United States v. Jim R. Johnson ( 1996 )


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  •                             ___________
    No. 95-2755
    ___________
    United States of America,        *
    *
    Appellee,              *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                          *   District Court for the
    *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    Jim R. Johnson,                  *         [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.             *
    ___________
    Submitted:   December 29, 1995
    Filed: January 19, 1996
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Jim R. Johnson, an African-American, appeals the 65-month
    sentence imposed by the district court1 after he pleaded guilty to
    possessing cocaine base (crack) with intent to distribute, in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We affirm.
    Following the preparation of his presentence report, Johnson
    objected to his offense-level calculation. Johnson contended that
    no scientific difference existed between crack cocaine and powder
    cocaine, and that the penalty provisions set forth in 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(b) were thus void for vagueness or rendered inapplicable by
    operation of the rule of lenity.    He also argued that Congress
    enacted section 841(b) in an arbitrary and irrational manner,
    1
    The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., United States District
    Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    resulting in a disparate impact upon African-Americans in violation
    of his due process and equal protection rights.
    Johnson relied on United States v. Davis, 
    864 F. Supp. 1303
    (N.D. Ga. 1994), appeal pending (No. 95-8057 11th Cir.), in which
    the district court, after an evidentiary hearing, held that the
    terms "cocaine" and "cocaine base" were synonymous; that the
    penalty provisions of section 841(b) set forth a scientifically
    meaningless distinction between cocaine and cocaine base; and that
    the heightened penalties for cocaine base must be ignored by
    operation of the rule of 
    lenity. 864 F. Supp. at 1309
    .     In
    support, Johnson submitted copies of the Davis court records--
    including Davis's memorandum of law, the hearing transcript, and
    the district court's decision.
    In addition, Johnson sought a downward departure under 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, based on the United States
    Sentencing Commission's February 1995 report concluding that the
    100-to-1 ratio between the penalties for crack cocaine and powder
    cocaine was not justified, and a proposed Guidelines amendment--
    which would have eliminated the 100-to-1 ratio--forwarded by the
    Commission to Congress for its consideration. Johnson renews his
    claims on appeal.
    We conclude Johnson's void-for-vagueness and rule-of-lenity
    arguments are foreclosed by our decision in United States v.
    Jackson, 
    64 F.3d 1213
    , 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1995); his due process and
    equal protection arguments are foreclosed by our decision in United
    States v. Jackson, 
    67 F.3d 1359
    , 1367 (8th Cir. 1995); and his
    downward-departure argument is foreclosed by our decision in United
    States v. Higgs, No. 95-1928, slip op. at 2, 
    1995 WL 716193
    (8th
    Cir. Nov. 9, 1995) (per curiam).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    -2-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-