Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1953 )

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August 24, 1953
Hon. Robert L. Dalby Opinion No. S-87
County Attorney
Bowie County Re: Proper charge for mileage
Texarkana, Texas by sheriff for service of
process where part of such
Dear Mr. Dalby: mileage is covered by mail.
You have requested an opinion in regard to
the following question:
"Is the Sheriff of Bowie County en-
titled to charge mileage from the county
seat to the point where service of process
is made, even though a portion of said
distance may be covered by the use of mail,
or can he charge mileage only for the number
of miles actually and personall% travelled
in the service of such process?
You state that under a,uthorityof Article
1605a, Vernon's Civil Statutes, the Sheriff of Bowie
County maintains an office in Texarkana, a distance of
about 25 miles from the c0unt.yseat, which is located
at Boston, that most of the process issued by the clerk
at Boston is mailed to the sheriff at his Texarkana of-
fice, and when service of s.uchprocess is completed it
is returned by him to the clerk by mail.
Articles 1029, 1030, and 1065, Vernon's Code
of Criminal Procedure, provide for the fees that the
sheriff shall charge in the execution of criminal pro-
cess. It will be noted that these articles provide
mileage "for each mile actually and necessarily traveled,"
and mileage "for each mile the officer may be cornelled
to travel in executing criminal process, s . .-is
added
The ordinary signification must be applied to
words of general use. Article 10, V.C.S. If statutorj
words are unambiguous and clearly and distinctly express
Hon. Robert L. Dalby, page 2 (s-87)
the intent of the legislature, the statute must be given
effect according to its terns; Board of Insurance Com-
missioners v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 630 180
S.W.2d 906 (1944). The words hereinabove underlinid have
a clear and definite meaning-in general usage, so these
statutes must be applied and enforced as they read.
Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037 (1916).
Fee statutes are strictly construed and fees
are not permitted by implication. Binford v. Robinson,
112 Tex. 86, 244 S.W. 807 (1922); McCalla v. City of
Rockdale, 112 Tex. 209, 246 S.W. 654 (1922).
Article 3933, V.C.S., provides in part:
"Sheriffs and constables shall receive
the following fees:
'For traveling in the servioe of any
civil process, D . . shall receive . . 0
for each mile going and coming, e . . he
shall charge for the distance actually and
necessarily traveled in-the service of same."
Certainly it could not be said that an officer
is traveling in the service of process unless he actually
traverses the distance for which mileage is claimed.
What has been heretofore said in regard to mileage to be
charged in the execution of criminal process applies
with equal force to the execution of civil process.
Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Dawson, 69 Tex. 519, 7 S.W. 63
.
It is therefore our opinion, which is in accord
with your conclusion, that the sheriff would be entitled
to charge mileage only for the distance he actually and
necessarily travels in the execution of process. See
Bigham v. Jones, 116 Tex. 348, 291 S.W. 842 (1927)3 Burns
v. State, 123 614 61 S.W.2d 512 (1933); Lewis v.
Tex'C;6g, 64 S.W.2d 972 (1933).
State, 124 Tex,Cr.
. .!
Hon. Robert L. Dalby, page 3 (s-87)
SUMMARY
A sheriff is entitled to charge mileage
only for the disitance,heactually and neces-
sarily travels in the execution of civil and
criminal process. Where the papers are trans-
mitted by mail overa portion of the distance
between the place of issuance and the place
of service, the officer is not entitled to
mileage based on the distance covered by mall.
Yours very truly,
APPROVED: JOHNBER SREPPERD
Attorney General
J. C. Davis, Jr.
County Affair8 Division
C. K. Richards BY
Reviewer Eugen Brady
G;ap-,,
Assistant
Robert S. Trotti
First Assistant
EB:am