United States v. Carl v. Collins , 42 F. App'x 906 ( 2002 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 01-3050
    ________________
    United States of America,                *
    *
    Appellee,                    *
    *      Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 *      District Court for the
    *      District of Nebraska.
    Carl V. Collins,                         *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellant.                   *
    ________________
    Submitted: April 19, 2002
    Filed: July 31, 2002
    ________________
    Before HANSEN, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,
    Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    HANSEN, Chief Judge.
    Following a bench trial, Carl V. Collins was convicted of possession with
    intent to deliver cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Collins
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm the
    judgment of the district court.1
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    The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the
    District of Nebraska, tried the case without a jury. The Honorable Richard G. Kopf,
    Chief Judge, imposed judgment and sentence.
    The Nebraska State Patrol interdicts narcotics that travel into and/or through
    Omaha by surveilling, among other places, the local airport, bus terminal, and train
    station. Trooper Rasgorshek worked each of these locations as part of the Patrol's
    Commercial Interdiction Unit. On March 31, 2000, while Rasgorshek was working
    at the Greyhound bus station, an eastbound bus destined for Chicago entered the
    station. The passengers disembarked, and the bus was moved to a refueling and
    cleaning area. After the passengers had disembarked, Rasgorshek entered the bus to
    look for suspicious packages. He saw a black leather jacket in the front of an
    overhead compartment. In his experience, Rasgorshek had observed that jackets and
    blankets were sometimes placed in the front of overhead compartments to conceal
    suspicious looking packages placed in the back of the compartment. Rasgorshek
    pushed the jacket out of the way with the flat of his hand to see if there were any
    packages or bags behind it. When he pushed the jacket, he felt a hard, square object
    in the jacket. Rasgorshek removed the jacket from the overhead bin and placed it on
    the seat in front of the seat immediately below the overhead bin. Rasgorshek could
    not place the jacket in the seat directly below the overhead compartment because two
    black leather soft-sided suitcases occupied it. Rasgorshek then brought in his
    narcotics-detection dog to examine the jacket. The dog alerted to the presence of
    narcotics in the jacket, and Rasgorshek called other members of the interdiction team
    for assistance.
    The officers had the bus station manager make a public announcement that this
    particular bus would not be able to continue to Chicago and that the passengers would
    have to retrieve their belongings from the bus and move them to a new one. The
    officers then watched the passengers emerge from the bus, looking for the person
    wearing the leather jacket and/or carrying the black suitcases. The officers observed
    Collins standing in the terminal next to the leather suitcases. Rasgorshek approached
    him, identified himself as an officer, informed Collins that he was not under arrest,
    and asked if Collins would answer some questions. The officer asked Collins about
    his destination, and Collins informed the officers that he was traveling from Los
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    Angeles to Ohio. Rasgorshek then asked Collins if his jacket was inside the bags and
    Collins responded in the affirmative. (Trial Tr. at 54,115.) Because the terminal was
    crowded, Rasgorshek asked Collins to accompany him to the bus station's back
    luggage room out of the flow of traffic. Collins agreed. He picked up his bags and
    followed Rasgorshek into a corridor at which point Investigator Sattlefield, for safety
    purposes, placed handcuffs on Collins and escorted him to the luggage room.
    Rasgorshek picked up the bags and carried them the remainder of the way.
    In the luggage room, Rasgorshek saw the black jacket tucked partially inside
    but hanging partially outside an unzipped section of one of the bags. He asked
    Collins if that was his jacket, and although Collins had earlier told Rasgorshek that
    his jacket was in the bag, he now denied owning the jacket. Collins told the officers
    that the jacket belonged to a white male he had befriended on the bus. Collins further
    told the officers that he had taken it off the bus with the intent to return it to that
    person when they boarded the new bus because it appeared to Collins that the person
    had accidentally left the jacket on the bus. After hearing this, Rasgorshek lifted the
    jacket out of the bag. It was the same jacket his drug dog had alerted to on the bus.
