coverage insurance
provision is ambiguous. A layperson could reasonably interpret this provision in
two ways: first, to cover the commercial vehicle being rented, as State Farm urges;
or second, to cover non-commercial vehicles irrelevant to this transaction, as
Defendants urge.
Defendants argue “basic automobile liability insurance” is unambiguous as a
term of art defined by state code. But we are interpreting a contract, not a statute,
and the contract did not use “basic automobile liability insurance” “in a technical
sense” or give it “special meaning.” See Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1270. The
contract’s proviso “with limits as required by the state financial responsibility law
or other applicable statute” does not define “basic automobile liability insurance”
or specify it is a term of art, and there are financial responsibility laws and statutes
applicable to both commercial and personal vehicles. See E.M.M.I. Inc., 84 P.3d at
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390; Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assn. v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 230 Cal.
App. 3d 1010, 1021 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Laypersons cannot be expected to know of
statutory limitations or exclusions on coverage not contained in their insurance
policies.”).
The term “basic automobile liability insurance” is ambiguous because “it is
not defined in the policy and . . . a layperson’s understanding would differ from the
legal definition of the term.” Lunsford v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 18 F.3d
653, 654 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Indeed, Defendants themselves
repeatedly refer to L&L’s commercial vehicle policy with State Farm of $1 million
liability coverage as “an automobile liability policy.” If Defendants’ “attorney[s]”
and “insurance expert[s]” use the term “automobile liability” insurance
interchangeably to cover commercial vehicles, a layperson would most likely do so
as well. See Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal.
1971).
The contract as a whole also shows the insurance provision to be ambiguous.
Bay Cities, 855 P.2d at 1271. The cover of the policy declares in bold font that it is
for commercial rentals, and the Penske Provides Coverage insurance provision is
in the Commercial Rental section. A layperson could think that the Penske
Provides Coverage “basic automobile liability insurance” covers commercial
vehicles in an amount comparable to the alternative $1,000,000 Customer Provides
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insurance requirement, which the Agreement presents as the only other option in
the very next subsection. Defendants’ view “basic automobile liability insurance”
as covering an amount appropriate only for Household Rentals, but that would be
both legally inadequate and practically pointless for a Commercial Rental. We
conclude that the cases cited by Defendants (including an unpublished California
Court of Appeal decision) are inapt due to varying factual and legal differences.
The dissent relies on an unpublished California Court of Appeal
case, Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., No. E062118, 2015
WL 5320546 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2015), to argue that we misconstrue
California law. But California prohibits other courts from citing its unpublished
cases. See Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1126 n.8
(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115(a)) (“Under California Rules of
Court . . . an unpublished opinion cannot be cited to or relied on by other courts.”);
Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115(a) (with exceptions not relevant here, “an opinion of a
California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified
for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a
party in any other action.”). As such, it would be improper for our court to rely
upon this unpublished, uncitable case. That California courts have occasionally
ignored their own rule, as the dissent points out, is no reason to assume that they
would regularly do so, or adopt the reasoning of the unpublished decision in
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Golden Eagle. And because California litigants and courts cannot rely on or cite to
it, the absence of comment on it from the California courts is similarly
unconvincing.
Ultimately, we do not apply a presumption that California courts will follow
an unpublished appellate court opinion, as we do with a published opinion of a
state appellate court. See Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994–95
(9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here there is no convincing evidence that the state supreme
court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions
of the state’s intermediate appellate courts.”) (quoting Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). As the dissent points out, we are not precluded from considering the
unpublished opinion. But given our interpretation of other, published California
court decisions, the unpublished decision in Golden Eagle is not a conclusive
indication of how California courts would rule in a precedential opinion, and we
therefore decline to rely on it here.
There was no genuine dispute that L&L customarily relied on Penske
Provides Coverage to insure its rentals of commercial vehicles; L&L did not need a
minimal personal vehicle policy; L&L was never told that Penske Provides
Coverage limited coverage to a certain amount; and the Penske Provides Coverage
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$20 per day fee was 320% more expensive than the State Farm Policy’s
commercial vehicle coverage policy per day average.
Moreover, “ambiguous language is construed against the party who caused
the uncertainty to exist. In the insurance context, we generally resolve ambiguities
in favor of coverage.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal.
1990) (citation omitted). Even accepting Defendants’ arguments that L&L’s
objectively reasonable expectations were undeterminable, summary judgment in
favor of State Farm was still proper. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 957 F.3d at 1042
(citations omitted). Because the language here is ambiguous, we affirm the district
court’s order granting summary judgment for State Farm.
