Doris Scott v. John E. Potter , 134 F. App'x 989 ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 04-2133
    ___________
    Doris Scott,                              *
    *
    Appellant,                   * Appeal from the United States
    * District Court for the
    v.                                  * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    *
    John E. (Jack) Potter, in his official    *
    capacity as Postmaster General,           *     [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                    *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 12, 2005
    Filed: June 8, 2005
    ___________
    Before SMITH, FAGG, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Doris Scott appeals from the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary
    judgment in her employment discrimination action against Postmaster General John
    Potter (hereinafter United States Postal Service (“USPS”)). We review a grant of
    summary judgment de novo. See Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines,
    
    278 F.3d 847
    , 850 (8th Cir. 2002).
    1
    The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District
    of Nebraska, sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Scott’s sex discrimination claim was properly dismissed because she failed to
    exhaust her administrative remedies for that claim. See Miller v. Runyon, 
    32 F.3d 386
    , 389 (8th Cir. 1994). As to Scott’s age and race discrimination claims, USPS
    proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Scott—USPS had
    concluded from medical documentation provided by Scott’s treating physician that
    she could not meet the physical requirements of the job—and Scott failed to provide
    any evidence suggesting that the proffered rationale was a pretext for discrimination.
    See Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 
    357 F.3d 787
    , 792 (8th Cir. 2004). Furthermore,
    with regards to her race discrimination claim, Scott did not make out a prima facie
    case because the employee who was ultimately promoted was of the same race. See
    Kenney v. Swift Transp., Inc., 
    347 F.3d 1041
    , 1044 (8th Cir. 2003).
    We therefore affirm the district court.
    ______________________________
    -2-