United States v. Keyno Williams , 79 F. App'x 244 ( 2003 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 02-3477
    ___________
    United States of America,              *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                               * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Missouri.
    Kenyo Williams,                        *
    *        [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellant.                 *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 1, 2003
    Filed: October 23, 2003
    ___________
    Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BYE, and RILEY.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Kenyo Williams challenges the district court’s application of a 4-level
    enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony. We reverse
    and remand.
    Police officers arrested Mr. Williams after observing him driving a stolen
    vehicle. The vehicle’s steering column was broken. During the search incident to
    arrest, police found a loaded pistol in Mr. Williams’s waistband. Computer checks
    revealed that the pistol was stolen. Mr. Williams, who had two Missouri convictions
    for second-degree burglary, pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession
    of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).
    At sentencing, the presentence report recommended a 4-level enhancement
    under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), as Mr. Williams had “used or possessed any firearm
    or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Mr. Williams objected,
    denying that he was driving the stolen vehicle, and arguing that the loaded pistol was
    not used in connection with the stolen-vehicle felony; he contended that possession
    of the firearm was merely coincidental. The government countered that possessing
    the firearm emboldened Mr. Williams to tamper with the stolen vehicle.
    The district court found that Mr. Williams had tampered with (i.e., driven) a
    vehicle which he knew was stolen, a Missouri felony, and that he had possessed a
    firearm while committing that felony. Admitting that it was a “very close case,” and
    that the evidence did not show the firearm actually facilitated the tampering offense,
    the court found that it was “not clearly improbable” the firearm had the potential to
    facilitate the tampering. The district court thus overruled Mr. Williams’s objection,
    stating that “[t]he ‘not clearly improbable’ standard strongly favor[ed] the
    government, and that standard [was] the basis for the Court’s ruling.” The court
    sentenced Mr. Williams to 100 months imprisonment and 2 years supervised release.
    In Guidelines cases, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear
    error and its conclusions of law de novo. See United States v. Mack, No. 02-3491,
    
    2003 WL 22097477
    , at *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2003). The sentencing court must apply
    a 4-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm in connection
    with another felony offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). “Felony offense” refers
    to “any offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term
    exceeding one year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction
    obtained.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.7). Section 2K2.1(b)(5) does not require
    proof that the firearm was used in the commission of the felony; rather, the
    -2-
    government need prove only that the firearm was used or possessed in connection
    with the underlying felony. See United States v. Scolaro, 
    299 F.3d 956
    , 957 (8th Cir.
    2002), cert. denied, 
    123 S. Ct. 1774
     (2003).
    Mr. Williams does not dispute that tampering with the stolen vehicle
    constitutes another felony offense; rather, he argues on appeal that the government
    did not present any evidence that possessing the firearm emboldened him to take or
    drive the stolen vehicle, and that the “not clearly improbable” standard should be
    applied only when the other felony offense involves drugs.
    We agree with Mr. Williams that the district court erred in applying the “not
    clearly improbable” standard from commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which
    increases a defendant’s drug-trafficking sentencing range by 2 levels for possessing
    a dangerous weapon while committing a drug offense. See United States v. Routon,
    
    25 F.3d 815
    , 819 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that § 2D1.1(b)(1) is “an inappropriate guide
    for applying” § 2K2.1(b)(5) because government’s burden of proof is more
    demanding under § 2K2.1(b)(5)); cf. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 & comment. (n.3)
    (enhancement for weapons possession reflects increased risk of violence when drug
    traffickers possess weapons). On remand, the district court should determine, without
    reference to the “not clearly probable” standard, whether Mr. Williams used or
    possessed the handgun “in connection with” his tampering felony offense. See Mack,
    
    2003 WL 22097477
    , at *6.
    Accordingly, we vacate Mr. Williams’s sentence and remand for further
    proceedings on the section 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement, consistent with this opinion.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-3477

Citation Numbers: 79 F. App'x 244

Filed Date: 10/23/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023