United States v. Allen , 254 F. App'x 475 ( 2007 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 07a0791n.06
    Filed: November 13, 2007
    No. 06-2166
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              )                  ON APPEAL FROM THE
    )                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    v.                                     )                  COURT FOR THE EASTERN
    )                  DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
    DAVID MORRIS ALLEN,                    )
    )                          OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.             )
    _______________________________________)
    Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
    KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case involves Defendant-Appellant
    David Morris Allen’s direct appeal of his conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
    District of Michigan, for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
    For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We decline to
    reach Allen’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without prejudice to Allen’s right to raise
    the claim in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
    I. BACKGROUND
    At approximately five a.m. on the morning of September 25, 2004, the Detroit Police
    Department executed a raid at Club Fabulous, an after-hours night club. Officer Nevin Hughes saw
    the defendant standing outside the club holding a gun and then saw him throw the gun onto the
    ground near a fire hydrant. Apart from Allen, Hughes saw no other people on the sidewalk directly
    outside the club. Hughes arrested Allen and retrieved the gun. Allen had a felony conviction dating
    prior to this arrest.
    On May 17, 2005, Allen was charged in a one-count indictment with being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Following a three-day trial and
    several hours of deliberation, a jury convicted Allen. Prior to sentencing, Allen fired his trial
    attorney and retained Attorney David S. Steingold as new defense counsel. On January 24, 2006,
    the district judge granted Allen’s motion to extend the time for filing his motion for a new trial
    pursuant to FED . R. CRIM . P. 33. On April 14, 2006, Allen filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that
    his previous defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. His motion included
    a request for an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied the motion because it concluded that
    the trial counsel’s alleged acts and omissions, whether taken separately or as a whole, did not meet
    the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). Allen filed a motion for reconsideration that included another request for an evidentiary
    hearing, which Allen believed would bolster his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
    district court denied the motion for reconsideration on the grounds that Allen had failed to show that
    the order denying the new trial contained a palpable error and that correcting the error would result
    in a different disposition of the case, as required by Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule
    7.1(g)(3).
    On August 29, 2006, the district court sentenced Allen to fifty-one months’ incarceration
    followed by two years’ supervised release. Allen filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.
    2
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    Allen contests on appeal the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial, without first
    granting him an evidentiary hearing. We will affirm a district court’s denial of a criminal
    defendant’s motion for a new trial “unless there has been error as a matter of law or a clear and
    manifest abuse of judicial discretion.” 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT , NANCY J. KING , & SUSAN R.
    KLEIN , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 559 (3d ed. 1999); see also United States v. Pierce,
    
    62 F.3d 818
    , 823 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Seago, 
    930 F.2d 482
    , 488 (6th Cir. 1991)),
    cert. denied, 
    516 U.S. 1136
    (1996). The defendant has the burden of proving that the district court
    should grant a new trial. 
    Id. (citing United
    States v. Davis, 
    15 F.3d 526
    , 531 (6th Cir. 1994)).
    Similarly, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to grant an evidentiary
    hearing before ruling on a motion for a new trial. United States v. Bass, 
    460 F.3d 830
    , 838 (6th Cir.
    2006), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 
    127 S. Ct. 2959
    (2007); United States v. O’Dell, 
    805 F.2d 637
    , 643
    (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 859
    (1987).
    To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, we must assess whether the
    district judge “relie[d] on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or . . . improperly applie[d] the law or
    use[d] an erroneous legal standard.” Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    59 F.3d 608
    , 615 (6th Cir. 1995)
    (citing Southward v. S. Cent. Ready Mix Supply Corp., 
    7 F.3d 487
    , 492 (6th Cir. 1993)). “In
    examining findings of fact, this court may reverse only if after a review of all the evidence, we are
    ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Harrison v. Metro.
    Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 
    80 F.3d 1107
    , 1112-13 (6th Cir.) (quoting Anderson v. City
    of Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 573 (1985)), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 863
    (1996).
    3
    We review de novo a criminal defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which is
    a mixed question of law and fact. Mallett v. United States, 
    334 F.3d 491
    , 497 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 698 (1984)), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 1133
    (2004). We
    decline to address ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal, however, unless the “the
    existing record is adequate to assess properly the merits of the claim.” United States v. Hynes, 
    467 F.3d 951
    , 969 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 
    415 F.3d 537
    , 555-56 (6th Cir.
    2005)).
    B. The District Court’s Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing before Ruling on Allen’s Motion
    Allen argues that “[a]t a minimum, the trial court should have granted [his] request for an
    evidentiary hearing raised in both his original Rule 33 motion, and renewed in his motion for
    reconsideration.” Defendant-Appellant Br. at 15. A trial court, however, has the discretion to deny
    an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a motion for a new trial. 
    O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 643
    . We
    require a defendant to produce at least a modicum of evidence in support of a request for an
    evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
    Bass, 460 F.3d at 838
    (holding that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant [the
    defendant] an evidentiary hearing . . . because [the defendant] failed to proffer any evidence that his
    trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance”). When filing his Rule 33 motion, Allen did not offer
    any evidence in support of his allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Accordingly,
    1
    In support of his motion for reconsideration, Allen provided the affidavit of one witness.
    The district court, however, correctly determined that the affidavit should have been submitted as
    part of the original Rule 33 motion. Moreover, the affiant provided no information concerning
    Allen.
    4
    the district court acted within its discretion in denying both Allen’s original Rule 33 motion and his
    motion for reconsideration.
    C. The District Court’s Rejection of Allen’s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim
    We reach ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal only if the record is
    sufficiently developed to permit us to review the claims. United States v. Jones, 
    489 F.3d 243
    , 255
    (6th Cir. 2007). The presumption against resolving an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal
    “stems from the fact that a finding of prejudice is a prerequisite to a claim for ineffective assistance
    of counsel, and appellate courts are not equipped to resolve factual issues.” United States v. Brown,
    
    332 F.3d 363
    , 368-69 (6th Cir. 2003). “[I]n most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable
    to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.” Massaro v. United States, 
    538 U.S. 500
    , 504 (2003).
    Allen argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for four reasons,
    of which the most significant is Allen’s allegation that his counsel did not investigate witnesses to
    the Club Fabulous raid. To evaluate Allen’s ineffective-assistance claim, we would need evidence
    such as an affidavit from Allen’s defense attorney stating why he chose not to interview these
    witnesses, or further affidavits from the persons who would have potentially served as witnesses
    indicating the probative value of their testimony. Because insufficient evidence exists for us to
    determine whether the failure on the part of Allen’s trial attorney to investigate witnesses to the Club
    Fabulous raid constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we decline to reach this claim.
    D. Allen’s Equal-Protection Claim
    Allen argues that Project Safe Neighborhoods, as applied in locations within the Eastern
    District of Michigan, violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
    5
    Because Allen’s trial attorney did not raise this issue through a pre-trial motion in the district court,
    and in the absence of plain error affecting Allen’s “substantial rights,” we conclude that Allen has
    forfeited this argument. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-35 (1993).
    III. CONCLUSION
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on Allen’s motion for a new trial based
    on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without granting an evidentiary hearing. The record
    is insufficiently developed, however, to determine whether there is merit to Allen’s claim that his
    trial attorney’s failure to investigate potential witnesses amounted to constitutionally deficient
    assistance. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying Allen’s motion for a
    new trial, without prejudice to Allen’s right to bring an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in
    a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
    6