Mejia Del Cid v. Garland ( 2021 )

Case: 20-60917 Document: 00516062086 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/20/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 20, 2021
No. 20-60917
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Carlos Ramon Mejia Del Cid,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A 095 097 148
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Carlos Mejia Del Cid, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dis-
missing his appeal of the denial by an immigration judge of his application for
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Tor-
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60917 Document: 00516062086 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/20/2021
No. 20-60917
ture (“CAT”). In his application, Mejia Del Cid had claimed he was afraid
to return to Honduras because he feared that he would be extorted, tortured,
and killed by gang members who wished to recruit or extort him or by a for-
mer client who had argued with him over a payment. His counsel designated
his proposed particular social group as “people who fear for their welfare and
well-being.” In his petition, Mejia Del Cid avers generally that he proved
that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution and that he was unwil-
ling or unable to return to Honduras.
On petition for review of a BIA decision, we review factual findings
for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Lopez-Gomez v. Ash-
croft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001). The substantial-evidence standard
applies to review of decisions denying withholding of removal and relief
under the CAT and requires only that the BIA’s conclusion be based on the
evidence presented and that its decision be substantially reasonable. Zhang
v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2005); Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS,
78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). “This court may not overturn the BIA’s
factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Gomez-
Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
Mejia Del Cid has failed to brief any challenge to the BIA’s disposition
of his claims arising under the CAT, so he has abandoned them. See Nastase
v. Barr, 964 F.3d 313, 318 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 877 (2020).
To the extent that his withholding-of-removal claim is not abandoned, Mejia
Del Cid has not demonstrated that the record compels a conclusion contrary
to the BIA’s. To obtain withholding of removal, a petitioner must show a
“clear probability” or that “it is more likely than not” that, if he returns to
his native country, he will be persecuted “on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion.”
Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1138 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The alien must demonstrate “that race, relig-
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No. 20-60917
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”
Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and emphasis omitted). The protected ground “cannot be inciden-
tal, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” Id.(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Conduct driven by purely personal or criminal motives does not con-
stitute persecution on account of a protected ground. Thuri v. Ashcroft,
380 F.3d 788, 792−93 (5th Cir. 2004). Further, economic extortion and
actions based on a desire for financial gain do not rise to the level of perse-
cution on account of a protected ground. See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch,
794 F.3d 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2015). Mejia Del Cid alleged only his former cli-
ent’s desire to harm him for economic and “purely personal” reasons, which
do not constitute persecution on account of a protected ground. Thuri,
380 F.3d at 793. Mejia Del Cid’s theory that the gang would extort him econ-
omically or commit crimes based on a desire for financial gain is also inade-
quate to show that the gang would target him on account of a protected
ground. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 493.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Mejia Del
Cid did not establish a cognizable particular social group. To establish mem-
bership in a particular social group, an alien must demonstrate that he is a
member of a group of persons that “share a common immutable character-
istic that they either cannot change or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). The group described as “people who fear
for their welfare and well-being” lacks particularity because it could include
a “wide swath of society crossing many political orientations, lifestyles, and
identifying factors.” Id. at 522. Additionally, business owners extorted by
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No. 20-60917
gangs and people who oppose gangs are not protected groups under
immigration law. Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 667, 668 (5th Cir.
2012); Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 522.
Accordingly, the record does not compel a finding contrary to that of
the BIA as to whether Mejia Del Cid was entitled to withholding of removal
and protection under the CAT. See Gomez-Palacios, 560 F.3d at 358. The
petition for review is DENIED.
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