Washington v. Champion , 62 F. App'x 851 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 20 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHNNY DAVID WASHINGTON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-5024
v. (D.C. No. 98-CV-696-K)
(N.D. Oklahoma)
RON CHAMPION, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the
district court’s order denying relief in his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Because petitioner filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), our review of his claims
is governed by its provisions. McGregor v. Gibson , 248 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir.
2001). Under AEDPA, petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He can make this showing by
establishing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitted).
If a claim was decided on its merits by a state court, petitioner is entitled to
relief only if he can establish that the state court decision “‘was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Id. § 2254(d)(2).’” McCracken
v. Gibson , 268 F.3d 970, 975 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 165(2002). The “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) requires a finding the state court
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arrived at a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court or decided the case
differently than the Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams
v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The “unreasonable application clause” of
§ 2254(d)(1) requires a conclusion not only that the state court decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly, but also that the
application of federal law was unreasonable. Id. at 411. Under § 2254(d)(2), “a
decision adjudicated on the merits . . . based on a factual determination will not
be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the
evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell , 123
S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2003). We read petitioner’s brief as arguing the provisions of
§ 2254(d)(1) only. Finally, we will not consider an issue on habeas review that
has been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural
ground unless petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. McCracken , 268 F.3d at 976.
Petitioner raised fourteen issues in his federal petition, all of which were
raised either on direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA) or in an application for post-conviction relief. The issues presented
were: (1) trial court error in permitting petitioner to appear before the jury in
prison clothing; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel; (4) trial court error in allowing testimony of
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petitioner’s psychologist regarding past crimes; (5) error in admitting a
Department of Corrections “Pen Pack”; (6) improper communication by the trial
court with the jury without notice to petitioner or his attorney; (7) error in
admitting testimony of Angie R. Jones in violation of petitioner’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights; (8) trial court error in berating petitioner’s attorney before the
jury, indicating lack of judicial impartiality; (9) denial of due process because the
preliminary hearing failed to establish elements of one kidnaping count; (10) error
in sustaining state’s motion in limine on petitioner’s insanity defense; (11) error
in failing to dismiss attempted rape count based on complaining witness’ denial
such attempt occurred; (12) lack of evidence to support the attempted rape
conviction; (13) failure to properly instruct the jury as to consummation of crime
of rape; and (14) defective information which failed to allege perpetrating acts
and lacked necessary consummation clause.
Although on direct appeal the OCCA adjudicated several of petitioner’s
claims in summary fashion, “we owe deference to the state court’s result , even if
its reasoning is not expressly stated.” Aycox v. Lytle , 196 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original). In reviewing the state court's decision,
the district court correctly concluded, based on the record, that under either
harmless error analysis standard, i.e., Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
or Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 (1993), petitioner was not entitled to
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habeas relief based on his brief appearance before the jury in jail clothing. The
district court also correctly determined there was sufficient evidence under the
standard established in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979), to support the
attempted rape conviction based on the proof requirements. Our review of the
evidence produced at trial reflects that a rational jury clearly could have found
petitioner guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to the other issues presented on direct appeal which challenged state
evidentiary rulings at trial, i.e., admission of testimony of petitioner’s
psychologist regarding certain statements made by petitioner, admission during
the sentencing phase of the “Pen Pack,” and inadequate notice of Jones’
testimony, these alleged errors were not so grossly prejudicial as to have “fatally
infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due
process.” Fox v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1286, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Petitioner’s second and third claims raised issues of ineffective assistance
of trial and appellate counsel. The OCCA appropriately considered these claims
in petitioner’s post-conviction application. The court applied the correct legal
standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), acknowledging that,
specifically, petitioner failed to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland .
Based on our review of the trial transcript and the lack of any other evidence, we
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agree that the OCCA's adjudication of these claims was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of federal law.
The OCCA determined the balance of petitioner’s claims were procedurally
barred. If the OCCA declined to reach the merits of those claims on independent
and adequate state grounds, they may not be considered on federal habeas review
unless petitioner is able to demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or that failure to consider the
claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v.
Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991). Petitioner makes no such showing.
Further, petitioner does not claim, nor has he demonstrated, that he is actually
innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted.
We have reviewed the well-reasoned and thorough disposition of
petitioner’s claims as outlined in the district court’s order of January 31, 2002.
We DENY a COA for substantially the same reasons set forth in that order and
DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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