Sandra S. Comegys v. Shirley S. Chater ( 1997 )


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  •                                     ___________
    No. 96-1608
    ___________
    Sandra S. Comegys,                      *
    *
    Appellant,                *
    *
    v.                                 *    Appeal from the United States
    *    District Court for the
    Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner         *    Southern District of Iowa
    of the Social Security                  *
    Administration,                         *         [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted:     December 20, 1996
    Filed:   January 8, 1997
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Sandra S. Comegys appeals from the final judgment of the District
    Court1 for the Southern District of Iowa affirming the decision of the
    Commissioner to deny Comegys disability insurance and Supplemental Security
    Income (SSI) benefits.     For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
    Comegys, born October 11, 1946, applied for disability insurance
    benefits and SSI, alleging she was disabled as of December 1992, due to
    thoracic outlet syndrome, cubital tunnel and carpal tunnel syndromes,
    severe headaches, and neck pain.       Her
    1
    The Honorable R. E. Longstaff, United States District Judge
    for the Southern District of Iowa.
    insured status expires on December 31, 1996.           Her application was denied
    initially and upon reconsideration.            Comegys requested and received a
    hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
    At the November 1993 hearing Comegys was represented by counsel and
    a vocational expert testified that there were a significant number of jobs
    in the national and local economies which Comegys could perform despite her
    impairments.     The   ALJ   concluded    that   the   combination   of   Comegys's
    impairments was severe, but did not meet or equal the criteria of any of
    the Listed Impairments.      The ALJ pointed to evidence in the record which
    showed that Comegys had worked after she had been diagnosed with right and
    left carpal tunnel and thoracic outlet syndromes; that she received relief
    from the transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS) unit; that a
    consultative orthopedic surgeon noted that all of her subjective symptoms
    did not correlate with objective clinical findings and she showed some
    fabrication of symptoms; and that her treating osteopath made it clear in
    his summary of Comegys's symptoms that he was reporting what Comegys told
    him rather than describing his clinical findings and as such the ALJ was
    not bound to consider them.       In determining whether Comegys's pain and
    discomfort resulted in functional limitations sufficient to be legally
    disabling, the ALJ reviewed the Polaski v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1322
    (8th Cir. 1984), factors and found that Comegys's daily activities were not
    consistent with and did not support a finding of total disability, that her
    assertion of functional limitations was not confirmed by clinical findings
    and thus was not credible, and that she reported only minimal side effects
    of medication.   The ALJ concluded that Comegys could not return to her past
    relevant work.   Shifting the burden to the Commissioner and relying on the
    testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that there were other
    jobs in the national economy which she could perform.           Thus, Comegys was
    not disabled.
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    The Appeals Council denied further review, and upon judicial review,
    the district court concluded that substantial evidence in the record as a
    whole supported the Commissioner's decision.
    On    appeal,   Comegys   argues   that   the   Commissioner's   decision     is
    incorrect, and asserts she was diagnosed with Dupuytren's contracture in
    March 1996; she had Bell's Palsy in July 1995; and she had a right knee
    replacement in September 1994.         She also argues that in May 1996, she was
    diagnosed with fibromyalgia, which had been included as one of her treating
    osteopath's diagnoses, but had not been properly developed.
    Our review of an administrative decision to deny Social Security
    benefits is limited and is deferential to the agency.               See Ostronski v.
    Chater, 
    94 F.3d 413
    , 416 (8th Cir. 1996).           If substantial evidence in the
    record       as a whole supports the administrative decision, it must be
    affirmed.       
    Id. We may
    not "merely parse the record for substantial
    evidence supporting the Secretary's decision," but must also "consider
    evidence in the record that detracts from the weight of the decision."
    Robinson v. Sullivan, 
    956 F.2d 836
    , 838 (8th Cir. 1992).
    The issue before us is whether substantial evidence supports that
    Comegys was not disabled during the period for which benefits were denied,
    in this case December 1992 through April 5, 1994, the date of the ALJ's
    decision.       See Williams v. Sullivan, 
    905 F.2d 214
    , 216 & n.6 (8th Cir.
    1990)    (where    Appeals   Council   declines    to   review   case,   the   date   of
    Commissioner's final decision is the date ALJ decision was issued; new
    evidence submitted to Appeals Council must be new, material, and relate to
    period on or before date of ALJ's decision).
    Although the record for the period ending April 1994 contains several
    inconsistent medical findings and diagnoses, inconsistencies in the record
    and the weight accorded to evidence
    -3-
    are for the Commissioner to resolve, "within broad limits."                    Onstad v.
    Shalala, 
    999 F.2d 1232
    , 1234 (8th Cir. 1993).               In making his credibility
    determinations, we conclude the ALJ analyzed the factors consistent with
    Polaski    v.    
    Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322
    ,    noting   that   Comegys's   daily
    activities did not suggest she was in disabling pain, that the clinical
    findings did not correlate with the extent of Comegys's complaints of
    alleged pain, and that many of her complaints were not credible.                 The ALJ
    properly shifted the burden to the Commissioner to show that jobs existed
    which    Comegys    could   perform,     and   the     vocational   expert's   testimony
    supported that there were such jobs in the local and national economy.
    Even if this court might have weighed the evidence differently, the
    Commissioner's decision must be upheld when there is evidence to support
    either outcome.        See Browning v. Sullivan, 
    958 F.2d 817
    , 822 (8th Cir.
    1992). Considering the deference accorded to the Commissioner's decision
    and this court's limited review, and having carefully reviewed the record,
    we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision.
    Comegys suggests in her reply brief that the ALJ may not have
    adequately developed the record with respect to her May 1996 diagnosis of
    fibromyalgia.       See Boyd v. Sullivan, 
    960 F.2d 733
    , 736 (8th Cir. 1992).
    We find no error in the ALJ's failure to develop the record further as to
    this impairment.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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