United States v. Halstead , 261 F. App'x 472 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4952
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD L. HALSTEAD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Chief
    District Judge. (1:01-cr-00045-IMK)
    Submitted:   November 16, 2007            Decided:   January 9, 2008
    Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Richard A. Jaffe, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter,
    United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia; Patrick M. Donley,
    Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Daniel S. Goodman, Appellate
    Section, Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald   L.   Halstead   appeals,   challenging    his    sentence    on
    several grounds.    We affirm.
    I.
    A jury convicted Halstead of one count of conspiracy to commit
    mail fraud and health care fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
    ,
    1341, 1347, fourteen counts of health care fraud, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1347
    , and one count of conspiracy to launder monetary
    instruments, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (h).             The district
    court sentenced Halstead to 121 months imprisonment, to be followed
    by three years supervised release.        On appeal, we affirmed the
    convictions finding that “[t]he Government presented sufficient
    evidence to prove that Halstead created and instructed a system at
    the clinic to recruit new patients, convince them of the need for
    unnecessary treatments, perform the maximum amount of reimbursable
    treatments regardless of medical need, and then bill insurance
    companies under doctors’ signatures without their consent. . . .
    [and also to] support[] Halstead’s money laundering conviction.”
    United States v. Filcheck, 165 F. App’x 284, 286-87 (4th Cir.
    2006).   We   vacated   the   sentence,   however,     and    remanded    for
    resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), because the district court had treated the Sentencing
    2
    Guidelines as mandatory, rather than advisory.                         Filcheck, 165 F.
    App’x at 288 & n*.
    On   remand,    the      district    court         began    by   considering        the
    appropriate guideline range.1             The court found that it had clearly
    erred in computing Halstead’s base offense level at the original
    sentencing.    Under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a), the base offense level is
    23 if a person is convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(A),
    (a)(2)(A),    or     (a)(3)(A),     and        the      base   offense      level    is   20
    otherwise.     Halstead was convicted of conspiracy to commit money
    laundering    under       
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (h),       and   at   the     initial
    sentencing, the court had concluded that his base offense level was
    20.
    At resentencing, the court determined that Halstead merited a
    base offense level of 23 because § 1956(h) specifies that “[a]ny
    person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section
    . . . shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
    for the offense the commission of which was the object of the
    conspiracy.”       
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1956
    (h) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); see
    also U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a) (specifying that the base offense level
    for   conspiracy     is   the    same     as      for    the   substantive        offense).
    Halstead was convicted for conspiracy to violate § 1956(a)(1)(A),
    an offense receiving a base offense level of 23.                               The plain
    1
    The district court used the 1996 Guidelines at both hearings,
    and neither party contends that the court erred in doing so.
    3
    language of § 1956(h) and U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a) required that he
    receive the same base offense level as he would have received for
    the underlying offense, and thus the district court assigned him a
    base offense level of 23 instead of 20.
    The court then turned to the amount of loss.           At the initial
    sentencing, the district court had calculated the intended loss as
    $1.9 million in assessing the total offense levels for both the
    fraud    and    conspiracy     to    commit   money   laundering   counts,
    respectively governed by U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 and U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1.
    Under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(F), this intended loss required that
    the court add five offense levels.2             Although on resentencing
    Halstead challenged this calculation on numerous grounds, the
    district court concluded that the measure was reasonable in light
    of the evidence.         The court then carefully calculated Halstead’s
    total offense level for the conspiracy to commit money laundering
    count, arriving at a total offense level of 34.
    The court concluded that Halstead had an advisory guideline
    range    of    151-188    months    imprisonment.     The   district   court
    considered the sentencing factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and
    sentenced Halstead to 151 months incarceration, followed by three
    years of supervised release.
    2
    The district court grouped the offense levels for the fraud
    counts and the conspiracy to commit money laundering count,
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).
    4
    II.
    Halstead challenges his sentence on five grounds. The Supreme
    Court     recently   held   that    “courts     of   appeals   must   review    all
    sentences . . . under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,”
    Gall v. United States, No. 06-7949, 552 U.S.                   , slip op. at 2
    (Dec. 10, 2007).       Only “significant procedural error” -- such as
    failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the guideline
    range -- or the substantive unreasonableness of a sentence merit
    the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion.                   Id.
    at __, slip op. at 12.
    A.
    Halstead initially argues that only the jury could determine
    the amount of intended loss attributable to his conduct, citing
    United States v. Milam, 
    443 F.3d 382
     (4th Cir. 2006) and Cunningham
    v. California, 
    127 S. Ct. 856
     (2007).
    In Cunningham, the Court applied “Apprendi’s bright-line rule:
    Except for a prior conviction, ‘any fact that increases the penalty
    for   a   crime   beyond    the    prescribed    statutory     maximum   must   be
    submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
    Cunningham, 
    127 S. Ct. at
    868 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000)).            In Milam, we vacated a sentence “which
    concededly involved facts that supported a sentence ‘exceeding the
    maximums authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or
    a jury verdict.’” 
    443 F.3d at 388
    .            Both of these cases emphasize
    5
    that judges may not make factual determinations to increase a
    sentence beyond the statutory maximum.
    But the Supreme Court has “never doubted the authority of a
    judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
    statutory range. . . .          For when a trial judge exercises his
    discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range,
    the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts
    that the judge deems relevant.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (citations
    omitted).    Here, the district court found the intended loss in
    order to determine the advisory guideline range and select the
    appropriate sentence within the statutory range.                     The district
    court’s determination did not result in a sentence above the
    statutory   maximum.        Thus,   Halstead    had     no   right    to   a   jury
    determination of the intended loss.
