James Stringer v. Nancy A. Berryhill , 700 F. App'x 566 ( 2017 )


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  •               United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-1511
    ___________________________
    James Bret Stringer
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
    ____________
    Submitted: November 6, 2017
    Filed: November 9, 2017
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before WOLLMAN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    James Bret Stringer appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
    disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). We find
    no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of appointed counsel, see Phillips
    v. Jasper County Jail, 
    437 F.3d 791
    , 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (relevant criteria include
    factual and legal complexity of case; there is no statutory or constitutional right to
    appointment of counsel in civil case), or in the denial of entry of default judgment, see
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (default judgment warranted only when defendant “has failed to
    plead or otherwise defend”); Taylor v. City of Ballwin, 
    859 F.2d 1330
    , 1332 (8th Cir.
    1988) (abuse-of-discretion standard of review).
    Upon de novo review, we agree with the district court that substantial evidence
    on the record as a whole supports the denial of benefits. See Gann v. Berryhill, 
    864 F.3d 947
    , 950-51 (8th Cir. 2017). Specifically, the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s)
    credibility determination is entitled to deference, because it was based on several valid
    reasons. See Julin v. Colvin, 
    826 F.3d 1082
    , 1086 (8th Cir. 2016) (credibility
    determination is ALJ’s province, and, so long as it is supported by good reasons and
    substantial evidence, this court will defer to it); see also Halverson v. Astrue, 
    600 F.3d 922
    , 932 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ is not required to discuss each credibility factor as long
    as factors are acknowledged and considered). Further, under the circumstances of this
    case, the ALJ was not required to schedule a second consultative examination. See
    Martise v. Astrue, 
    641 F.3d 909
    , 926-27 (8th Cir. 2011) (ALJ is required to order tests
    and medical examinations only if medical records presented to him give insufficient
    medical evidence to determine if claimant is disabled); Shannon v. Chater, 
    54 F.3d 484
    , 488 (8th Cir.1995) (reversal for failure to develop record is warranted only when
    such failure is unfair or prejudicial). As to residual functional capacity (RFC), the
    ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, in part because the credibility
    determination was proper. See Boyd v. Colvin, 
    831 F.3d 1015
    , 1020 (8th Cir. 2016)
    1
    The Honorable Robert E. Larsen, United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri, now retired, to whom the case was referred for final
    disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    -2-
    (it is ALJ’s responsibility to determine RFC based on all relevant evidence: medical
    records, observations of treating physician and others, and claimant’s own description
    of his limitations). While there were no medical opinions, it appears the medical
    evidence would have supported even a less restrictive RFC,2 see Hensley v. Colvin,
    
    829 F.3d 926
    , 931-32 (8th Cir. 2016) (RFC is medical question and must be supported
    by some medical evidence of claimant’s ability to function in workplace, but there is
    no requirement that RFC findings be supported by specific medical opinion); and,
    contrary to Stringer’s assertion, it was his burden to establish his RFC, see id. at 932.
    Finally, we reject Stringer’s assertion of ALJ bias. See Perkins v. Astrue, 
    648 F.3d 892
    , 902-03 (8th Cir. 2011) (claimant bears burden of producing sufficient evidence
    to overcome presumption that ALJ is unbiased). The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    2
    The ALJ who denied Stringer DIB and SSI in February 2013, found Stringer
    capable of lifting more weight, and engaging in more walking and standing.
    -3-