Matthews v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners , 228 F. App'x 436 ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 18, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-30407
Summary Calendar
RONALD MATTHEWS
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA;
LOUISIANA/MISSISSIPPI CARPENTERS REGIONAL COUNCIL, CARPENTER’S
LOCAL 1098
Defendants - Appellees
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
RONALD MATTHEWS
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
LOUISIANA/MISSISSIPPI CARPENTERS REGIONAL COUNCIL
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge
USDC No. 3:03-CV-49
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Plaintiff-appellant Ronald Matthews appeals the district
court’s judgment, arguing that the district court erred when it
held that he was required to file an internal grievance before
utilizing the court system. We AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Matthews, an African-American and long-time member of
Carpenter’s Local 1098, worked as a Business Representative-
Organizer with the Louisiana/Mississippi Carpenters Regional
Council (“the Regional Council”). The Regional Council is a
regional labor organization, comprised of representatives of
local Carpenters’ unions throughout Mississippi and Louisiana.
Executive Board members from the local unions make up the
Regional Council’s governing body. The Executive Secretary-
Treasurer oversees the Regional Council’s day-to-day functions.
Kevin T. Curley, a white male and then Executive Secretary-
Treasurer, hired Matthews and assigned him office space at his
local union, Carpenters Local Union 1098, in Baton Rouge.
Matthews’s primary job responsibility was organizing
unrepresented workers and contractors and persuading them of the
benefits of unionization. Matthews often visited workers at job
sites and at their homes to discuss joining the union. At times
Matthews also assisted in referring union members to jobs.
Granville Stewart, Director of Organizing, served as
Matthews’s direct supervisor. Because Stewart did not have his
2
office in Baton Rouge, he used other Regional Council employees
in the Local 1098 office as lead organizers to direct the daily
tasks of the Regional Council organizers in that office. Joseph
Ardoin Jr. served as the lead organizer when Matthews began
working for the Regional Council in December 2000. Jason Engels
replaced Ardoin as lead organizer in September 2001 and served in
that position throughout the remainder of Matthews’s employment.
On January 28, 2002, Stewart recommended that Matthews be
discharged from employment. Wiley LeBert, Acting Executive
Secretary-Treasurer, sought and received permission from the
Regional Council’s Executive Board to terminate Matthews’s
employment. On April 24, 2002, LeBert wrote a letter to Matthews
notifying him of the discharge. Stewart delivered the letter to
Matthews and told Matthews that he was being discharged for
ineffective performance.
Matthews filed a charge with the EEOC against the Regional
Council. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC dismissed
Matthews’s charge on the basis that it was unable to find a
violation. Matthews then filed this lawsuit against United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America;
Louisiana/Mississippi Carpenters Regional Council, and
Carpenter’s Local 1098, alleging racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of rights. The
defendants-appellees filed motions for summary judgment, which
3
the district court granted. Matthews now appeals the district
court’s judgment.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, using the same standards applied by the district court.
Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378,
382 (5th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “there
is no genuine issue of any material fact” and the moving party is
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Brooks, Tarlton,
Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States, 832 F.2d 1358, 1364
(5th Cir. 1987); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
Once the moving party establishes that there is no genuine
issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce
evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party
cannot rely only upon allegations, denials in a pleading, or
unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must
“set forth specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’
issue concerning every essential component of its case.” Morris
v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.
1998). The district court may not grant a motion for summary
judgment simply because it is unopposed. Hetzel v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
4
The district court granted summary judgment on the basis
that Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998),
required Matthews to take advantage of the internal grievance
procedures set in place by his employer before taking action in
court. The district court improperly applied Faragher. The
Supreme Court in Faragher held that in sexual harassment cases
for a hostile environment, when no tangible adverse employment
action resulted, employers are exempted from liability if the
employee unreasonably fails to take advantage of a policy set in
place by the employer to avoid harm. 524 U.S. at 807. The
affirmative defense in Faragher does not apply to Matthews’s case
for two reasons: (1) this case is a racial discrimination case
for wrongful termination, not a sexual, or other, harassment
case;1 and (2) Matthews suffered a tangible employment action–-
termination. See id.
However, we may affirm summary judgment on alternative
grounds than those relied upon by the district court when the
record provides “an adequate and independent basis for that
result.” Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.
1979). Such a basis exists here.
The plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may
present either direct or circumstantial evidence of intentional
1
Matthews conceded before the district court that he could
not establish a claim for hostile work environment.
5
discrimination.2 See Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d
345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005). When the plaintiff presents only
circumstantial evidence that his discharge was motivated by race
discrimination, the court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting analysis. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). Under that analysis, the plaintiff must first
present evidence establishing the existence of a prima facie case
of gender discrimination. See Machinchick, 398 F.3d at 350.