    B.
    Halstead next contends that the district court erred in
    calculating the $1.9 million intended loss because it adopted an
    allegedly arbitrary and unreliable methodology.                 Halstead also
    contends    that,   given    the    absence    of   a   reliable      method    for
    calculating intended loss, the court should have looked to “gain”
    as an alternative.
    The district court, relying upon United States v. Miller,
    determined that amount of “loss” should be assessed in this case by
    looking to the “intended loss.”        
    316 F.3d 495
    , 501 (4th Cir. 2003).
    6
    The court determined the amount that the defendants charged,
    reduced that amount in light of the expected received to billed
    ratio, and then subtracted the amount the defendants would have
    been paid for the legitimate services performed during that time
    period.    Then the court determined the loss properly attributable
    to each defendant, see United States v. Bolden, 
    325 F.3d 471
    , 498
    (4th   Cir.    2003),    and    attributed     the   entire   intended    loss   to
    Halstead because he was the “architect” of this carefully monitored
    scheme.
    “[T]he Guidelines permit courts to use intended loss in
    calculating a defendant’s sentence.”             Miller, 
    316 F.3d at 502
    .         We
    review the district court’s factual determination of the amount of
    intended      loss     for     clear   error,    recognizing      that    only     a
    preponderance of the evidence need support these findings. See 
    id. at 498, 503
    .         “Moreover, ‘the loss need not be determined with
    precision.      The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
    loss, given the available information.’”                  
    Id.
     at 503 (citing
    U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, cmt. n.9).           After careful review of the record,
    we can only conclude that the district court carefully assessed the
    evidence      before    it   and   committed    no   reversible   error    in    its
    determination of the amount of intended loss.
    C.
    Halstead’s final argument with regard to intended loss is that
    the $1.9 million loss overstates the seriousness of his crimes.
    7
    Halstead notes that:      he was required to pay restitution of only
    $46,000; his consulting firm received fees of only slightly more
    than $100,000; and he heavily disputed the loss calculation. Given
    these   facts,   Halstead   suggests     that    using   intended     loss   to
    calculate his sentence results in an unreasonable sentence in this
    case.   The Government points out, however, that more than 40,000
    patient visits to the clinic occurred during this time frame, and
    that Halstead had arranged for patient testing not on the basis of
    medical needs, but rather on insurance coverage. Further, Halstead
    organized the fraudulent scheme and the district court found him
    accountable   for   the   entire   intended     loss   because   he   was    the
    “architect” of the scheme.
    In reviewing the reasonableness of the sentence, Gall directs
    that we give due deference “to the District Court’s reasoned and
    reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole,
    justif[y] the sentence.”      Gall, 522 U.S. at          , slip op. at 21.
    This deference is justified because “[t]he sentencing judge is in
    a superior position to find facts and judge their import under §
    3553(a) in the individual case.”           Id. at __, slip op. at 13
    (emphasis added). The district court considered the Guidelines and
    the § 3553(a) factors, and explained that the “amount of loss in
    this case, [and] the amount of planning that went on and the type
    of crime” supported a sentence within the guideline range.              Under
    8
    our deferential review of sentencing decisions, we cannot find that
    the court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
    D.
    Halstead also argues that the district court erred in using
    the money laundering Guidelines.              He contends that because the
    conspiracy to commit money laundering was inextricably related to
    the health care fraud, he should have been sentenced under the
    fraud Guidelines.        Thus, Halstead asserts that the sentence was
    unreasonable because, as he sees it, only one crime occurred here,
    fraud.
    We addressed a similar argument in United States v. Caplinger,
    
    339 F.3d 226
    , 233-34 (4th Cir. 2003).             There, the defendant argued
    that his conviction for money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
     was
    essentially a fraud conviction, and he should have been sentenced
    under the fraud Guidelines.              
    Id. at 233
    .            We rejected this
    argument,     reasoning     that    “Guidelines       §    1B1.2(a),      however,
    instructed the district court to refer to the Statutory Index
    (Appendix    A)    to   identify   the   guidelines       for   the    statutes   of
    conviction.       The index, in turn, directed the court to the money
    laundering    guidelines,      U.S.S.G.       §   2S1.1,    for       [defendant’s]
    convictions for money laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    .”                   
    Id. at 233-34
     (citations omitted).         This rationale applies equally here.
    9
    E.
    Finally, Halstead contends that the law-of-the-case doctrine
    or mandate rule precluded the district court from revising its
    determination of his base offense level for the conspiracy to
    commit money laundering count from a 20 to a 23.   Notably, Halstead
    does not dispute that, under the money laundering Guidelines, his
    base offense level should have been a 23.   Rather, he contends that
    the district court violated its mandate on remand.
    We have recognized that “to the extent that the mandate of the
    appellate court instructs or permits reconsideration of sentencing
    issues on remand, the district court may consider the issue de
    novo.”   United States v. Bell, 
    5 F.3d 64
    , 67 (4th Cir. 1993).   In
    this case, we instructed the district court on remand to “first
    determine the appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines.”
    Filcheck, 165 F. App’x at 288.     Thus, the district court did not
    err by correcting its prior mistake in assessing the base offense
    level for Halstead’s conviction of conspiracy to commit money
    laundering under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    .
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
    is
    AFFIRMED.
    10