Brian Arthur Hill v. Patrick Scott , 349 F.3d 1068 ( 2003 )


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  •                       United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-3220
    ___________
    Brian Arthur Hill,                        *
    *
    Plaintiff-Appellant,         *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    Patrick Scott; Catherine Pavlak;          *
    Mark Pierce, all individually and in      *
    their professional capacities as St. Paul *
    police officers;                          *
    *
    Defendants-Appellees,        *
    *
    Michael Rasmussen; Jerome Steffen;        *
    *
    Defendants,                  *
    *
    City of St. Paul,                         *
    *
    Defendant-Appellee.          *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 14, 2003
    Filed: November 14, 2003
    ___________
    Before BOWMAN, HEANEY and BYE, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    BYE, Circuit Judge.
    Brian Arthur Hill filed this action pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claiming three
    officers of the St. Paul Police Department violated his Constitutional rights and state
    tort law when they arrested and detained him. The district court granted summary
    judgment for defendants on the grounds the defendants are protected from the federal
    claims by qualified immunity, Hill failed to establish his tort claims, and defendants
    were protected from the state claims by state official immunity. Hill appeals, arguing
    he proffered sufficient evidence to show the officers violated his clearly established
    rights. We affirm.
    I
    Pursuant to the proper standard of review, described below, the following are
    undisputed facts. Brian Arthur Hill was arrested just inside the doorway of his home
    by Officers Catherine Pavlak and Mark Pierce of the St. Paul Police Department.
    Pavlak and Pierce arrested Hill because Officer Patrick Scott told them there was a
    warrant for Hill’s arrest. Officer Scott had a previous history with Hill. In 1995, Hill
    sued Scott and other officers for wrongful arrest and excessive force, and defendants
    settled on the eve of trial. The events at issue in this action occurred less than one
    year after the settlement.
    The events leading up to the arrest began when St. Paul Parking Enforcement
    Officer Michael Rasmussen attempted to take possession of a disabled parking permit
    issued to Hill’s father. The Hills had reported one of their two permits stolen and
    Rasmussen believed the permit hanging in Hill’s sister’s car was the one reported
    stolen. Hill disputes the permit was the one reported stolen and claims Rasmussen
    had no right to take it back. Hill objected strongly to giving the permit to Rasmussen,
    who felt threatened and called for police back-up. Officers Scott, Pavlak and Pierce
    responded to the scene.
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    Officer Scott did not participate in the actual arrest of Hill – such task being
    performed by Officers Pavlak and Pierce. But Scott’s actions leading to the arrest are
    at issue, and are as follows. When the three officers arrived, Scott recognized Hill
    and asked a dispatcher to conduct a warrant check on him. Specifically, Scott asked
    the dispatcher for information on first name “Brian” last name “Hill,” a black male
    in his late 20s, with a possible address of 1081 Hague and possibly a suspended
    license. The dispatcher replied there was an outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrant
    on a Brian Walter Hill, born August 19, 1972, who was 5'11" and 175 pounds with
    green eyes, on the charge of driving with no proof of insurance. The dispatcher did
    not confirm or deny any other information. Scott believed the warrant was for
    appellant Hill and told Officers Pavlak and Pierce there was an arrest warrant out for
    Hill. Hill vehemently denied having a warrant. The officers tried to arrest Hill on the
    warrant but he resisted and retreated into his house. Officers Pavlak and Pierce
    followed him inside and one grabbed an arm. Hill and his sister fought with the
    officers. The officers sprayed Hill and his sister with mace and arrested both for
    obstructing legal process.
    After Hill’s arrest, Pavlak and Pierce transported Hill to a hospital for treatment
    for the mace exposure. Meanwhile, Scott called the dispatcher with more specific
    information about Hill, namely, his birth date of April 24, 1970. The dispatcher
    responded the Brian Hill with that birth date was Brian Arthur Hill, not Brian Walter
    Hill, and there were no outstanding warrants for Brian Arthur Hill. That information
    was communicated to Officers Pavlak and Pierce who had custody of Hill at the
    hospital. Pavlak and Pierce declined Hill’s request to be released and booked him on
    a charge of obstructing legal process for the scuffle at the Hill residence. Hill was
    ultimately released without being charged for that or any other offense arising from
    these events.
