William Cooper v. Wood, Caseworker ( 1997 )


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  •                                 ___________
    No. 95-3798
    ___________
    William Cooper
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellant  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                            * District Court for the Western
    * District of Missouri.
    Wood, Caseworker; James Gammon;     *
    O’Brien, Lt.; Gary W. McCarter;     *       [UNPUBLISHED]
    Stobietto, Caseworker; Robert D.    *
    Riley; Charles Baker                *
    *
    Defendants - Appellees   *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 12, 1997
    Filed: April 15, 1997
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE,* District Judge.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    William Cooper appeals from the final judgment of the District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri dismissing as frivolous and malicious
    Cooper’s 
    28 U.S.C. § 1983
     action.    For the reasons discussed below, we
    reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    Cooper filed the instant complaint, making several claims relating
    to his transfer to the Moberly Correctional Center.   In his
    *The HONORABLE ANDREW W. BOGUE, United States District Judge
    for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    report, recommendation, and order, the magistrate judge granted Cooper
    leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered service of process.        The
    defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment and Cooper moved for
    additional time to respond to that motion.        Without ruling on Cooper’s
    motion, the district court dismissed the case.
    In Cooper v. Malone, No. 93-4424-CV-C-5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 1995),
    aff’d, 
    65 F.3d 172
     (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
    116 S.Ct. 1329
     (1996),
    following a jury trial on Cooper’s excessive force claims, the district
    court, upon its own motion, found Cooper had made false accusations,
    misrepresented the expected testimony of witnesses, and ignored court
    orders limiting his cross-examination.     The court further found that Cooper
    presents false, frivolous and malicious claims; has abused the judicial
    process; has imposed unnecessary burdens on, and useless consumption of,
    court resources; and has admitted that he files lawsuits to “get back at
    the system and to give [the state] something to do.”    In the same “Findings
    and Order” filed in the Cooper v. Malone case, the court, sua sponte, found
    that both Cooper v. Malone and the instant case were frivolous and
    malicious.   The court entered judgment dismissing the instant case “[i]n
    accordance with [its] findings and order in Cooper v. Malone . . . on the
    authority of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (d).”    On appeal, Cooper argues the district
    court erred in relying on findings in Cooper v. Malone to dismiss his
    complaint in the instant case under § 1915(d).
    We agree that Cooper’s claim in this case cannot be dismissed under
    § 1915(d) without the district court first making specific findings
    relative to the frivolity or maliciousness of the claim.       Generally, the
    determination of whether a complaint is frivolous or malicious precedes the
    decisions of whether to proceed in forma pauperis and whether process
    should be issued and served. Gentile v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 
    986 F.2d 214
    , 217 (8th Cir. 1993).   If the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
    it should be dismissed out
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    of hand. 
    Id.
       If it is not frivolous or malicious, in forma pauperis should
    be granted, and process issued and served. 
    Id.
           “The case should then
    proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as any paid complaint
    does, except that if the Court becomes convinced at any time that the
    complaint is frivolous or malicious, it may revoke in forma pauperis status
    and dismiss the complaint under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (d).” 
    Id.
    In Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989), the Supreme Court
    indicated a complaint is frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d) “where
    it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”   The Court, however,
    did not define what is “malicious” under § 1915(d).         Our cases have
    interpreted “malicious” to apply to situations where the plaintiff knows
    the allegations to be false, Horsey v. Asher, 
    741 F.2d 209
    , 212 (8th Cir.
    1984); where the complaint is “plainly part of a longstanding pattern of
    abusive and repetitious lawsuits,” 
    Id. at 213
    ; and where the complaint
    contains disrespectful references or abusive language, In re Tyler, 
    839 F.2d 1290
    , 1293 (8th Cir. 1988)(per curiam).
    With respect to the case at bar, the district court made no record
    findings upon which to base its conclusion that the complaint is “frivolous
    and malicious.”   The court, in the context of another case, merely found
    that Cooper has abused the judicial process in the past.   A complaint filed
    in forma pauperis, however, is not subject to dismissal simply because the
    plaintiff is litigious.      Rather, the substance of the claim is the
    appropriate measure. See, Crisafi v. Holland, 
    655 F.2d 1305
     (D.C. Cir.
    1981); and Horsey, 
    741 F.2d at 213
     (“It is the maliciousness of the
    complaint, not of the plaintiff personally, that is important”).   Moreover,
    a finding that one complaint is frivolous or malicious is not sufficient
    grounds for dismissing a separate complaint as frivolous or malicious.
    Horsey, 
    741 F.2d at 213
    .
    -3-
    Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal and remand for the district
    court, in its discretion, to make specific findings to justify dismissal
    of this case or to proceed with the case on the merits.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -4-