Martha Aulston v. Michael Astrue , 277 F. App'x 663 ( 2008 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1780
    ___________
    Martha L. Aulston,                      *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the
    * Eastern District of Arkansas.
    Michael J. Astrue, Social Security      *
    Administration Commissioner,            *      [UNPUBLISHED]
    *
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 30, 2008
    Filed: May 16, 2008
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Martha L. Aulston appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
    disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). In
    Aulston’s applications for SSI and DIB, she alleged disability since February 2000
    from back problems. After hearings in 2002 and 2003, Aulston’s alleged onset date
    was amended to January 2002, and in July 2003 an administrative law judge (ALJ)
    1
    The Honorable John F. Forster, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
    consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
    found her disabled. The Commissioner subsequently determined that Aulston had
    provided erroneous information on whether she had engaged in substantial gainful
    activity. The matter was reopened, and after yet another hearing in 2004, the ALJ
    issued an opinion finding that (1) Aulston had engaged in substantial gainful activity
    until August 2003, and her DIB insured status had expired in March 2003; (2) her
    Type II diabetes and history of heart surgery were severe impairments, but not of
    listing-level severity; (3) her subjective complaints were not entirely credible; and (4)
    she had the residual functional capacity to perform work at the medium exertional
    level, and thus could perform her past relevant work as a certified nurse’s assistant.
    Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. See Flynn v. Astrue, 
    513 F.3d 788
    ,
    792 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review).
    We reject Aulston’s argument that the ALJ erred by ignoring treating physician
    Safwan Sakr’s opinion that the requirements of Listing 1.02 (major joint dysfunction)
    were met. As the district court noted, Dr. Sakr’s records were not before the ALJ, and
    thus we disagree with Aulston’s passing assertions that the ALJ was required to
    further develop the record or consult a medical adviser on Listing 1.02, or to explain
    further his finding that the limitations at issue did not meet the listing-level
    requirements. The Appeals Council is required to consider new and material evidence
    submitted after the ALJ’s opinion if it relates to the period on or before the date of the
    ALJ’s decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b). We interpret the Appeals
    Council’s statement that the additional evidence did not provide a basis for changing
    the ALJ’s decision as a finding that Dr. Sakr’s records were not material. See
    Bergmann v. Apfel, 
    207 F.3d 1065
    , 1069-70 (8th Cir. 2000) (whether additional
    evidence meets criteria is question of law this court reviews de novo; to be material,
    evidence must be relevant to claimant’s condition for time period for which benefits
    were denied, and must not merely detail after-acquired conditions or post-decision
    deterioration of pre-existing condition). The ALJ stated in the August 2004 decision
    that he was reopening his July 2003 decision, which was issued almost a year before
    Aulston developed the symptoms for which she saw first saw Dr. Sakr in June 2004--
    -2-
    eleven days after the 2004 hearing--and Aulston based her claim on osteoarthritis-
    related back and hip problems, not on shoulder, ankle, or wrist problems from
    rheumatoid arthritis which were never brought to the attention of the ALJ, although
    Aulston was counseled. We decline to consider Aulston’s undeveloped argument that
    she “clearly” met the requirements of Listing 9.08 (diabetes). See SmithKline
    Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 
    439 F.3d 1312
    , 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (collecting
    cases for proposition that undeveloped arguments are waived). Accordingly, we
    affirm.
    ______________________________
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1780

Citation Numbers: 277 F. App'x 663

Filed Date: 5/16/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023