Blanche E. Dyer v. United States ( 1996 )


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  •                                     ___________
    No. 95-4250
    ___________
    Blanche Elizabeth Dyer,                 *
    *
    Appellant,                *
    *   Appeal from the United States
    v.                                *   District Court for the
    *   Southern District of Iowa
    United States of America,               *
    *          [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted:     May 24, 1996
    Filed:   June 4, 1996
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Blanche Elizabeth Dyer appeals from the final judgment of the
    District Court1 for the Southern District of Iowa denying her third 28
    U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate her sentence.          For the reasons discussed
    below, we affirm.
    Dyer was convicted of sixteen counts of drug trafficking offenses.
    At sentencing, over Dyer's objection, the district court imposed a two-
    level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    based on Dyer's perjured trial testimony that her husband and another
    codefendant had no knowledge of the drug transactions.       The district court
    found Dyer "testif[ied] both before the jury and before this Court strictly
    to use testimony to her own benefit, if possible, and not to enlighten the
    jury or the
    1
    The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States
    District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
    Court on what the facts are," and that she "lie[d] on the witness stand,
    intentionally trying to use the opportunity to testify to mislead the
    Court."    The district court then sentenced Dyer to 230 months imprisonment.
    Dyer appealed the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.       This court,
    affirming Dyer's sentence, concluded the district court's findings of
    perjury were not clearly erroneous.    United States v. Dyer, 
    910 F.2d 530
    ,
    533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    498 U.S. 907
    (1990).          This court also
    affirmed the subsequent denials of Dyer's first and second section 2255
    motions.    Dyer v. United States, 
    23 F.3d 1424
    (8th Cir. 1994); 
    id., 972 F.2d
    353 (8th Cir. 1992) (Table).
    In this third section 2255 motion, Dyer alleged that the district
    court failed to make independent findings necessary to establish any
    perjury to support the obstruction-of-justice enhancement as required by
    United States v. Dunnigan, 
    507 U.S. 87
    , 95-96 (1993).         The government
    argued that Dyer's section 2255 motion constituted an abuse of the writ and
    that the district court's findings met the requirements of Dunnigan and
    Eighth Circuit precedent.
    The district court addressed the merits and concluded that the
    evidence had persuaded it beyond a reasonable doubt that Dyer testified
    falsely at trial and at sentencing, that she knew when she testified that
    her testimony was false, and that she knew her testimony would cause the
    government more difficulty in proving her husband's guilt.     Thus, because
    Dyer committed perjury that obstructed justice and the enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was proper, the district court denied Dyer's motion to
    vacate.
    Although Dyer's third section 2255 motion may constitute an abuse of
    the writ, we address the merits because the district court
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    did so.   See Rodriguez v. United States, 
    17 F.3d 225
    , 226 (8th Cir. 1994)
    (per curiam).
    In United States v. 
    Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95
    , the Supreme Court
    concluded that "if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting
    from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and
    make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to
    or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury
    definition."     See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury requires false testimony
    concerning   a   material   matter   with    willful   intent   to   provide   false
    testimony, rather than from confusion, mistake or faulty memory).
    We conclude that the district court's findings encompassed all the
    factual predicates for a perjury finding and were sufficiently specific to
    support the enhancement.    See United States v. 
    Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 93-94
    ;
    United States v. Turk, 
    21 F.3d 309
    , 313 (8th Cir. 1994) (statement judge
    examined defendant's testimony and was convinced she committed perjury by
    denying her involvement was sufficiently specific finding).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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