United States v. Demeulenaere , 205 F. App'x 685 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 9, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-8030
vs. (D.C. No. 05-CR-108-CAB)
(D . W yo.)
CRA IG A LAN DEM EULEN AERE,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Craig Demeulenaere appeals the sentence imposed by
the district court for his convictions for possessing with intent to distribute over
50 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B)
(count 1) and distributing less than 50 grams of methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (count 2). After a jury found him guilty on
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
these two counts, the district court sentenced M r. Demeulenaere to concurrent
terms of 68 months imprisonment followed by concurrent terms of three years
supervised release. M r. Demeulenaere was acquitted of a third count, possession
with intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal, he argues that the court
impermissibly enhanced his sentence based on acquitted conduct and uncharged
misconduct, thus violating his right to due process of law , to be free of double
jeopardy, and his right to trial by jury. He further argues that his sentence is
unreasonable because he was sentenced for acquitted conduct. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
Background
Using a confidential informant, agents from the W yoming Division of
Criminal Investigation set up a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from M r.
Demeulenaere. The transaction proceeded as intended and M r. Demeulenaere was
arrested. Agents then obtained a warrant to search M r. D emeulenaere’s home.
During the search, the agents found 111.83 grams of methamphetamine, 37 grams
of marijuana, and 129.79 grams of cocaine. They also located a revolver under
his mattress.
At sentencing, the district court imposed a two-level enhancement for
possession of a firearm. The court also considered the entire amount of
methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine found in M r. Demeulenaere’s home for
2
purposes of calculating his base offense level, despite the jury’s verdict that count
1 involved less than 50 grams of methamphetamine and its acquittal of M r.
Demeulenaere on count 3. Although the total offense level was tw enty-eight,
with a criminal history category of I, the district court nevertheless departed
downward two levels, ultimately sentencing M r. Demeulenaere based on a total
offense level of twenty-six. The court explained why the sentence was reasonable
and indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence even if the guideline
range w as determined to be improperly calculated. R. Doc. 7 at 32 (Sent. Tr.).
Discussion
M r. Demeulenaere’s argument that the district court could not consider
facts contrary to the jury verdict is foreclosed by United States v. M agallanez,
408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005). In M agallanez, we held that a sentencing
court has broad discretion to consider information regarding a defendant’s
conduct, even when the court’s view of the conduct conflicts with the jury’s
verdict. Id. at 684. Indeed, sentencing courts may consider conduct for which a
defendant has been acquitted. See United States v. W atts, 519 U.S. 148, 149
(1997). Our holding in M agallanez is but an application of the principle that
different standards of proof govern at trial and at sentencing. M agallanez, 408
F.3d at 684. “An acquittal by the jury proves only that the defendant was not
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, and
3
even after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), sentencing courts
determine relevant facts based on a preponderance standard. M agallanez, 408
F.3d at 685.
M r. Demeulenaere asks that we revisit M angallanez, but we may not
overrule it, even if we were inclined to do so (which we are not). See United
States v. M eyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that one panel may
not overrule another panel). Other circuits have reached the same conclusion as
we did in M agallanez, and we think the decision is soundly supported by the
overwhelming weight of relevant authority. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez,
453 F.3d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 527
(2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 788 (7th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2005).
W e also reject the argument that the district court could not consider
uncharged conduct, specifically possession of the firearm and of certain drug
quantities. See Aplt. Br. at 10-11. W e have repeatedly held that uncharged
conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence may be considered in
sentencing. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir.
2006).
In alleging that his sentence is unreasonable because it was based on
factual findings contrary to the jury verdict, M r. Demeulenaere merely retools his
argument. W e review the district court’s legal interpretation and application of
4
the sentencing guidelines de novo, but we review its factual findings for clear
error. U nited States v. Henry, 164 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999). W e
conclude that the district court made a thorough review of the facts and did not
comm it clear error given that it was obliged to apply a preponderance standard at
sentencing. W e have reviewed the district court’s reasoning and agree that the
sentence w as reasonable based on these facts.
As a final matter, we must address M r. Demeulenaere’s pending motion
seeking leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. M r. Demeulenaere is
represented by counsel and the briefs submitted are adequate to guide our
decision in this case. A ccordingly, M r. Demeulenaere’s motion is denied and w e
order his supplemental brief stricken from the record. See United States v.
Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 964 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004).
A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
5