United States v. Patrick James ( 2022 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 22-1222
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Patrick Derone James
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: September 23, 2022
    Filed: November 10, 2022
    ____________
    Before LOKEN, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
    Reserving the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress, Patrick Derone
    James conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm -- a
    loaded Glock 43 with an obliterated serial number found during a stop of a vehicle
    in which he was riding. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He appeals the
    judgment of conviction, arguing the district court1 wrongfully denied his motion to
    suppress the firearm and marijuana seized during the stop, his statements during the
    stop, and statements he made during the following custodial interview. Reviewing
    the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo,
    we conclude the stop was supported at least by reasonable suspicion, if not by
    probable cause, and therefore affirm. See United States v. Saddler, 
    19 F.4th 1035
    ,
    1037 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review).
    I. Background
    Cedar Rapids, Iowa Police Officer Michael Merritt testified at length at the
    suppression hearing. His testimony, consistent with his Incident Report prepared the
    day after the stop at issue, is reflected in the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact, to
    which there was no objection. It included the following: On March 9, 2020, Cedar
    Rapids Police Officer Emily Machula received a stolen vehicle report from Robin
    Cooper. Mr. Cooper reported that he rented a gray 2019 Dodge Grand Caravan from
    Enterprise rental car, that he lent it to a man known as “Pacman” who did not return
    it on March 2, when the rental agreement expired, and that Enterprise told him to
    report the vehicle as stolen. Officer Machula entered the vehicle as stolen in the
    National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) computer system, reporting an Iowa
    license plate number and the vehicle identification number (“VIN”).
    On March 21, Officer Michael Merritt reviewed the still-active report and
    recognized the name Pacman and his physical description as identifying Patrick
    Derone James. Officer Merritt drove to James’s last known address and saw a vehicle
    with Texas license plates in the driveway that matched the description of the stolen
    1
    The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the District of
    Northern District of Iowa, adopting as modified the Report and Recommendation of
    the Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    -2-
    vehicle. He “ran” the Texas plate and learned it was registered to a gray 2019 Dodge
    Grand Caravan with the same VIN as the stolen vehicle. Though the Iowa and Texas
    license plates were registered to the same vehicle, the stolen vehicle report only listed
    the Iowa plate number. After unsuccessfully attempting to call Enterprise, Officer
    Merritt noticed the vehicle had left the driveway. He quickly located the vehicle and
    initiated a stop based solely on the stolen vehicle report. Approaching the vehicle,
    Officer Merritt noted a strong odor of marijuana. A search of the vehicle then
    uncovered marijuana and a loaded Glock 43 with an obliterated serial number. James
    was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by
    a felon.
    James’s motion to suppress argued that the stop violated his Fourth
    Amendment rights because Officer Merritt did not have probable cause or reasonable
    suspicion to stop the vehicle and that any mistake of law in stopping the vehicle was
    objectively unreasonable. Magistrate Judge Roberts recommended that the motion
    be denied because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. District Judge
    Williams adopted the Report and Recommendation as to reasonable suspicion,
    modified the Report to find that the stop was supported by probable cause, and denied
    the motion to suppress.
    II. Discussion
    A police officer may initiate what is known as a Terry stop if he has
    “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. A person who is reasonably suspected
    of “operat[ing] a stolen truck” falls within the universe of persons who may be
    subjected to a brief Terry stop. See United States v. Davison, 
    808 F.3d 325
    , 329 (8th
    Cir. 2015). “Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of particularized,
    objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
    reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed.” United States v.
    Tamayo-Baez, 
    820 F.3d 308
    , 312 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Probable cause is
    -3-
    present when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
    be found in a particular place.” United States v. Shackleford, 
    830 F.3d 751
    , 753 (8th
    Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). The district court concluded that Officer Merritt had both
    reasonable suspicion and probable cause to support the stop.
    As Magistrate Judge Roberts found, at the time Officer Merritt initiated the
    stop, he knew that: (i) a 2019 gray Dodge Grand Caravan with Iowa license plates
    was listed on the NCIC stolen vehicles report after the vehicle’s owner instructed the
    renter, Robin Cooper, to report the vehicle stolen by “Pacman,” which Merritt knew
    was a commonly known alias of James, who had a prior criminal history; (ii) Merritt
    observed a gray Dodge Grand Caravan matching the description of the stolen vehicle
    in the driveway at James’s last known address; (iii) the Texas license plate attached
    to that vehicle was registered to the same VIN as the Iowa license plate on the stolen
    vehicle report; (iv) the vehicle left the driveway while Officer Merritt was running
    the license plate and attempting to contact Enterprise.
    We agree with the district court that these particularized, objective facts gave
    Officer Merritt reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver of the Dodge Grand
    Caravan, likely James, was operating a stolen vehicle in violation of Iowa criminal
    law. Therefore, Officer Merritt did not violate James’s Fourth Amendment rights
    when he stopped the vehicle. See United States v. Smart, 
    393 F.3d 767
    , 770-71 (8th
    Cir. 2005).
    James argues that “[t]he stop of the vehicle was improper because Officer
    Merritt made a mistake of law that the vehicle was stolen” under applicable Iowa law.
    Officer Merritt had no evidence “that Mr. James had any intent to deprive Mr. Cooper
    or Enterprise of the vehicle.” We disagree. There was no “mistake” here, like the
    officer’s misreading of stolen report “hot sheets” in United States v. Williams, 
    929 F.3d 539
    , 542 (8th Cir. 2019). The gray Dodge Grand Caravan Merritt observed was
    in fact the car on the NCIC stolen vehicle report. Investigation might determine that
    -4-
    the car was not in fact stolen, but it is well established that “[m]istakes of law or fact,
    if objectively reasonable, may still justify a valid stop.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    Reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop, like probable cause to arrest or search,
    “does not require officers to establish the elements of the offense with a level of
    certainty as though trial level proof must exist at the side of the road.” United States
    v. Brooks, 
    982 F.3d 1177
    , 1180 (8th Cir. 2020). Here, Officer Merritt testified that
    he knew the situation was unusual, unique in his experience, because dual license
    plates were registered to the same VIN and James was initially loaned the car by
    Cooper. So he initiated a stop, not a “felony stop,” to investigate the stolen vehicle
    issue. We agree with the district court that this decision was based on reasonable
    suspicion and was objectively reasonable.
    Because the vehicle stop was constitutional, we need not address James’s
    additional argument that his subsequent statements are fruit of a poisonous tree. The
    judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-1222

Filed Date: 11/10/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/10/2022