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
State Farm v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., Case No. 20-55893
OCT 15 2021
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal involves the application of California law. In that circumstance,
we are bound to follow precedent from the California Supreme Court. See Norcia
v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017). In the
absence of precedent from the Supreme Court, it is our task to predict how the
California Supreme Court would address the issue. See id. In making this
prediction, we give credence to rulings from the California Court of Appeal. See
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960 F.3d 603, 610-
11 (9th Cir. 2020). Because the majority disposition diverges from this established
approach, I respectfully dissent.
This case involves contractual interpretation. The contract clause at issue
was part of a transaction between Penske and a commercial customer who rented a
freightliner truck. The contract provided in pertinent part:
Penske Provides Coverage. If Customer elects Penske
Liability Coverage, Penske agrees to provide liability
protection for Customer . . . in accordance with the
standard provisions of a basic automobile liability
insurance policy . . ., with limits as required by the state
financial responsibility law or other applicable statute.
(emphasis added).
Both the district court and the majority ignored the clear and explicit
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language referencing “basic automobile liability” and relied instead on the final
phrase to conclude that Penske was required to provide coverage in the amount
required for commercial motor carriers.
The problem with the conclusion reached by the district court and the
majority is that it flies in the face of a California Court of Appeal decision directly
on point, Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. v. Penske Truck Leasing Co. L.P., No. E062118,
2015 WL 5320546 (Cal. Ct. App., September 14, 2015). In Golden Eagle, the
exact same policy provision was at issue. Insurer Golden Eagle, similarly to State
Farm, argued that this identical contract language obligated Penske to provide
coverage in the amount required for commercial motor carriers ($750,000), as
opposed to the substantially lower amounts required for automobile liability
insurance ($15,000 for injury to one person/$30,000 for injury to two or more
persons/$5,000 for property damage). The California Court of Appeal rejected the
insurer’s argument, explaining that the terms of the contractual provision “plain[ly]
. . . establish that Penske is promising to provide a basic automobile liability
insurance policy.” Id. at *2 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court clarified that “automobile liability insurance is a term of art and triggers . . .
requirements that are different from the requirements . . . applicable to commercial
vehicles.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court also disagreed with the contention that the provision was unclear,
clarifying that:
A plain reading of Penske’s Liability Insurance
provision does not support an interpretation that Penske
intended to provide a liability policy with the $750,000
limit required under the Motor Carriers of Property
Permit Act. In clear terms, the Liability Insurance
provision promises to provide a basic automobile liability
insurance policy.
...
By the clear language of the Liability Insurance
provision, Penske promises to provide its commercial
rental customers with only the coverage required for an
automobile liability insurance policy. Had Penske
intended to provide the $750,000 combined single limit
required for commercial motor vehicles under the Motor
Carriers of Property Permit Act, its Liability Insurance
provision would not include the phrase “basic automobile
liability insurance policy,” but rather “commercial
vehicle liability insurance policy,” or the like.
Id. at *3 (emphases added).
The Court emphasized that the language of the provision was plain and the
meaning was clear. See id. The Court declared that any other interpretation would
run afoul of California’s rules of contract interpretation. See id. at *2-*3. The
Court expressly rejected Golden Eagle’s various arguments for interpreting the
coverage provision as “referencing the Motor Carriers of Property Permit Act.” Id.
at *3. The Court found those arguments “unpersuasive because each requires us to
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overlook the clear phrase ‘basic automobile liability policy.’” Id. (emphasis
added). The Court reasoned that Golden Eagle’s arguments could only succeed if
the Court “were to find [“basic automobile liability insurance policy”] ambiguous,
which [it did] not.” Id.
