Alice Roberts v. BJC Health System , 452 F.3d 737 ( 2006 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-2572
    ___________
    Alice Roberts; Kevin Hales; Christy     *
    Millsap; Tim Millsap, Individually and  *
    on behalf of all other natural persons  *
    similarly situated,                     *
    *
    Appellees,                  *
    *
    v.                                * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    BJC Health System, doing business as * Eastern District of Missouri.
    BJC Healthcare; Missouri Baptist        *
    Medical Center; Sisters of Mercy        *
    Health System; St. John’s Mercy Health *
    System, doing business as St. John’s    *
    Mercy Medical Center; Reconstructive *
    and Microsurgery Associates, Inc.,      *
    *
    Appellants.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: March 16, 2006
    Filed: June 21, 2006
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,1 District
    Judge.
    ___________
    1
    The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District
    Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    RILEY, Circuit Judge.
    Alice Roberts, Kevin Hales, Christy Millsap, and Tim Millsap (collectively
    Appellees) filed a putative class action in Missouri state court against BJC Health
    System, doing business as BJC Healthcare; Missouri Baptist Medical Center; Sisters
    of Mercy Health System; St. John’s Mercy Health System, doing business as St.
    John’s Mercy Medical Center; and Reconstructive and Microsurgery Associates, Inc.
    (RMA) (collectively Appellants), alleging Appellants overcharged for certain medical
    procedures. Appellants removed the case to federal court based on federal question
    subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
    (ERISA), 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
    , completely preempted Appellees’ claims. The
    district court2 remanded the matter back to state court for lack of federal question
    subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants appeal. Because 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (d) bars
    appellate review of remand orders based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we
    dismiss the appeal.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    Appellees filed this action in Missouri state court, alleging RMA “miscoded”
    certain medical procedures, the other Appellants knew of or were involved in this
    miscoding, and as a result Appellants overcharged Appellees. After removing the
    action to federal court, Appellants moved to dismiss, claiming Appellees lacked
    standing because Appellees did not allege they actually paid for any of the medical
    procedures. Appellees moved to remand the case back to the Missouri state court,
    contending ERISA did not preempt their claims.
    The district court concluded Appellees lacked standing because they had not
    sustained an injury in fact, and accordingly, the court lacked subject matter
    2
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
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    jurisdiction. Based on this conclusion, the district court dismissed the case without
    prejudice and denied Appellees’ motion to remand as moot. Upon Appellees’ motion
    to amend the court’s order and judgment, the district court (1) clarified it never made
    a determination regarding whether ERISA preempted Appellees’ claims, and
    (2) vacated its previous order and remanded the case back to state court for lack of
    federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
    Appellants appeal the district court’s remand order, arguing that after the
    district court determined Appellees lacked standing, the court should have dismissed
    the case without prejudice, as the court did in its first order, rather than modifying its
    opinion and remanding the case. Appellees move to strike or dismiss the appeal,
    arguing that because the district court remanded the case for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, this court cannot review the district court’s remand order.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (c) and (d) and our case law precedent, we cannot
    review the district court’s remand order. Because Appellees lacked standing, the
    district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 
    304 F.3d 797
    , 801 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding “if a plaintiff lacks standing, the district court has
    no subject matter jurisdiction” (citation omitted)). “If at any time before final
    judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
    shall be remanded.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (c). When a district court remands a case based
    on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 1447(c), “a court of appeals lacks
    jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the remand order.” Things Remembered, Inc. v.
    Petrarca, 
    516 U.S. 124
    , 127-28 (1995); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (d). Thus, when a
    case is remanded under section 1447(c), the remand order must stand “whether
    erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ.”
    Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 
    423 U.S. 336
    , 343 (1976), overruled on
    other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    517 U.S. 706
    , 714-15 (1996); see
    also Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 
    119 F.3d 619
    , 623
    -3-
    (8th Cir. 1997). Finally, we note that although arising in a different context than the
    case before us, the Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in its recent decision in
    Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, No. 05-409, 
    2006 WL 1640102
    , at *9 (U.S. June 15,
    2006) (holding where the district court remanded the removed action to state court for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
    Act of 1998, the district court’s remand order is unreviewable under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (d)).
    We recognize our holding today creates a potential Catch-22 for the parties: the
    district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
    Appellees failed to allege Article III standing, and upon remand, the state court might
    dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction because of ERISA preemption.3 The parties
    may find themselves unable to proceed in either federal or state court. One remedy
    to this dilemma is including a class member in the case who sustained an injury in
    fact.
    3
    We note, however, if this were a genuine Catch-22 holding, we may not have
    explained our decision:
    “‘What right do you have?’ the girls said. ‘Catch-22,’ the men said. All
    they kept saying was ‘Catch-22, Catch-22.’ What does it mean, Catch-
    22? What is Catch-22?”
    “Didn’t they show it to you?” Yossarian demanded, stamping about in
    anger and distress. “Didn’t you even make them read it?”
    “They don’t have to show us Catch-22,” the old woman answered. “The
    law says they don’t have to.”
    “What law says they don’t have to?”
    “Catch-22.”
    Joseph Heller, Catch-22 375 (Simon & Schuster 1999) (1961).
    -4-
    III.  CONCLUSION
    We grant Appellees’ motion and dismiss this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (d) for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
    ______________________________
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