United States v. Randy Beltramea , 831 F.3d 1022 ( 2016 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 15-3199
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Randy Beltramea
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant
    Federal Public Defender
    lllllllllllllllllllllInterested party - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: February 9, 2016
    Filed: August 5, 2016
    ____________
    Before SMITH and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSON,1 District
    Judge.
    ____________
    SMITH, Circuit Judge.
    1
    The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court
    for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.
    The Federal Public Defender (FPD) appeals an order of the district court2
    compelling Terry McAtee, an Assistant Federal Public Defender, to reveal
    communications that he had with his client, Randy Beltramea. We dismiss the appeal
    for lack of jurisdiction.
    McAtee represented Beltramea, who had been indicted for fraud. With
    McAtee's assistance, Beltramea entered into a plea agreement with the government.
    Subsequently, the government learned that Beltramea violated the terms of that
    agreement. The government indicted Beltramea for obstruction of justice on that
    basis. With the assistance of new counsel from outside the FPD's office, Beltramea
    pleaded guilty to the obstruction charges. The government then subpoenaed McAtee
    to testify at Beltramea's sentencing hearing regarding the facts of the breach. The FPD
    moved to quash McAtee's subpoena, but the district court denied the motion. The
    proceedings below are still pending. Nevertheless, the FPD has immediately appealed
    the district court's ruling. Beltramea has not joined this appeal even though he filed
    a memo in the district court that supported the FPD's motion.
    The FPD and the government assert that we have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Perlman v. United States, 
    247 U.S. 7
    (1918). Nevertheless, we have a "special
    obligation" to satisfy ourselves that we actually possess the authority to decide this
    case. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 
    475 U.S. 534
    , 541 (1986).
    The Supreme Court has long held that a party subject to an order of production
    must refuse and be held in contempt before seeking appellate review. United States
    v. Ryan, 
    402 U.S. 530
    , 532–33 (1971); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings
    (Malone), 
    655 F.2d 882
    , 884 (8th Cir. 1981). However, immediate review is available
    2
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    -2-
    "in the limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render
    impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's claims." 
    Ryan, 402 U.S. at 533
    .
    Perlman is one example. 
    Id. But the
    Perlman exception applies when the appellant
    seeks to quash a subpoena directed to a disinterested third-party custodian of
    information over which the appellant has asserted a privilege. Id.; see also Church of
    Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 18 n.11 (1992). The exception is
    limited to an appeal by the privilege holder. In re Grand Jury, 
    705 F.3d 133
    , 144 (3d
    Cir. 2012). It does not swallow the general rule, which dictates that the target of the
    subpoena—the third-party custodian—can appeal only after he has been held in
    contempt. 
    Id. In this
    case, the FPD, on behalf of McAtee, moved the district court to quash
    the subpoena and then immediately appealed the district court's denial. McAtee—the
    target of the subpoena—has yet to refuse compliance.3 And the district court has not
    held him in contempt, a final judgment that McAtee has the right to appeal.
    Accordingly, subsequent appellate review is not impossible. We therefore dismiss this
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.4
    ______________________________
    3
    We recognize that McAtee's resistance to the district court's order of
    production arises out of his honorable adherence to the ethical obligations of our
    profession. See Schwimmer v. United States, 
    232 F.2d 855
    , 863 (8th Cir. 1956).
    4
    Because Beltramea—the privilege holder and a party to the matter below—has
    not appealed, we need not decide whether we would have had jurisdiction if he had
    joined this appeal. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 
    558 U.S. 100
    , 107–13
    (2009) (considering the collateral order doctrine and observing that "postjudgment
    appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the
    attorney-client privilege").
    -3-