Joseph Rosenberg v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections , 261 F. App'x 932 ( 2008 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 07-1630
    ________________
    *
    Joseph Rosenberg,                           *
    *
    Appellant,                     *      Appeal from the United States
    *      District Court for the
    v.                                    *      Eastern District of Missouri.
    *
    Missouri Department of                      *             [UNPUBLISHED]
    Corrections,                                *
    *
    Appellee.                      *
    ________________
    Submitted: January 18, 2008
    Filed: January 25, 2008
    ________________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    ________________
    PER CURIAM.
    Joseph Rosenberg, employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections (the
    Department) in a supervisory position as a Correctional Officer III, appeals the district
    court's1 grant of summary judgment to the Department in this Title VII retaliation
    action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Rosenberg claimed that the Department
    1
    The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Missouri.
    suspended and transferred him to another facility in retaliation for opposing
    discriminatory practices. The undisputed facts indicate that Rosenberg escorted two
    female coworkers to Superintendent Don Roper's office so that they could report their
    claims of sexual harassment by a male supervisor and that he sat silently through the
    meeting. He had no other involvement in the claims.
    Having conducted a de novo review of the record, see Hughes v. Stottlemyre,
    
    506 F.3d 675
    , 678 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review), we agree with the district
    court's conclusion that Rosenberg failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
    under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a), see Brower v. Runyon, 
    178 F.3d 1002
    ,
    1005 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a) would
    require a good faith belief by the plaintiff that the employer had actually engaged in
    a discriminatory practice); Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 
    65 F.3d 98
    , 100 (8th
    Cir. 1995) ("[P]rotected opposition [requires] a plaintiff [to] show a good faith
    reasonable belief that his employer engaged in a discriminatory employment
    practice."), cert. denied, 
    517 U.S. 1104
     (1996). The record includes no indication that
    Rosenberg believed the substance of the complaints and discloses that his only
    involvement was to escort the women to the office and to sit quietly during the
    meeting. We decline to address arguments Rosenberg raises for the first time on
    appeal regarding the participation clause. See Stone v. Harry, 
    364 F.3d 912
    , 914 (8th
    Cir. 2004); Berg v. Norand Corp., 
    169 F.3d 1140
    , 1145 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 872
     (1999).
    Because an extended opinion would have no precedential value and no error of
    law appears, we affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir.
    R. 47B.
    ______________________________
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