    Hill filed an eleven-count complaint against five individual defendants and the
    City of St. Paul. Those were winnowed down to the following four claims:
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    (1) Officer Scott violated 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     by failing to verify the information
    received from the dispatcher; (2) Officers Pavlak and Pierce violated § 1983 by
    failing to release Hill when they learned there was no warrant for him; (3) Scott,
    Pavlak and Pierce committed state law torts of false arrest and Scott intentionally
    inflicted emotional distress on Hill; and (4) the City is also charged for being
    vicariously liable for state-law torts. The defendants moved for summary judgment
    on the basis of qualified immunity and the district court granted the motion. Hill
    appeals.
    II
    Appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is made de novo, applying
    the same standard as the district court. The question is whether, when all evidence
    and reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
    record shows the existence of any material fact. Graves v. Arkansas Dept. of Fin. &
    Admin., 
    229 F.3d 721
    , 723 (8th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment will only be granted
    if the evidence shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
    district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
    Qualified immunity is available to government officials who prove their
    conduct did “not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights of which
    a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818
    (1982). To avoid summary judgment based on qualified immunity, Hill had to proffer
    sufficient evidence to find a violation of a Constitutional right, show the alleged right
    was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, and raise a genuine issue
    of material fact about whether reasonable officers would have known their conduct
    would have violated this clearly established right. Smithson v. Aldrich, 
    235 F.3d 1058
    , 1061 (8th Cir. 2000). If an officer alleges conduct by an arrestee giving rise
    to probable cause and those facts are undisputed, the officer is entitled to qualified
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    immunity. Arnott v. Mataya, 
    995 F.2d 121
    , 123-24 (8th Cir. 1993). If, however, the
    arrestee challenges the officer’s description of the facts and presents a factual account
    that would not permit a reasonable officer to make an arrest, then there is a material
    factual dispute precluding summary judgment. 
    Id. at 124
    .
    A.    Officer Scott’s Acts Before the Arrest
    The Fourth Amendment right of citizens not to be arrested without probable
    cause is clearly established. See Habiger v. Fargo, 
    80 F.3d 289
    , 295 (8th Cir. 1996).
    To prevail on this claim, Hill must (1) show Scott had no probable cause to arrest
    him, and (2) raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether reasonable officers
    would have known Scott’s conduct would have violated the Fourth Amendment.
    Smithson v. Aldrich, 
    235 F.3d at 1061
    . Hill argues Scott had no probable cause to
    arrest him, and a reasonable officer would have known there was no probable cause,
    because (1) differences between the information the dispatcher gave Scott about the
    wanted Brian Hill and what Scott knew about appellant Hill should have given Scott
    notice the warrant was for someone else, and (2) Scott should have investigated
    further to determine if appellant Brian Hill was the person named in the warrant.
    Hill points to Kuehl v. Burtis, 
    173 F.3d 646
     (8th Cir. 1999), for support. In
    Kuehl a panel of the Eighth Circuit found qualified immunity does not protect an
    officer who unreasonably fails to investigate sufficiently before arresting a suspect.
    
    Id. at 651
    . In that case an officer investigating a fight ignored an independent
    witness’s statement exculpating Kuehl of assault, refused to speak with Kuehl for
    more than twenty seconds, ignored physical evidence consistent with Kuehl’s story
    she was the victim, not perpetrator, of assault, and omitted most exculpatory evidence
    from his police report. 
    Id. at 648
    . In holding the officer’s failure to fully investigate
    before arresting Kuehl violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the Court said, “law
    enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior
    to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so long as
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    ‘law enforcement would not [be] unduly hampered . . . if the agents . . . wait[ ] to
    obtain more facts before seeking to arrest.’” 
    Id. at 650
     (quoting, United States v.
    Woolbright, 
    831 F.2d 1390
    , 1394 (8th Cir. 1987)).
