State of West Virginia v. Nathan B. ( 2016 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    State of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below,                                      April 12, 2016
    Respondent                                                                    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 15-0698 (Roane County 15-F-23)
    Nathan B., Defendant Below,
    Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Nathan B., by counsel Robert Goldberg, appeals the Circuit Court of Roane
    County’s June 22, 2015, order denying his “motion for reconsideration of sentence” under Rule
    35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 The State, by counsel Jonathan E.
    Porter, filed a response. On appeal, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred in imposing his
    sentence below.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Based upon several instances of petitioner forcing his then-ten-year-old daughter to
    perform oral sex on him, petitioner was indicted on one count of first-degree sexual assault, one
    count of first-degree sexual abuse, two counts of sexual abuse by a parent, and two counts of
    incest. Petitioner eventually entered into a non-binding plea agreement with the State whereby he
    would plead guilty to five counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The State charged these five
    counts in an information and dismissed the indictment. The State further agreed to recommend a
    cumulative sentence of fifteen to seventy-five years of incarceration. However, by order entered
    1
    Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials
    where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va.
    254, 
    773 S.E.2d 20
    (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 
    742 S.E.2d 419
    (2013);
    State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 
    624 S.E.2d 761
    (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183
    W.Va. 641, 
    398 S.E.2d 123
    (1990). Further, while the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
    Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration of sentence, criminal defendants are
    entitled to seek a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b). Accordingly, we will properly
    refer to petitioner’s “motion for reconsideration of sentence” in this memorandum decision as a
    motion for reduction of sentence or a Rule 35(b) motion.
    1
    on May 27, 2015, the circuit court rejected this recommendation and sentenced petitioner to five
    consecutive terms of incarceration of five to twenty-five years, resulting in a cumulative sentence
    of twenty-five to one hundred twenty-five years of incarceration. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
    motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. By order entered on June 22, 2015, the circuit court denied the motion. It is from this
    order that petitioner appeals.
    We have previously held that “‘[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory
    limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.’
    Syllabus Point 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W.Va. 366, 
    287 S.E.2d 504
    (1982).” Syl. Pt. 3, State v.
    Georgius, 225 W.Va. 716, 
    696 S.E.2d 18
    (2010). We note that petitioner’s sentence for his crime
    is within the applicable statutory limitations. Specifically, the first-degree sexual abuse statute,
    West Virginia Code § 61-8B-7(c), states, in pertinent part, that
    the penalty for any person violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this section
    who is eighteen years of age or older and whose victim is younger than twelve
    years of age, shall be imprisonment for not less than five nor more than twenty-
    five years . . . .
    As stated in the information below, at the time of the crimes in question petitioner was over the
    age of eighteen and the victim was younger than twelve. As such, it is clear that petitioner was
    sentenced within the applicable statutory guidelines and his sentence is not reviewable on appeal.
    This is especially true in light of the fact that petitioner does not allege that the circuit
    court based its sentence on any impermissible factor. Instead, petitioner argues that the circuit
    court simply abused its discretion in rejecting the non-binding plea agreement below. According
    to petitioner, the circuit court’s “one and only reason for rejecting the plea’s sentencing
    recommendation was its desire for retribution.” However, petitioner fails to provide any evidence
    to support this assertion. Instead, petitioner asserts that the circuit court’s stated reasons for
    imposing this sentence, including presumed long-term psychological trauma to the victim,
    petitioner’s willful violation of the bond of trust between a parent and a child, and the leniency
    petitioner already received by way of the dismissal of additional charges, fail to adequately
    explain the circuit court’s sentence. As such, petitioner argues that the only conclusion is that the
    circuit court based its decision entirely upon retribution. However, petitioner goes on to assert
    that even if the Court were to believe retribution was a factor considered below, which is an
    assumption entirely lacking support from the record, such a consideration would not constitute
    an impermissible factor. For these reasons, petitioner has clearly failed to allege that the circuit
    court based its sentence on some impermissible factor and, therefore, the same is not reviewable
    on appeal.
    For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s June 22, 2015, order denying petitioner’s
    Rule 35(b) motion is hereby affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    2
    ISSUED: April 12, 2016
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    3