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption
of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to
the defendant to offer evidence of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action at issue. Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
If the defendant meets this burden of production, “the
presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff’s prima
facie case disappears and the plaintiff must meet [his] ultimate
burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination.”
Id. A plaintiff may meet this burden by producing evidence
either that the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
are false or, if true, that his protected characteristic was,
nevertheless, a motivating factor for the adverse employment
2
The test to survive summary judgment on racial
discrimination claims under § 1981 is the same as the test for
racial discrimination claims under Title VII. Patel v. Midland
Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 2002).
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action. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
148 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”); see also Sandstad
v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (holding that
“[e]vidence demonstrating the falsity of the defendant’s
explanation taken together with the prima facie case, is likely
to support an inference of discrimination even without further
evidence of [the employer’s] true motive.”). If a plaintiff
demonstrates that a protected characteristic was a motivating
factor in the employment decision, the defendant must then prove
that the same employment decision would have been made even in
the absence of the discriminatory motive. See Rachid v. Jack-in-
the-Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309-10 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Regional Council conceded that Matthews establishes a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. Further, Matthews
acknowledged before the district court that the Regional Council
provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for his
discharge–-that he poorly performed in the workplace. Ample
evidence of poor performance has been presented. The Regional
Council points to a formal written job evaluation by Stewart
which rated Matthews poorly in seven of eleven categories. The
highest score Matthews received in any category was a three out
of five. Engels, the lead organizer, also documented many other
7
problems with Matthews’s performance including that Matthews
failed to show up for specific assignments, conducted excessive
personal phone calls at work, slept during meetings, was
routinely tardy, lacked enthusiasm, misplaced his attention on
the work of others, and failed to obtain volunteers to work the
union’s phone bank. Accordingly, the only remaining question is
whether Matthews presented evidence that the reason given for his
discharge was a pretext for discriminating against him or that
his race was a motivating factor in his termination.
Matthews unsuccessfully attempts to rebut the Regional
Council’s non-discriminatory reasons for his discharge by arguing
that he did good work. But Matthews cites to no evidence that he
performed well, other than allegations in his own complaint and
Ardoin’s comment that Matthews did a good job recruiting black
union members. Indeed, when Stewart asked Matthews to review the
evaluation, Matthews did not contest the lowest ratings he
received in numerous categories, including public speaking,
leadership abilities, ability to develop campaign strategies, and
determination. Matthews presented no evidence to rebut either
Engels’s reports concerning Matthews’s problems or Stewart’s
evaluation; accordingly, Matthews failed to provide any evidence
that the Regional Council’s nondiscriminatory reason was a
pretext.
Matthews also fails to make the case that discrimination was
a motivating factor in the Regional Council’s decision to fire
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him. Matthews points to comments made by Ardoin3 as evidence
that racial discrimination played a factor in his termination,
and he contends that under Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342
F.3d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 2003), these remarks constitute proof of
an employer’s illegal racial animus. This court held in Palasota
that discriminatory remarks may be taken into account “even where
the comment is not in the direct context of the termination and
even if uttered by one other than the formal decision maker,
provided that the individual is in a position to influence the
decision.” 342 F.3d at 578. But the instant case can be
distinguished from Palasota, where members of upper management
made the discriminatory comments, because there is no evidence
that Ardoin was in a position to influence the decision makers.
At the time the Executive Board decided to terminate Matthews,
Ardoin no longer had a management role and had not had one for
seven months. Matthews points to no evidence that Ardoin
influenced either Stewart’s recommendation to discharge Matthews
or the Regional Council’s ultimate decision to discharge
3
The alleged remarks made by Ardoin are:
1. On December 13, 2000, Matthews asked Ardoin if
Ardoin ever thought he would see a day a black man was working at
Local 1098. Ardoin replied no, he never thought he would see the
day.
2. In December 2001, Ardoin told Matthews that if
Matthews kept organizing black members, the black members would
outnumber the white members.
3. In February 2002, Matthews overheard Ardoin tell
someone on the telephone that Matthews had a “nigger” using
Ardoin’s telephone.
9
Matthews.4 Accordingly, Matthews has presented no evidence that
race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate him.
Because Matthews failed to present evidence that the Regional
Council’s non-discriminatory reason for terminating him was
pretext or that race was a motivating factor in the discharge
decision, Matthews cannot withstand summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
4
Discriminatory intent may be established by evidence that
employees outside Matthews’s protected class were treated more
favorably than him in similar situations. See Keelan v. Majesco
Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005). Matthews complains
that secretaries failed to give him phone messages, failed to
receive a set of keys, and that mail addressed to him was opened
by support staff, but there is no evidence that these incidents
were related to the decision to fire him. Similarly situated
white employees were affected in most cases.
10