United States v. Rhodes , 429 F. App'x 340 ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4469
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ROY CECIL RHODES, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
    District Judge. (4:09-cr-00064-F-3)
    Submitted:   March 28, 2011                   Decided:   May 20, 2011
    Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Walter H. Paramore, III, WALTER H. PARAMORE, III, P.C.,
    Jacksonville, North Carolina, for Appellant. George Edward Bell
    Holding,   United  States  Attorney,   Jennifer P.  May-Parker,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Roy Cecil Rhodes, Jr., appeals his conviction and 169-
    month sentence for one count of conspiracy to distribute and
    possess    with     intent    to    distribute        more    than    fifty       grams   of
    cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and one
    count of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base and
    aiding    and     abetting    in     violation        of     21    U.S.C.    § 841(a)(1)
    (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).                    Counsel has filed a brief in
    accordance      with     Anders    v.    California,         
    386 U.S. 738
        (1967),
    certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
    questioning whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 should apply
    to Rhodes’s sentence.             The Government has elected not to file a
    brief.    Rhodes has filed a pro se supplemental brief.
    I.       Adequacy of the Rule 11 Hearing
    In the Anders context, we first review whether the
    district court properly conduced its Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 colloquy
    before accepting Rhodes’s guilty plea.                       Because Rhodes did not
    move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, any
    error    in   the   Rule     11    hearing       is   reviewed      for     plain   error.
    United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525-26 (4th Cir. 2002).
    To establish plain error, he “must show:                     (1) an error was made;
    (2) the error is plain; and (3) the error affects substantial
    rights.”        United    States    v.   Massenburg,          
    564 F.3d 337
    ,   342-43
    2
    (4th Cir. 2009)      (reviewing          unpreserved      Rule    11    error).         “The
    decision     to    correct     the       error     lies    within       [this      court’s]
    discretion, and [the court] exercise[s] that discretion only if
    the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
    reputation    of    judicial        proceedings.”          
    Id. at 343
      (internal
    quotation marks omitted).                 The defendant bears the burden of
    showing plain error.
    We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the
    district court complied with the mandates of Rule 11.                             The court
    ensured that Rhodes’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and
    supported by an adequate factual basis.                    Accordingly, we decline
    to disturb Rhodes’s conviction.
    II.    Reasonableness of Sentence
    An      appellate            court      reviews       a     sentence         for
    reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.                                Gall v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).                         This review requires
    consideration       of       both        the       procedural         and     substantive
    reasonableness      of   a    sentence.            
    Id. First, we
        must    assess
    whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines
    range,     considered    the        18    U.S.C.      § 3553(a)        (2006)      factors,
    analyzed     any     arguments           presented        by     the        parties,     and
    sufficiently explained the selected sentence.                         
    Id. at 49-50;
    see
    United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n
    3
    individualized     explanation     must       accompany    every   sentence.”);
    United    States   v.   Carter,    
    564 F.3d 325
    ,   330   (4th Cir. 2009)
    (same).    An extensive explanation is not required as long as the
    appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
    exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”                    United
    States v. Engle, 
    592 F.3d 495
    , 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007)), cert. denied, 131 S.
    Ct. 165 (2010).
    Because Rhodes did not ask for a sentence different
    from that imposed, we review the procedural reasonableness of
    his sentence for plain error.                See 
    Lynn, 593 F.3d at 577-78
    .
    Our review of the record reveals no such error.                    The district
    court properly calculated the Guidelines range, heard arguments,
    and offered an explanation for the sentence imposed.                   While the
    explanation was not lengthy, the court clearly demonstrated that
    it considered the parties’ arguments and created a proper record
    for appellate review.
    Turning     to   the   substantive        reasonableness    of   the
    sentence, we presume on appeal that a sentence within a properly
    calculated Guidelines range is reasonable.                   United States v.
    Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007).                  After reviewing the
    record, we conclude that Rhodes has not rebutted the presumption
    of reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
    4
    III. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
    Finally, counsel questions whether Rhodes should have
    received the benefit of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.                           This
    argument was not raised in the district court, and we conclude
    that it is waived.           In any event, however, we conclude that
    Rhodes is not entitled to the benefit of the Fair Sentencing
    Act, as his offense predates the effective date of the Act.                         See
    United States v. Diaz, 
    627 F.3d 930
    , 931 (2d Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Brewer, 
    624 F.3d 900
    , 909 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010), cert.
    denied, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 10-9224);
    United States v. Bell, 
    624 F.3d 803
    , 814 (7th Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Gomes, 
    621 F.3d 1343
    , 1346 (11th Cir. 2010), petition
    for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Feb. 15, 2011) (No. 10-
    9271);    United     States     v.     Carradine,      
    621 F.3d 575
    ,     580
    (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Mar. 21,
    2011) (No. 10-8937).
    Rhodes has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising a
    similar   Fair     Sentencing   Act     claim,    as    well    as    a    claim     of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, and claims that his sentence
    violates Kimbrough      v.    United    States,   
    552 U.S. 85
          (2007)    and
    Furman v. Georgia, 
    408 U.S. 238
    (1972).                  With respect to his
    claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that
    ineffective assistance is not apparent on the face of the record
    and the claim is accordingly not cognizable on direct appeal.
    5
    With respect to his other claims, we conclude that they are
    without merit.
    Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
    the   entire    record    and   have   found   no   meritorious   issues     for
    appeal.    We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
    This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
    of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
    for further review.        If the client requests that a petition be
    filed,    but   counsel    believes    that    such   a   petition   would    be
    frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
    withdraw from representation.           Counsel’s motion must state that
    a copy thereof was served on the client.              We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    6