    The undisputed facts of this case are materially distinguishable from those in
    Kuehl. First, none of the information provided to Scott by the dispatcher contradicted
    what Scott knew of Hill before the arrest. The first and last names were identical, the
    two Brian Hills are only two years apart in age, and there was only one inch
    difference in height and twenty-five pounds difference in weight. Hill argues Scott
    should have known the wanted Brian Hill was Caucasian because the dispatcher told
    Scott the warrant was for a Brian Hill with green eyes. But as Hill concedes in his
    brief, some African Americans (though rare) have green eyes. Unlike Kuehl, there
    were no contradictions between the dispatcher’s description and Hill that would have
    prompted a reasonable officer to investigate more fully. Second, in Kuehl, the officer
    was investigating a possible crime after the fact and based his assessment of probable
    cause for arrest on his shoddy investigation. In this case there was a facially valid
    warrant for the arrest of someone with a description remarkably close to appellant
    Hill.
    Instead of Kuehl, we are inclined to look to similar cases where officers
    mistook the arrestee for the subject of a warrant. The rule in those cases is that
    mistaken arrest based on a facially valid warrant does not violate the Fourth
    Amendment if the officers reasonably mistook the arrestee for the person named in
    the warrant. Hill v. California, 
    401 U.S. 797
    , 802 (1971) (“When the police have
    probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party
    for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.”). We answer
    this question by looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest to
    determine its reasonableness. Rodriguez v. Farrell, 
    280 F.3d 1341
    , 1347 (11th Cir.
    2002) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    123 S.Ct. 1482
     (2003); Patton v. Przybylski, 
    822 F.2d 697
    , 699-700 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Glover, 
    725 F.2d 120
    , 122 (D.C.
    -6-
    Cir. 1984) (“The reasonableness of the arresting officers’ conduct must be determined
    by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest.”). Given the
    remarkably similar descriptions of the two Brian Hills, we find the officers were
    reasonable in mistaking the one for the other. See Brady v. Dill, 
    187 F.3d 104
    , 114
    (1st Cir. 1999) (noting mistakenly arresting person of a different race was not
    unreasonable and stating that “courts have concluded with some regularity that
    relatively minor discrepancies in physical features or other data do not render
    unreasonable an arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant.”); Johnson v. Miller, 
    680 F.2d 39
    , 42 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding police officer’s misidentification arrest of a
    white woman pursuant to an arrest warrant for a black woman did not violate the
    Constitution); see also Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1346-49 (holding a mistaken arrest was
    reasonable and thus did not constitute a Constitutional violation for purposes of §
    1983 where the plaintiff shared the same name, sex, age, and race as the fugitive, had
    a similar Social Security number, and lived in a neighboring town); Blackwell v.
    Barton, 
    34 F.3d 298
    , 303-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding an officer was reasonable in
    arresting § 1983 plaintiff with the same first name and similar physical characteristics
    as those listed on the warrant); Brown v. Patterson, 
    823 F.2d 167
    , 169 (7th Cir. 1987)
    (holding an officer was reasonable to arrest § 1983 plaintiff with the same name and
    race, but otherwise different identifying information, as was listed on the warrant).
    Hill argues Scott should not have relied upon the consistencies between the
    warrant information and appellant Hill, rather, Scott should have conducted further
    investigation by asking Hill or his family for Hill’s date of birth or middle name. Had
    Scott been able to confirm Hill’s date of birth or middle name before the arrest he
    would have had more reason to doubt Hill was a wanted man.1 There may have been
    1
    We do not decide the related question of whether it would have been a
    violation of the Fourth Amendment if Scott had arrested Hill despite knowing his
    birthdate and middle name were different from the ones on the warrant. Some courts
    have found Constitutional arrests with similar differences between arrestee and the
    subject of the warrant. See, e.g,, Patton, 
    822 F.2d at 698-99
     (concluding officer’s
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    no arrest and ensuing struggle. Such a result would have been preferable for
    everyone involved, and in hindsight Scott should have taken the extra step. But that
    is not the question before us, and hindsight is not the standard. The issue is whether
    Scott’s failure to investigate the birth date violated Hill’s Constitutional rights, and
    whether a reasonable officer would know such a failure would be a Constitutional
    violation. This is not a situation where Scott knew Hill was not the subject of the
    warrant, or where Scott knew further investigation would have revealed there was no
    warrant for Hill. This is a case where further investigation would have cast doubt on
    whether Hill was the subject of the warrant. But that is always the case where an
    arrestee denies being the subject of a facially valid warrant; there can always be more
    investigation to verify identity. The question is, how much investigation does the
    Constitution require? In light of all the circumstances, we hold Scott had sufficient
    consistent identifying information to reasonably conclude the warrant was for
    appellant Hill and no reasonable officer would have known failing to investigate
    further would violate the Fourth Amendment.
