United States v. Reuben Stewart , 711 F. App'x 810 ( 2018 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-4548
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Reuben Stewart
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: December 11, 2017
    Filed: February 21, 2018
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Reuben Stewart appeals the district court’s1 determination that his Florida
    conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career
    1
    The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri.
    Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He argues that the mens rea element of
    Florida aggravated assault is not enough to qualify as “use” of physical force. We
    review the district court’s application of the ACCA de novo. United States v. Walker,
    
    840 F.3d 477
    , 489 (8th Cir. 2016).
    A previous conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA if it “has
    as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
    person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine whether Florida
    aggravated assault is a “violent felony” under the ACCA, we use “the formal
    categorical approach and look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
    definition of the prior offense.” United States v. Fogg, 
    836 F.3d 951
    , 954 (8th Cir.
    2016) (quoting United States v. Schaffer, 
    818 F.3d 796
    , 797 (8th Cir. 2016)).
    Florida law defines aggravated assault as “an assault (a) [w]ith a deadly
    weapon without an intent to kill; or (b) [w]ith an intent to commit a felony.” Fla. Stat.
    § 784.021(1).2 “An ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do
    violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing
    some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence
    is imminent.” Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1). The Florida courts have held that the state can
    satisfy the mens rea element of aggravated assault by proving that the defendant acted
    with “culpable negligence,” which means:
    [C]onduct of a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard
    of human life or the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects;
    or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of
    indifference to consequences; or such wantonness or recklessness or
    grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that
    reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an
    2
    Aggravated assault is a third-degree felony in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 784.021(2).
    -2-
    intentional violation of them. Momentary inattention or a mistake of
    judgment does not constitute culpable negligence.
    DuPree v. State, 
    310 So. 2d 396
    , 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (citations omitted).
    Stewart argues only that Florida aggravated assault cannot be a violent felony
    because it requires mere negligence. While “merely accidental or negligent conduct”
    might not be a violent felony, see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 
    543 U.S. 1
    , 11 (2004), reckless
    conduct can, in certain circumstances, be a “use” of physical force. United States v.
    Fields, 
    863 F.3d 1012
    , 1015 (8th Cir. 2017); see also 
    Fogg, 836 F.3d at 956
    . And
    although the Florida courts describe the mens rea element of aggravated assault as
    including “culpable negligence,” the definition of that phrase makes clear that they
    are really talking about recklessness. 
    DuPree, 310 So. 2d at 398
    (requiring “reckless
    disregard,” “indifference to consequences,” or “reckless indifference to the rights of
    others”).
    We affirm the judgment of the district court.3
    ______________________________
    3
    Because we reject Stewart’s argument using the categorical approach, we need
    not reach the district court’s alternative use of the modified categorical approach.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-4548

Citation Numbers: 711 F. App'x 810

Filed Date: 2/21/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023