United States v. Jody Davis , 859 F.3d 572 ( 2017 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-2008
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Jody Lee Davis
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: May 9, 2017
    Filed: June 12, 2017
    ____________
    Before RILEY and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and ROSSITER,1 District Judge.
    ____________
    ROSSITER, District Judge.
    1
    The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the
    District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
    Jody Lee Davis (“Davis”) appeals from the district court’s2 decision to impose
    a 210-month prison sentence and recommend that his federal sentence be served
    consecutively to potential future state court sentences. For the reasons stated below,
    we affirm Davis’s sentence.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    In 2012 and 2013, Davis was convicted in Iowa state court of numerous crimes,
    including one count of identity theft, one count of burglary, two counts of theft, and
    ten counts of forgery. On February 4, 2015, an Iowa state court sentenced Davis to
    suspended sentences for all of those crimes and placed him on probation.
    After being indicted in federal court on methamphetamine charges, Davis pled
    guilty on November 16, 2016 to Attempted Manufacture and Aiding and Abetting the
    Manufacture of Methamphetamine. Davis was sentenced on April 12, 2016. At the
    time of sentencing, probation-revocation proceedings were pending in Iowa state
    court based on the methamphetamine arrest. After discussing the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    factors, the district court noted that state-court probation revocation proceedings were
    pending but specifically stated, “I did not consider the pending cases in deciding on
    a disposition.” The district court sentenced Davis to 210 months in prison,
    recommending to the Bureau of Prisons that the sentence be served consecutively to
    any term of state imprisonment resulting from the probation revocation.
    It is clear that the district court has the discretion to “order that [Davis’s]
    sentence run consecutively to his anticipated state sentence in the probation
    revocation proceeding.” Setser v. United States, 
    566 U.S. 231
    , 244-45 (2012). This
    case presents the novel issue of whether it is error for a district court to explicitly not
    2
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Court for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    -2-
    consider the possibility of a state court sentence when ordering that a federal sentence
    be consecutive to any possible state-court sentence.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    Davis argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
    court failed to consider the potential state prison time. The government claims that
    Davis’s argument is really one of procedural error.3 After careful review, we
    conclude the district court neither procedurally erred in determining Davis’s sentence
    nor imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
    A.      Standards of Review
    Because Davis failed to object to any procedural error, we review for plain
    error. United States v. Cottrell, 
    853 F.3d 459
    , 462 (8th Cir. 2017). “To establish
    plain error, [a defendant] must prove (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and
    (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Grimes, 
    702 F.3d 460
    , 470 (8th Cir. 2012)).
    “We review the substantive unreasonableness of sentences under a standard
    akin to an abuse-of-discretion standard, cognizant that it will be the unusual case
    when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the
    applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.
    Edwards, 
    820 F.3d 362
    , 366 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Sayles, 
    754 F.3d 564
    , 567 (8th Cir. 2014)). “A sentence may be unreasonable if the district court
    fails to consider a relevant factor which should have received significant weight;
    gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers the
    appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment.” 
    Id.
    3
    Davis insists his claim is based solely on substantive unreasonableness.
    -3-
    B.    Procedural Error
    Davis claims United States Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.3 obligates the district
    court to examine the length of potential future state terms of imprisonment.
    According to Davis, by failing to perform this examination, the district court violated
    the requirement in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) to craft “a sentence sufficient, but not greater
    than necessary, to comply with purposes” of sentencing. Davis provides no authority
    to support his novel interpretation of § 5G1.3.
    Section 5G1.3(a) applies when “the instant offense was committed while the
    defendant was serving a term of imprisonment . . . or after sentencing for, but before
    commencing service of, such term of imprisonment.” In both cases, the sentences
    should run consecutively. Whether or not § 5G1.3(a) applies, the district court could
    not have violated it by imposing the sentence consecutively.4
    The next two subsections of § 5G1.3, (b) and (c), deal with situations where the
    other term of imprisonment results from relevant conduct to the instant offense of
    conviction. These subsections do not apply because the prior convictions for theft,
    burglary, and forgery are not relevant conduct to the making of methamphetamine,
    and the fact that an offense also results in a revocation of probation “does not make
    the state conviction ‘relevant conduct’ to the federal conviction.” United States v.
    Jones, 
    628 F.3d 1044
    , 1049 (8th Cir. 2011).5
    4
    This subsection could arguably be applicable in this case because the crimes
    were committed after the imposition of a suspended sentence but before Davis began
    serving it. See United States v. Murphy, 
    69 F.3d 237
    , 246 n.8 (8th Cir. 1995).
    5
    The district court did make the federal sentence concurrent to any sentence
    imposed in two state court cases involving relevant conduct, that is, the manufacture
    of methamphetamine and the possession of drug paraphernalia.
    -4-
    Davis turns to the final subsection, § 5G1.3(d), which provides, “In any other
    case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant
    offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively
    to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment
    for the instant offense.”6 See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    . He argues that § 5G1.3(d) requires
    the district court to at least consider the potential state term of imprisonment.
    However, by its express language, this subsection only applies to cases where there
    are currently existing undischarged terms of imprisonment, not potential future terms
    of imprisonment. See Setser, 
    566 U.S. at 237-39
     (acknowledging that § 3584 does
    not apply to scenarios in which the state term of imprisonment has not yet been
    imposed).
    Davis has failed to provide any authority requiring the district court to weigh
    the possibility of future state prison terms. The district court considered all the
    relevant § 3553(a) factors “available at the time of sentencing.” Setser, 
    566 U.S. at 244
    . The district court did not err by expressly not considering the fact that Davis’s
    probation could possibly be revoked.
    C.     Substantive Unreasonableness
    Davis argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
    court failed to consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors. “Because we previously
    concluded the district court considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, [Davis’s]
    substantive unreasonableness argument is without merit.” United States v. Lewis, 
    557 F.3d 601
    , 615 (8th Cir. 2009).
    6
    Application Note 4(c) to § 5G1.3(d) recommends that the federal sentence run
    consecutively to a state sentence imposed after revocation of probation. While this
    note only specifically applies to cases where the state revocation occurs before the
    federal sentencing, the purpose of punishing crimes more seriously when committed
    during probation would still apply in this case.
    -5-
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm Davis’s sentence.
    ______________________________
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-2008

Citation Numbers: 859 F.3d 572

Filed Date: 6/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023