    B.    Officers Pavlak and Pierce: Continued Detention
    Hill does not allege Pavlak and Pierce violated his rights with his initial arrest
    because, as he acknowledges, they had no reason to disbelieve Scott’s information of
    there being a warrant for Hill. Instead, Hill claims Pavlak and Pierce violated his
    Constitutional rights when they refused to release him after they found out there was
    no warrant for his arrest. “Continuing to hold an individual in handcuffs once it has
    been determined that there was no lawful basis for the initial seizure is unlawful
    within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Rogers v. Powell, 
    120 F.3d 446
    , 454
    (3d Cir. 1997). However, there may be a separate, independent basis for the
    arrest of man with same first and last name as the subject of a warrant was
    Constitutional despite the fact the arrestee had driver’s license from a different state,
    an address different from the one in the arrest warrant, and different date of birth).
    -8-
    continued detention. 
    Id.
     The district court found, and Pavlak and Pierce now argue,
    they had probable cause to arrest Hill because his violent resistance to arrest was
    obstruction of legal process. We agree.
    Under Minnesota law, it is a misdemeanor if a person “(1) obstructs, hinders,
    or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or
    apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense; [or] (2)
    obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the
    performance of official duties . . . .” Minn. State § 609.50. The undisputed facts
    show Officers Pavlak and Pierce had probable cause to believe Hill violated this law
    because they witnessed (and directly experienced) his resistance of arrest. Hill argues
    his resistance cannot be the basis of probable cause to believe he committed the crime
    of obstruction of legal process because he had a right to resist the arrest. In
    Minnesota, there is a right to resist an unjustified bodily attack (a.k.a. excessive force)
    by an officer, but there is no right to resist an unlawful search or arrest. State v.
    Kutchara, 
    350 N.W.2d 924
    , 927 (Minn. 1984); State v. Wick, 
    331 N.W.2d 769
    , 771
    (Minn. 1983). Hill had a right to resist only if Pavlak’s and Pierce’s use of force was
    improper or excessive. However, Hill does not allege excessive force; and he admits
    he resisted arrest first, and then the officers became physical in response. He argues
    he was resisting only because he believed they had no right to arrest him and was
    afraid they might use excessive force. This is not a basis for lawful resistance in
    Minnesota. Therefore, Officers Pavlak and Pierce had probable cause to believe Hill
    had committed the crime of obstruction of legal process and could retain him in
    custody even after discovering there was no warrant for his arrest. They are entitled
    to qualified immunity for their actions.
    C.     The Pendant State Law Claims
    Hill alleges Officers Scott, Pavlak and Pierce are liable for the state law tort of
    false arrest; Scott is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the City
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    is vicariously liable for all of the above. The district court found the officers’ conduct
    insufficient to meet the high threshold of intentional infliction of emotional distress
    and the arrest was reasonable for the same reason Hill’s federal claims fail. We
    agree; the officers are immune and the City is not liable.
    Under Minnesota law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
    distress are: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct
    was intentional or reckless; (3) it caused emotional distress; and (4) the distress was
    severe. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 
    330 N.W.2d 428
    , 438-39 (Minn. 1983).
    The conduct “must be extreme and outrageous, so atrocious that it passes the
    boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.”
    Haagenson v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 
    277 N.W.2d 648
    , 652-53 n.3
    (Minn. 1979) (citation omitted). On a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress, summary judgment is proper if a party does not meet the high standard of
    proof needed for the claim. Strauss v. Thorne, 
    490 N.W.2d 908
    , 913 (Minn. Ct. App.
