United States v. Stanley Harris ( 1999 )


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  •                        United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 98-2529
    ___________
    United States of America,                 *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Missouri.
    Stanley Harris, Jr.,                      *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 2, 1999
    Filed: June 10, 1999
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Stanley Harris, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to
    distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court1
    sentenced Harris to 188 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. This
    appeal followed. After counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
    1
    The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), we granted Harris permission to file a pro se supplemental brief.
    We now grant counsel&s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.
    In his Anders brief, counsel first suggests that the district court erred by applying
    a two-level increase for possession of firearms under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998). However, a firearm-possession enhancement “should
    be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon
    was connected with the offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1,
    comment. (n.3) (1998). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
    finding, based on uncontested facts in the presentence report (PSR), that the weapon
    found with drugs in a kitchen cabinet was sufficiently connected with the offense. See
    United States v. Howard, 
    169 F.3d 1127
    , 1130 (8th Cir. 1999) (standard of review);
    United States v. LaRoche, 
    83 F.3d 958
    , 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court
    may accept as true all factual allegations contained in PSR not specifically objected to
    by parties); see also United States v. Payne, 
    81 F.3d 759
    , 763 (8th Cir. 1996) (temporal
    and spatial nexus between drugs and weapon existed where weapon was found in same
    location as drugs or where part of conspiracy took place).
    Counsel also suggests that the district court erred in calculating Harris&s criminal
    history score. Having reviewed the calculations based on uncontested information in
    the PSR, we conclude the district court did not clearly err. See U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.1(b), 4A1.2(a)(2), 4A1.2(k)(1) & comment. (n.3) (1998);
    United States v. Milton, 
    153 F.3d 891
    , 897 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 1082
    (1999); see also United States v. Bartolotta, 
    153 F.3d 875
    , 879 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (standard of review), cert. denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 850
    (1999).
    As for Harris&s pro se assertions that his counsel was ineffective, the record is
    undeveloped on that issue and this appeal does not warrant departure from the general
    rule that ineffective-assistance claims should be presented in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
    proceeding. See United States v. Santana, 
    150 F.3d 860
    , 863 (8th Cir. 1998).
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    Finally, we have reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous issues and have found
    none. See Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). Accordingly, the judgment is
    affirmed.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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