    Rasgorshek inserted his hand into a hole in the pocket and removed a brick-like
    object from between the lining and the jacket. The brick field-tested positive for
    cocaine and weighed approximately 963 grams. The officers arrested Collins.
    "In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court's finding of guilt
    under a sufficiency of the evidence standard, determining whether there is substantial
    evidence to support the guilty verdict." United States v. Navarrete -Barron, 
    192 F.3d 786
    , 792 (8th Cir. 1999). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    verdict, resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the verdict, and accept as
    established all reasonable inferences tending to support the verdict. Id.; United States
    v. Buford, 
    108 F.3d 151
    , 153 (8th Cir. 1997). We will reverse the conviction only if
    "a reasonable fact-finder must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the
    government's proof of one of the offense's essential[] elements." United States v.
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    McCracken, 
    110 F.3d 535
    , 540 (8th Cir. 1997). To convict Collins for possession
    with the intent to distribute, the government must have shown that Collins knowingly
    possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it. United States v. Thompson, 
    285 F.3d 731
    , 733 (8th Cir. 2002).
    Collins argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the element of
    knowing possession. To establish the element of knowing possession, the
    government must have proved that Collins had either actual or constructive
    possession of the contraband. United States v. Campa-Fabela, 
    210 F.3d 837
    , 839-40
    (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 1010
    (2001). Possession of drugs can be
    established where the defendant has ownership of or has asserted dominion or actual
    control over the contraband. 
    Id. at 839;
    McCracken, 110 F.3d at 541
    . Viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was
    sufficient evidence supporting the element of knowing possession. Rasgorshek first
    noticed the black jacket in a bin directly above Collins' luggage. The jacket matched
    the appearance of Collins' bags. Rasgorshek testified that there was no other luggage
    in that same area of the bus and that "[w]ith no other bags or anything in the area, it
    appeared to me that whoever owned the jacket was also going to be the person who
    owned the two black leather bags." (Trial Tr. at 47.) Collins removed the jacket from
    the bus along with his bags when the station manager announced that all passengers
    should remove their luggage and personal items from the bus. He was in possession
    of the bags and the jacket when Rasgorshek initially approached him. Although
    Collins later denied ownership of the jacket, claiming that it belonged to the
    passenger sitting beside him, he initially told Rasgorshek that it was his jacket inside
    the bag. Collins claims that he was wearing a black leather three-quarter length coat
    the day of the arrest and that it would be nonsensical to conclude that he packed two
    leather jackets for this short trip. The officers denied, however, that Collins was
    wearing a different black jacket when they confronted him, and no other evidence
    supports Collins' claim. An inventory of the luggage revealed that the only jacket in
    either bag was the black leather jacket containing the cocaine. The district court, as
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    it was entitled to do as the trier of fact, simply credited the testimony of the officers
    and not Collins. (Trial Tr. at 271.) We will not reweigh the evidence or pass
    judgment on the credibility of the witnesses when reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence on appeal. United States v. Anderson, 
    78 F.3d 420
    , 422 (8th Cir. 1996); see
    also United States v. Jones, 
    254 F.3d 692
    , 695 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
    district court's credibility determinations "are well-nigh unreviewable, so long as the
    findings are not internally inconsistent or based on testimony that is incoherent,
    implausible, or contradicted by objective evidence in the case").
    The government and Collins have widely different interpretations of the facts
    of this case. The government alleges that Collins was traveling from Los Angeles to
    Chicago to distribute cocaine. Collins alleges that he was traveling to Ohio to
    propose to his fiancé and was merely attempting to return a seemingly forgotten
    jacket to a fellow traveler. Where the evidence supports two competing theories of
    the case, however, we will not disturb the conviction as long as a reasonable
    interpretation of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    government, supports the verdict. 
    Thompson, 285 F.3d at 734
    . The government has
    presented sufficient evidence which reasonably can be interpreted to support the
    conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    A true copy.
    Attest:
    CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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