    1992).
    The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Scott includes an
    additional factual twist. Hill alleges, and would testify, that during the confrontation
    Scott said, “Fuck you. Get your Black ass in the house.” Scott denies making the
    statement, so we have a dispute of fact which cannot be resolved on summary
    judgment. But we do not need to resolve it. Even assuming Officer Scott made the
    obscene statement, his actions do not rise to the level of an intentional infliction of
    emotional distress. For the reasons described above, Officer Scott’s investigation of
    Hill was reasonable. The use of such highly charged and insulting language, while
    highly improper and not to be condoned, does not raise Scott’s otherwise proper and
    reasonable actions above the “bounds of decency” bar. Stead-Bowers v. Langley,
    
    636 N.W.2d 334
    , 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“The emotional distress must be so
    severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”). Therefore, we affirm
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    summary judgment on the state law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional
    distress.
    Hill’s state tort law claim of false arrest fails for the same reason discussed
    above: the officers reasonably believed there was a warrant for Hill’s arrest when
    they first arrested him, and had probable cause to believe Hill committed obstruction
    of legal process when he resisted that arrest. State law provides official immunity for
    reasonable acts just as federal law provides qualified immunity for federal claims.
    Johnson v. Morris, 453, N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990). Under Minnesota law, the
    question comes down to whether the officers acted “reasonably and lawfully under
    the circumstances.” Perkins v. St. Louis County, 
    397 N.W.2d 405
    , 408 (Minn. Ct.
    App. 1986). The undisputed evidence shows the officers so acted. We therefore
    affirm summary judgment of the state law claims against the officers and City.
    HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    I concur in the majority’s opinion as it relates to Officers Pavlek and Pierce, for
    they arrested Brian Hill only after Officer Scott informed them that a valid warrant
    had been issued for a Brian Hill. I disagree, however, that Officer Scott’s cursory
    investigation into whether the warrant actually pertained to Plaintiff Brian Hill
    approached the level required to shield him from suit. I therefore respectfully dissent
    from that portion of the majority’s opinion.
    This matter comes to us on appeal from an order granting summary judgment
    on qualified immunity grounds. Thus, we view “the evidence and the inferences
    which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable” to Hill, the
    nonmoving party. Lambert v. City of Dumas, 
    187 F.3d 931
    , 934 (8th Cir. 1999)
    (emphasis added). Where a plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested, qualified
    immunity will only protect the arresting officer if the arrest was objectively
    reasonable. Ripson v. Alles, 
    21 F.3d 805
    , 808 (8th Cir. 1994). Officers may be
    -11-
    entitled to qualified immunity for mistakenly arresting suspects, so long as the
    mistake was a reasonable one. Kuehl v. Burtis, 
    173 F.3d 646
    , 649 (8th Cir. 1999).
    In the absence of exigent circumstances, a mistaken arrest is “reasonable” only when
    it follows a sufficient investigation establishing grounds for the intrusion. 
    Id. at 650
    .
    Prior to the current dispute, Hill had an unfortunate history with the St. Paul
    Police Department that spanned several years. In 1995, he was assaulted by officers
    outside a St. Paul bar and restaurant. Hill, an African American, alleged that at least
    one of the officers used a racial epithet during this encounter. Then, in 1996, St. Paul
    Police Officer Scott entered his home without a warrant to investigate a police call
    and assaulted Hill inside his home. During this second physical confrontation, Scott
    suggested Hill should have “learned his lesson” from the 1995 incident. Yet again
    in 1996, Hill was accosted by the St. Paul Police when officers attempted to arrest
    him on an invalid warrant at his house. Officers restrained Hill for a time, even
    though he shared very few characteristics with the wanted suspect. Hill sued the St.
    Paul Police Department and its chief due to the above incidents. In 1998, Hill settled
    the matter with the defendants, including Scott.
