Marilyn Leggett etc. v. Kenneth Apfel , 1 F. App'x 583 ( 2001 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 00-1434
    ___________
    Marilyn Leggett, o/b/o Bobby Leggett,*
    SS# XXX-XX-XXXX,                     *
    *
    Appellant,              *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                             * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner,      *
    Social Security Administration,      *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.               *
    ___________
    Submitted: January 3, 2001
    Filed: January 11, 2001
    ___________
    Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit
    Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Marilyn Leggett, widow of Bobby Leggett, appeals the District Court’s1 order
    affirming the Commissioner’s decision to deny her husband’s application for disability
    1
    The Honorable Henry Woods, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable
    John F. Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
    Arkansas.
    insurance benefits (DIB). Having carefully reviewed the record, see Roberts v. Apfel,
    
    222 F.3d 466
    , 468 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review), we affirm.
    Bobby applied for DIB in October 1991, alleging disability since October 1982
    from heart disease, diabetes, a stroke, and degenerative arthritis. His insured status
    expired December 31, 1984. After a second hearing in May 1997,2 the administrative
    law judge (ALJ) found Bobby capable of performing his past relevant work (PRW),
    and thus not disabled, before his date last insured (DLI).
    Marilyn first argues that the ALJ failed to make credibility findings as to her
    testimony about Bobby’s subjective complaints—shortness of breath, chest pain, and
    back pain—and his limited daily activities. This argument fails, as the ALJ specifically
    stated that the hearing testimony did not establish disabling limitations prior to the DLI,
    and Marilyn alone testified at the hearing (as by then, Bobby was deceased). The ALJ
    cited the Polaski v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), factors and specified
    various inconsistencies between the testimony and other evidence in the record, as
    required. See Lowe v. Apfel, 
    226 F.3d 969
    , 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that findings
    were adequately explained and supported by the whole record where the ALJ referred
    to Polaski factors and specified inconsistencies in the record to support its credibility
    findings, and that the ALJ was not required to discuss methodically each Polaski
    factor).
    Marilyn next contends that the ALJ erred in finding Bobby was capable of
    performing his PRW before his DLI. We disagree. The ALJ (1) determined Bobby
    had the residual functional capacity for light work; (2) specified the physical exertional
    requirements of such work; and (3) found that the demands were consistent with light
    work based on Marilyn’s testimony about Bobby’s PRW being managerial or desk jobs
    2
    Another administrative law judge found Bobby not disabled after a February
    1994 hearing, but the case was remanded for further development of the record.
    -2-
    involving no physical labor. See Sells v. Shalala, 
    48 F.3d 1044
    , 1046 (8th Cir. 1995)
    (holding that the ALJ must investigate and make findings on the demands of a
    claimant’s PRW and compare them with the claimant’s capabilities). She also
    erroneously suggests that the ALJ was required to call a vocational expert (VE). See
    Barrett v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 1019
    , 1024 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the testimony of a
    VE is not required where the ALJ determined that the claimant could perform PRW).
    We decline to address Marilyn’s other arguments, as they were not raised in the
    District Court. See 
    Roberts, 222 F.3d at 470
    ("[U]nless a manifest injustice would
    result, a claim not articulated to the district court is subject to forfeiture on appeal.").
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
    -3-