United States v. Robin L. Iron Shield ( 2012 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-2328
    ___________
    United States of America,                  *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                  * District Court for the District
    * of North Dakota.
    Robin L. Iron Shield,                      *
    *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: February 13, 2012
    Filed: March 27, 2012 (Corrected March 27, 2012)
    ___________
    Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Robin Iron Shield appeals his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, see
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2243
    (a), asserting that the district court1 erred in refusing to sever his trial
    from that of his co-defendant, Bruce Kills in Water, and that the evidence was
    insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, United States District Judge for the District
    of North Dakota.
    I.
    A single indictment charged Iron Shield with having sexual intercourse with a
    thirteen-year-old girl, S.O.R., and Kills in Water with having sexual intercourse with
    another thirteen-year-old girl, O.M. Although the two events occurred in the same
    apartment at approximately the same time, Iron Shield maintains that the defendants
    were improperly joined in the indictment because they did not participate "in the same
    act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense
    or offenses." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). He maintains that the two offenses were
    separate and distinct. But since Iron Shield did not raise this issue in the trial court,
    we may review it only for plain error, and cannot give relief unless the misjoinder, if
    it was one, had a substantial injurious effort on the verdict. See United States v.
    Robertson, 
    606 F.3d 943
    , 951-52 (8th Cir. 2010).
    The record here will not support that finding. This was a simple case: There
    were only two defendants, the trial lasted only a day and a half, and only four
    witnesses testified. The district court very carefully told the jury, both in its
    preliminary instructions and its final instructions, that the charges against the
    defendants were separate and distinct and that the jurors were required to judge each
    defendant individually. During the trial, moreover, the district court cautioned that
    incriminating statements by each of the defendants were to be considered only to the
    extent that they bore on the case of that defendant. These instructions, in the
    circumstances, cured any possibility of prejudice, much less a substantial injurious
    effect, arising from the joinder. See Zafiro v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 534
    , 540-41
    (1993).
    In a related argument, Iron Shield asserts that the district court abused its
    discretion by denying his motion to sever his trial from Kills in Water's, see Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 14(a), because their defenses were irreconcilable or antagonistic. It is true
    that Iron Shield denied engaging in sexual intercourse with S.O.R., while Kills in
    Water admitted that he had had intercourse with O.M. but denied knowing that she
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    was under sixteen years old. This makes the defendants' defenses different, but it does
    not make them antagonistic or irreconcilable for the very reason that Iron Shield
    argued that he had been misjoined with his co-defendant: The acts with which the
    defendants were charged were completely distinct and separate, and the jury could
    easily have believed one defense without rejecting the other. Each defense stood on
    its own. See United States v. Lewis, 
    557 F.3d 601
    , 609-10 (8th Cir. 2009). Any
    possible prejudice that the different defenses might have created was in any event
    cured by the district court's careful instructions, already alluded to, to the jury to
    compartmentalize the evidence.
    II.
    Iron Shield contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because
    his admission that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with S.O.R. was not
    corroborated and was the only evidence of intercourse, as opposed to other sexual
    activity, introduced at trial. It is true that S.O.R. testified that she did not remember
    if she and Iron Shield had had sex and did "not believe" that they did, and there were
    no witnesses to the actual sexual act charged. But the corroboration that the law
    requires must only bolster the reliability of a defendant's admission to render a case
    submissible; it need not independently establish all or any of the elements of the crime
    charged. The defendant's admission, if other evidence tends to show its reliability, is
    sufficient to do that. United States v. Kirk, 
    528 F.3d 1102
    , 1111 (8th Cir. 2008).
    Here, there was evidence that Iron Shield was lying on the floor in the apartment with
    S.O.R. on the night in question, that they were embracing and kissing, that he
    removed her bra, and that they were lying under blankets together when they awoke
    the next morning. Clothes that belonged to both of them were found in the apartment
    and S.O.R.'s bra was wrapped in blankets found there. There was other corroborating
    testimony, but the recited evidence is more than sufficient to show the reliability of
    Iron Shield's statements that he had intercourse with S.O.R. The case against him was
    therefore sufficient to go to the jury.
    Affirmed.
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