    Less than a year after Hill settled his lawsuit, he was again faced with a conflict
    with the St. Paul Police Department, giving rise to the instant lawsuit. On June 15,
    1999, Parking Enforcement Officer Rasmussen was outside Hill’s house, trying to
    retrieve a disabled parking permit that had been reported stolen. Rasmussen and Hill
    got into an argument about the permit, and Rasmussen eventually called for back-up
    support. Scott was the first to respond to the call. When Scott arrived, he did not
    attempt to intervene, but rather waited for other support to arrive. Meanwhile, he
    decided to investigate whether Hill was wanted for any outstanding warrants.
    Scott did not ask Hill, or anyone else, for Hill’s date of birth, driver’s license
    number, address, middle name, or any other identifying characteristic, before
    performing his warrant check. None of these identifying characteristics were
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    included in Scott’s warrant check. Scott inquired simply whether any warrants were
    issued for a black male, late twenties, with a first name of Brian and last name of Hill,
    who had a possible address of 1081 Hague and a possible suspended driver’s license.
    A warrant for a misdemeanor traffic offense was confirmed for a Brian Walter Hill,
    whose age, height, and weight approximated that of Plaintiff Brian Hill. Brian Walter
    Hill, however, had green eyes. The operator did not confirm the race or address for
    Brian Walter Hill, nor did she state whether his driver's license was suspended.
    At this point, it was incumbent upon Scott to make a further inquiry. Qualified
    immunity should not be granted when minimal further investigation would have
    cleared the suspect. Kuehl, 
    173 F.3d at 650
    . The majority distinguishes between
    cases such as Kuehl, in which an officer fails to fully investigate before arresting a
    suspect, and those in which an officer mistakenly arrests the wrong person on an
    outstanding warrant. Assuming this distinction is valid, I agree that Officers Pavlek’s
    and Person’s conduct falls within the “mistaken arrest” category, for they arrested
    Hill based on faulty information from Scott. On the other hand, Officer Scott’s
    behavior better fits the Kuehl line of cases, and his failure to investigate the validity
    of the warrant is inexcusable. Accord Edwards v. Baer, 
    863 F.2d 606
    , 608 (8th Cir.
    1988) (finding arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity from suit where
    officer sufficiently investigated whether warrant was valid).
    A simple follow-up call to the operator requesting additional information such
    as the address of Brian Walter Hill, or a request for Hill’s driver’s license or birth
    date, or even a simple query about Hill’s eye color, would have alerted Scott that this
    Brian Hill had no outstanding warrants. Scott did nothing, however, to confirm the
    warrant before broadcasting to his fellow officers that Hill was wanted. Thus, this is
    not a case like Edwards, where the arresting officer confirmed the existence of what
    turned out to be an invalid warrant twice before arresting the suspect. In that case,
    we held that the officer’s additional investigation was reasonable in light of the
    totality of circumstances. 
    Id. at 608-09
    . Here, even after Hill complained that he did
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    not have a warrant outstanding against him, Scott did not perform even the slightest
    further examination to determine if Hill was telling the truth.
    The district court held that further investigation was not practicable in part
    because the situation called for quick action. See Kuehl, 
    173 F.3d at 650
     (holding
    officer’s failure to fully investigate before arresting may be justified by exigent
    circumstances). The evidence presented, however, does not support this
    characterization of the facts. Brian Walter Hill’s warrant was for a misdemeanor
    traffic offense, not an inherently dangerous or violent crime. Due to the nature of the
    warrant, St. Paul Police Department policy afforded the officers discretion to merely
    advise Hill of the warrant; they were not required to arrest him. In other words, no
    arrest was necessary, and there was no need to act quickly to effectuate an arrest
    before finding out if one was authorized. Scott knew the nature of the warrant, and
    knew that he did not have to arrest Hill on this type of warrant. Moreover, there is
    no evidence that Hill presented a flight risk. On the contrary, he has lived at the same
    address in St. Paul for nearly his entire life. Particularly in light of Hill’s adversarial
    history with Scott and the St. Paul Police Department, Scott’s actions are not
    reasonable as a matter of law.
    In short, Scott cannot be excused for his failure to sufficiently investigate
    whether Plaintiff Brian Hill was the true subject of the warrant. With minimal further
    inquiry, Scott would have spared Hill from yet another unjustified intrusion of Hill’s
    liberty. I would therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment as
    it related to Officer Scott.
    ______________________________
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