Richard Percefull v. Chris Claybaker, etc , 211 F. App'x 521 ( 2006 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 05-4223
    ___________
    Richard D. Percefull,                  *
    *
    Appellee,                  *
    *
    v.                               *   Appeal from the United States
    *   District Court for the
    Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden,      *   Western District of Arkansas.
    AR; Board of Alderman of Camden,       *
    Arkansas, Marvin Moore, James          *   [UNPUBLISIHED]
    Adcock, Tony Anthony, James            *
    Dishroom, Preston Woods, Irene         *
    Galbert, Charles Launius, Zin McRae;   *
    City of Camden Public Works            *
    Department; Sam Steelman,              *
    *
    Appellants.                *
    ___________
    Submitted: November 3, 2006
    Filed: November 9, 2006
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden, Arkansas, appeals from the district court’s1
    interlocutory summary judgment order denying him qualified and legislative
    immunity in Richard D. Percefull’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging violations of the
    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on Claybaker’s role in the seizure of
    Percefull’s bass boat. Reviewing de novo, see Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 
    414 F.3d 989
    , 991 (8th Cir. 2005), we affirm.
    Under our limited jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether
    Claybaker’s role in the seizure of Percefull’s bass boat violated Percefull’s clearly
    established constitutional rights. “‘Beyond this narrow issue, we may exercise
    jurisdiction only over issues that are “inextricably intertwined,” meaning the issues
    would necessarily be resolved when we resolve the question of qualified immunity.’”
    Powell v. Johnson, 
    405 F.3d 652
    , 654 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schilcher v. Univ. of
    Ark., 
    387 F.3d 959
    , 962 (8th Cir. 2004)). Thus, we will not consider at this time
    Claybaker’s arguments that Percefull’s suit is barred by res judicata, and that Percefull
    failed to avail himself of adequate post-deprivation remedies.
    Claybaker also questions the sufficiency of Percefull’s evidence on causation
    and damages. We have consistently held that sufficiency of the evidence is outside
    the scope of our jurisdiction when reviewing an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
    qualified immunity. See Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. Greening, 
    398 F.3d 1080
    , 1082-83
    (8th Cir. 2005); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 
    64 F.3d 389
    , 395 (8th Cir.
    1995).
    To the extent Claybaker has properly raised and argued issues relevant to
    qualified immunity, we find no error in the district court’s denial of summary
    judgment. See Zinermon v. Burch, 
    494 U.S. 113
    , 132 (1990) (procedural due process
    1
    The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Arkansas.
    -2-
    requires state to provide predeprivation remedy where feasible before taking
    property); Dixon v. Lowery, 
    302 F.3d 857
    , 862 (8th Cir. 2002) (Fourth Amendment
    protects against seizures undertaken without legal authority). Claybaker himself
    admitted that there was no legal or judicial authorization for seizing Percefull’s boat,
    which undermines his argument that no reasonable person in his position would have
    known that he was violating Percefull’s rights. Nor did Claybaker provide any type
    of predeprivation hearing, although the evidence is disputed on whether the necessity
    of quick action rendered such a hearing impractical. Although Claybaker argues that
    Percefull had no protected property interest in his unregistered boat, he does not assert
    that the failure to register the boat authorized its seizure. Accord 
    Dixon, 302 F.3d at 862-64
    (disputed possessory interest may still be constitutionally protected).
    Finally, Claybaker submits that his actions are insulated by legislative
    immunity. Legislative immunity is typically reserved for those officials acting in
    some sort of legislative capacity, and it has no application where an executive official
    orders the performance of executive tasks. Cf. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 
    523 U.S. 44
    ,
    54-56 (1998) (granting executive official legislative immunity for enactment of
    ordinance which “bore all the hallmarks of” traditional legislative action).
    The order of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -3-