The Court concluded:
Nothing in the Liability Insurance provision or any other
part of the rental agreement mentions a “commercial
motor vehicle,” a “commercial vehicle liability insurance
policy,” a “motor carrier of property,” or the “Motor
Carriers of Property Permit Act.” We cannot read such
references into the provision to trump the clear existing
reference to basic automobile liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, the California Court of Appeal clearly, emphatically, and decisively
rejected the result reached by the majority. In doing so, the court used the words
“clear” or “clearly” repeatedly in discussing the policy provision at issue. The
majority acknowledges the Court of Appeal decision, but eschews it as
unpublished authority. However, we have specifically concluded that unpublished
authority informs our determination of how the California Supreme Court would
decide a question of California law. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Granite
State Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering unpublished
California Court of Appeal decision, despite “hav[ing] no precedential value,” as
4
“accurately represent[ing] California law” ) (citation omitted); see also U.S. Bank,
N.A., Trustee for Banc of America Funding Corp. Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-F v. White Horse Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 987 F.3d
858, 863 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that unpublished state decisions may be
considered in interpreting state law). After all, three California judges interpreting
California law are a far more accurate barometer of how the California Supreme
Court would decide this issue. See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Karussos, 65
F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (observing that
“the states regulate insurance companies for the protection of their residents, and
state courts are best situated to identify and enforce the public policies that form
the foundation of such regulations”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The majority casts aside the well-reasoned opinion of the California Court of
Appeal because, “California prohibits other courts from citing its unpublished
cases.” Majority Disposition p. 5. The majority cites for this proposition our
decision in Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1126 n.8
(9th Cir. 2005). However, in that case, the California Supreme Court had granted
review of the Court of Appeal decision, thereby superseding that decision. No
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similar circumstance is presented in this case. As noted below, no court has
questioned in any way the Court of Appeal decision in Golden Eagle. And, both
before and after Credit Suisse, we have considered unpublished decisions to inform
our determination of how the California Supreme Court would decide a question of
California law. See e.g., Employers Ins. Of Wasau, 330 F.3d at 1220 n.8 (pre-
Credit Suisse) and U.S. Bank, 987 F.3d at 863 (post-Credit Suisse) see also Daniel
v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1223 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that
“[e]ven though unpublished California Courts of Appeal decisions have no
precedential value under California law, the Ninth Circuit is not precluded from
considering such decisions as a possible reflection of California law”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC,
689 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), as amended (relying on
unpublished decisions of the California Court of Appeal as “accurately
represent[ing] California law . . . [a]lthough they are not precedent” under
California rules) (citation omitted); Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167
n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) (articulating that “[e]ven though unpublished California Courts
of Appeal decisions have no precedential value under California law, the Ninth
Circuit is not precluded from considering such decisions as a possible reflection of
California law”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Washington v.
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Cal. City Corr. Ctr., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that
“[t]he Court may cite unpublished California appellate decisions as persuasive
authority”) (citation omitted); see also Ovitz v. Chartis Prop. Cas. Co., No. CV
15-3916 PSG (PLAx), 2015 WL 12746209, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015)
(observing the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “unpublished Court of Appeal
decisions can be useful in determining how a California court would rule on an
issue of state law”) (citation omitted).
Indeed, this “prohibition” relied upon by the majority is regularly
disregarded, as California courts have not only cited to, but adopted the reasoning
of unpublished decisions. See, e.g., Cynthia D. v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. 4th 242, 254
(1993) (in bank) (citing to and “adapting” analysis from the concurrence to an
unpublished opinion); Save Lafayette Trees v. City of Lafayette, 32 Cal. App. 5th
148, 161 n.11 (2019) (adopting the reasoning of an unpublished decision as the
court’s “own”).
Notably, in the six years since Golden Eagle was decided, neither the
California Supreme Court nor any California Court of Appeal has questioned the
decision or the analysis in that case. This silence is significant because California
courts routinely express approval of or disagreement with unpublished decisions.
See, e.g., Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800,
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810-12 (2001) (disagreeing with reasoning articulated in unpublished decision);
People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 849-50 (2020) (remaining unpersuaded by two
unpublished decisions cited in support of the district attorney’s contentions);
Hadian v. Schwartz, 8 Cal. 4th 836, 842 (1994) (in bank) (granting review of and
reversing unpublished decision); People v. Martinez, 15 Cal. App. 5th 659, 662
(2017) (observing that “all California appellate districts . . . have weighed in on [an
issue splitting the courts of appeal] (albeit in unpublished opinions),” and
considering unpublished decisions in resolving the issue); People v. McDaniels, 21
Cal. App. 4th 1560, 1566 n.2 (1994) (stating that “[i]f the text of this opinion
sounds familiar to the parties and the court below, it should. Much of it is simply
taken from the unpublished opinion by Division Four in People v. Fanney (Nov.
30, 1990) A049446, involving the identical issue, the same court and counsel. . . .
[T]he analysis in an unpublished opinion may properly be considered”); People v.
Bullard, No. C091975, 2021 WL 3751139, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2021)
(approving of the reasoning delineated in an unpublished decision “[a]lthough . . .
contained in an unpublished portion of the opinion”) (citation omitted). Because
the majority goes astray by failing to follow the California Court of Appeal’s on-
point decision, I respectfully dissent.
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