United States v. Edward J. Clary ( 1996 )


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  •                                         ___________
    No. 96-1790
    ___________
    United States of America,                    *
    *
    Appellee,                      *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    v.                                     *   Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Edward James Clary,                          *            [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                     *
    ___________
    Submitted:        September 6, 1996
    Filed:        September 16, 1996
    ________
    ___
    Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Edward James Clary pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base (crack)
    with intent to distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(A),     which   carries      a    120-month    mandatory-minimum    sentence.
    Initially, the district court held that the penalties for cocaine base were
    unconstitutional and sentenced him to four years imprisonment.            We reversed
    and remanded for resentencing, holding that the penalty scheme set forth
    in section 841(b)--which provides the same penalties for given amounts of
    crack and 100 times greater amounts of powder cocaine ("the 100-to-1
    ratio")--did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.             United States v.
    Clary, 
    34 F.3d 709
    , 713-14 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 1172
    (1995).
    On remand, as relevant here, Clary challenged the validity of the
    100-to-1 ratio, arguing (1) that as no scientific difference
    existed between crack and cocaine powder, the penalty provisions set forth
    in section 841(b) were rendered inapplicable by operation of the rule of
    lenity; and (2) that Congress's recent rejection of a Guidelines amendment
    proposed          by   the        Sentencing     Commission--eliminating             the    100-to-1
    ratio--manifested a discriminatory purpose on Congress's part, so that
    continued application of the penalty scheme violated his equal protection
    rights.           Clary    also        maintained      he    was    entitled   to   a    three-level
    acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and to a
    sentence          within         the    Guidelines          range    without    regard         to   the
    mandatory-minimum sentence, under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (the "safety valve"
    provision).
    The district court1 rejected Clary's challenges to the 100-to-ratio;
    imposed an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1;
    denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction because Clary had used
    cocaine while on pretrial supervision and had failed to appear at his
    original sentencing and his resentencing; and denied "safety valve" relief
    because,          absent     a    reduction      for    accepting      responsibility,         Clary's
    Guidelines range exceeded the mandatory-minimum sentence and thus section
    5C1.2       was    inapplicable.           The   court       sentenced    Clary     to   151    months
    imprisonment, and he appeals.
    We conclude Clary's equal protection and rule-of-lenity arguments
    regarding the 100-to-1 ratio are foreclosed by this circuit's precedent.
    See United States v. Carter, No. 96-1329, 
    1996 WL 453275
    , at *2-*3 (8th
    Cir. Aug. 13, 1996) (per curiam) (equal protection); United States v.
    Crawford, 
    83 F.3d 964
    , 965-66 (8th Cir. 1996) (rule of lenity), petition
    for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 9, 1996) (No. 96-5557).
    1
    The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
    -2-
    We next conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying
    Clary an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, as he did not show he
    "clearly     demonstrate[d]   a   recognition     and   affirmative   acceptance    of
    personal     responsibility   for   his    criminal     conduct."     See    U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1(a); United States v. Thomas, 
    72 F.3d 92
    , 93 (8th Cir. 1995) (per
    curiam) (standard of review).           We note Clary does not dispute he used
    cocaine while on pretrial supervision.          See Thomas, 
    72 F.3d at 93
    .    Clary's
    voluntary admission of the conduct comprising his offense of conviction
    does not automatically entitle him to the reduction.          See United States v.
    Hawkins, 
    78 F.3d 348
    , 352 (8th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
    June    1,   1996)   (No.   95-9212).      Further,     conduct   resulting    in   an
    obstruction-of-justice enhancement "ordinarily indicates that the defendant
    has    not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct," U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4), and Clary has not shown this is an extraordinary
    case in which both adjustments apply.           See United States v. Anderson, 
    68 F.3d 1050
    , 1056 (8th Cir. 1995).              Because Clary's Guidelines range
    therefore exceeded the mandatory-minimum sentence, the district court
    properly concluded section 5C1.2 did not apply.             See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2;
    United States v. Goodwin, 
    72 F.3d 88
    , 90 (8th Cir. 1995) (safety-valve
    provision provides relief when mandatory-minimum sentence is greater than
    applicable guideline sentence).
    Finally, we need not address the arguments Clary raises for the first
    time on appeal, concerning double jeopardy, due process, and sufficiency
    of the evidence.     See Goodwin, 
    72 F.3d at 91
    .
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    -3-
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-