Jorge Hernando Florez Angel v. U.S. Atty. Gen. , 201 F. App'x 688 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-10746 OCTOBER 18, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
BIA Nos. A96-276-368 & A97-925-675
JORGE HERNANDO FLOREZ ANGEL,
MARIBEL SANCHEZ PESCA,
PABLO FLOREZ SANCHEZ,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(October 18, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I.
Jorge Hernando Florez-Angel, on behalf of himself, his wife Maribel
Sanchez-Pesca and his minor son Pablo Florez-Sanchez (“Petitioners”), petitions
this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of
the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal and denial of asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
Florez-Angel, a native and citizen of Colombia, arrived in the United States
in May 2002 on a non-immigrant visa for pleasure. He was later joined by his wife
and minor son in May 2003, each of whom also entered the country on non-
immigrant visas for pleasure. After remaining beyond the expiration date of the
visas, the INS issued notices to appear, charging them with removability for having
remained in the United States longer than permitted. Immigration and Nationality
Act § 237(a)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Florez-Angel appeared at an initial
hearing and conceded his removability. He then applied for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the CAT. Sanchez-Pesca and Florez-Sanchez also
applied for relief, and the IJ joined the three applications.
Florez-Angel claimed in his asylum petition and in testimony before the IJ
that, while in Colombia, he was subjected to threats by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (“FARC”) because of his political opinion, his membership in
the People’s Movement, and his work on political campaigns. His wife, Sanchez-
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Pesca, through her own petition and through the testimony of Florez-Angel, also
claimed to have been subjected to threats from the FARC. After considering the
evidence, the IJ found that the petitioners had failed to introduce sufficient,
concrete, and direct evidence to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution in Colombia on account of a protected characteristic. The IJ
also made a finding that Florez-Angel had failed to provide consistent and credible
testimony in support of the applications. The IJ, therefore, denied the requests for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.
Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision. Although
the BIA disagreed with the IJ’s determination regarding Florez-Angel’s credibility,
the BIA found that petitioners failed to carry their burden with respect to their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.
Petitioners then initiated this petition for review.
II.
Where the BIA has both issued its own opinion and adopted the IJ’s opinion,
we review both. The BIA’s and IJ’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo.
Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). Factual
determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, and we must
affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
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257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001). The substantial evidence test is highly
deferential and, to reverse, we must find not only that the evidence supports a
contrary conclusion, but that it compels one. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481 n.1 (1992); Farquharson v. United States Att’y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1320
(11th Cir. 2001).
III.
To establish asylum eligibility based on political opinion or any other
protected grounds, the applicant must establish with credible evidence (1) past
persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear”
that the statutorily listed factor will cause such future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b); see also Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. After meeting this burden, the
Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum and this determination “shall be
conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
While the IJ made an adverse credibility determination with which the BIA
disagreed, this court need not address this issue because, even if Florez-Angel was
credible, we conclude that the petitioners did not establish their eligibility for
relief.
First, petitioners failed to establish the existence of past persecution. As this
court has explained, persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few
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isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation. Sepulveda v. United States
Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). After careful review of the
record as a whole, we find that the evidence does not compel a finding that Florez-
Angel, Sanchez-Pesca, or Florez-Sanchez suffered past persecution as a result of
their political opinion or any other statutorily listed factor.
Second, petitioners did not show a well-founded fear of future persecution.
If the applicant demonstrates past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption
that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1). If the applicant cannot demonstrate past persecution, however, he or
she must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Ruiz v. United States Att’y Gen.,
440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006). After careful review of the record as a
whole, we find that the evidence does not compel a finding that petitioners
demonstrated that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Finally, as petitioners have failed to satisfy the less stringent standard for
asylum, it follows that their claims for withholding of removal and relief under the
CAT also fail. Zheng v. United States Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir.
2006); Forgue v. United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir.
2005); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1293, 1303.
Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.
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